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Abstract
Are international conflicts over fishery resources a growing security concern? High-profile incidences of conflict, 
diminishing fishery resources and climate impacts on marine systems have made the international community increasingly 
wary of fisheries conflict. However, we lack knowledge on conflict incidences over time, as well as the contexts in 
which the conflicts occur, to assess if fisheries conflict is a growing security threat. To fill that gap, this thesis aims to 
provide a more detailed understanding of the temporal and regional patterns of international fisheries conflict – more 
specifically its frequency, nature, regional occurrence over time, and its drivers. Gaining insight into these patterns can aid 
the development of conflict management strategies and implementation of policies to ensure future ocean security.
In Paper I, I present a review of the literature on fisheries conflict, aimed at assessing to what degree existing studies 
have incorporated ideas from complexity and social-ecological systems theory. Making use of an initial scan of 803 relevant 
papers, and the subsequent intensive review of 31 fisheries conflict studies, I identify areas within the literature that would 
benefit from further development. First, precise definitions of fisheries conflict are lacking. Second, there is a narrowness 
in the methods used to assess the drivers of fisheries conflict, as the literature is largely populated by single cases of conflict 
assessed in a qualitative manner. Third, nonlinear and dynamic feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and intervening variables 
are often not explicitly recognized. Fourth, there is room for a more widespread extension of higher order concepts and 
associated terminology to describe complex system interactions, such as ‘feedbacks’ or ‘adaptive capacity’.
In Paper II, I present findings on the characteristics of international fisheries conflict over time drawing on a global and 
longitudinal database I developed that logs international fisheries conflict between 1974 and 2016. The analysis shows that 
the frequency of fisheries conflict increased over this time period, with substantial variation in both the type of conflict and 
the countries involved. Before 2000, fisheries conflict involved mostly North American and European countries fighting 
over specific species. Since then, conflict has primarily involved Asian countries clashing over multiple species linked to 
illegal fishing practices. I also consider potential response strategies for the different conflict types uncovered.
In Paper III, I use a multi-model approach to test for the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis (diminishing supplies of 
resources increases conflict) and the demand-induced scarcity hypothesis (rising demand for resources increases conflict) 
on international fishery conflict data. Three alternative political and economic explanatory pathways are also tested. 
Overall, I find that no single indicator is able to fully explain international conflict over fishery resources. For the period 
1975 to 1996, I find a relationship between conflict over fishery resources and higher levels of GDP per capita. For the 
period 1997 to 2016, findings support the demand-induced scarcity hypothesis, with analyses also indicating that an increase 
in supply of fishery resources is linked to an increase in conflict occurrence.
Lastly, in Paper IV, I present four future fisheries conflict scenarios. The scenarios integrate longitudinal evidence on 
international fisheries conflict and expert data on fishery conflict trends and drivers. The scenarios take place in the years 
2030 to 2060 in the North-East Atlantic (“Scramble for the Atlantic”), the East China Sea (“The Remodeled Empire”), 
the coast of West Africa (“Oceanic Decolonization”), and the Arctic (“Polar Renaissance”). The aim is to illuminate how 
different decisions made today can lead to dramatically diverging future paths, and to inspire policy makers to work with 
exploratory scenario processes to build anticipatory capacity to support future ocean security.
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Are international conflicts over fishery resources a growing security concern? High-profile 
incidences of conflict, diminishing fishery resources and climate impacts on marine systems 
have made the international community increasingly wary of fisheries conflict. However, we 
lack knowledge on conflict incidences over time, as well as the contexts in which the 
conflicts occur, to assess if fisheries conflict is a growing security threat. To fill that gap, this 
thesis aims to provide a more detailed understanding of the temporal and regional patterns 
of international fisheries conflict – more specifically its frequency, nature, regional 
occurrence over time, and its drivers. Gaining insight into these patterns can aid the 
development of conflict management strategies and implementation of policies to ensure 
future ocean security. 
 
In Paper I, I present a review of the literature on fisheries conflict, aimed at assessing to 
what degree existing studies have incorporated ideas from complexity and social-ecological 
systems theory. Making use of an initial scan of 803 relevant papers, and the subsequent 
intensive review of 31 fisheries conflict studies, I identify areas within the literature that 
would benefit from further development. First, precise definitions of fisheries conflict are 
lacking. Second, there is a narrowness in the methods used to assess the drivers of fisheries 
conflict, as the literature is largely populated by single cases of conflict assessed in a 
qualitative manner. Third, nonlinear and dynamic feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and 
intervening variables are often not explicitly recognized. Fourth, there is room for a more 
widespread extension of higher order concepts and associated terminology to describe 
complex system interactions, such as ‘feedbacks’ or ‘adaptive capacity’. 
 
In Paper II, I present findings on the characteristics of international fisheries conflict over 
time drawing on a global and longitudinal database I developed that logs international 
fisheries conflict between 1974 and 2016. The analysis shows that the frequency of fisheries 
conflict increased over this time period, with substantial variation in both the type of conflict 
and the countries involved. Before 2000, fisheries conflict involved mostly North American 
and European countries fighting over specific species. Since then, conflict has primarily 
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involved Asian countries clashing over multiple species linked to illegal fishing practices. I 
also consider potential response strategies for the different conflict types uncovered. 
 
In Paper III, I use a multi-model approach to test for the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis 
(diminishing supplies of resources increases conflict) and the demand-induced scarcity 
hypothesis (rising demand for resources increases conflict) on international fishery conflict 
data. Three alternative political and economic explanatory pathways are also tested. Overall, 
I find that no single indicator is able to fully explain international conflict over fishery 
resources. For the period 1975 to 1996, I find a relationship between conflict over fishery 
resources and higher levels of GDP per capita. For the period 1997 to 2016, findings support 
the demand-induced scarcity hypothesis, with analyses also indicating that an increase in 
supply of fishery resources is linked to an increase in conflict occurrence. 
 
Lastly, in Paper IV, I present four future fisheries conflict scenarios. The scenarios integrate 
longitudinal evidence on international fisheries conflict and expert data on fishery conflict 
trends and drivers. The scenarios take place in the years 2030 to 2060 in the North-East 
Atlantic (“Scramble for the Atlantic”), the East China Sea (“The Remodeled Empire”), the 
coast of West Africa (“Oceanic Decolonization”), and the Arctic (“Polar Renaissance”). The 
aim is to illuminate how different decisions made today can lead to dramatically diverging 
future paths, and to inspire policy makers to work with exploratory scenario processes to 
build anticipatory capacity to support future ocean security. 
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Är internationella konflikter över fiskeriresurser en växande säkerhetsutmaning? 
Högprofilerade konflikthändelser, minskande fiskeriresurser och klimatpåverkan på marina 
system har ökat det internationella samfundets oro för fiskerikonflikter. Trots det, saknar vi 
kunskap om konflikthändelser över tid, samt sammanhangen där konflikterna skett, vilket 
gör att vi inte kan avgöra ifall fiskerikonflikter är ett ökande säkerhetshot. För att fylla denna 
kunskapslucka, ämnar denna avhandling öka vår förståelse för tidsmässiga och regionala 
mönster för internationella fiskerikonflikter. Särskilt kommer fokus ligga på 
konflikthändelsers frekvens, karaktär, regionala förekomst över tid, samt bakomliggande 
drivkrafter. Nya insikter om dessa mönster kan bidra till utvecklingen av strategier för 
konflikthantering och implementering av politik som kan säkerställa framtida säkerhet på 
världshaven. 
 
I Artikel I presenterar jag en genomgång av den vetenskapliga litteraturen om 
fiskerikonflikter. Målet med genomgången är att bedöma i vilken mån de existerande 
forskningsstudierna tar hänsyn till teoribildning kring komplexitet och social-ekologiska 
system. En inledande sökning resulterade i 803 relevanta artiklar. Utav dem valdes 31 
studier om fiskerikonflikter ut för djupgranskning. Baserat på dessa studier identifierar jag 
följande områden i forskningslitteraturen som i behov av vidare precisering och forskning: 
(1) Exakta definitioner av fiskerikonflikter saknas; (2) Variationen av metoder som används 
för att bedöma drivkrafter bakom fiskerikonflikter är låg, då forskningslitteraturen till stor 
del består av kvalitativt bedömda fallstudier; (3) Icke-linjära och dynamiska 
återkopplingsmekanismer, flera orsaker, effekter och intervenerande variabler erkänns 
sällan explicit; och (4) Det finns utrymme för en bredare användning av teoretiska begrepp 
och tillhörande terminologi för att beskriva komplexa systeminteraktioner, så som 
’återkoppling’ eller ’adaptiv förmåga’.  
 
I Artikel II redogör jag för typiska karaktärsdrag hos internationella fiskerikonflikter över tid. 
Analysen baseras på en global, longitudinell databas där jag registrerat internationella 
fiskerikonflikter mellan 1974 och 2016. Analysen visar att frekvensen av fiskerikonflikter 
ökade under denna tidsperiod, med stora variationer i både typ av konflikt och vilka länder 
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som var inblandade. Före 2000 omfattade fiskerikonflikter oftast nordamerikanska eller 
europeiska länder i konflikter över enstaka arter. Sedan dess har konflikter främst inbegripit 
asiatiska länder i sammandrabbningar över flera arter men kopplade till illegala 
fiskemetoder. Jag reflekterar även över potentiella strategier för att hantera de olika 
konflikttyper som identifierats. 
 
I Artikel III använder jag en multi-modellmetod på data om internationella fiskerikonflikter 
för att pröva hypotesen om utbudsframkallad brist (att sinande tillgångar av resurser ökar 
mängden konflikter) och hypotesen om efterfrågansframkallad brist (att ökande efterfrågan 
av resurser ökar mängden konflikter). Även tre alternativa politiska och ekonomiska 
förklarande utvecklingsvägar prövas. Överlag finner jag inte någon enstaka indikator som 
ensam kan förklara förekomsten av internationella konflikter över fiskeriresurser. För 
perioden 1975 till 1966 finns det ett samband mellan fiskerikonflikter och högre nivåer av 
BNP per capita. Mellan 1997 och 2016 stöds hypotesen om efterfrågansframkallad brist, 
samtidigt som analyser även antyder att ökande tillgångar av fiskeriresurser är kopplat till en 
ökad mängd konflikter. 
 
Till sist, i Artikel IV, presenterar jag fyra scenarier för framtida fiskerikonflikter. Scenarierna 
integrerar longitudinella data om internationella fiskerikonflikter med expertbedömningar 
om trender och drivkrafter. Scenarierna utspelar sig under åren 2030 till 2060 i nordöstra 
Atlanten (”Kapplöpningen om Atlanten”), Östkinesiska havet (”Det omdanade imperiet”), 
den västafrikanska kusten (”Havens avkolonisering”) och Arktis (”Polarrännessans”). Målet 
är att belysa hur beslut som tas idag kan leda till dramatiskt olika utvecklingsvägar i 
framtiden. Därigenom kan politiker och andra beslutsfattare inspireras att arbeta med 
utforskande scenarioprocesser för att öka sin förmåga att förutse potentiella framtider och 
därigenom stödja framtida säkerhet på världshaven. 
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Scope and aim 
International conflict over fishery resources is considered to be a growing security 
concern. Ongoing, high-profile interstate fishery disputes are sparking concerns of 
future global fish wars (note: for the remainder of this thesis, terms such as fishery 
conflicts refer to marine fishery conflicts, excluding conflicts over fresh water 
species). One of those ongoing interstate disputes is the so-called ‘mackerel war’ 
between Norway, the European Union (EU), Iceland and the Faroe Islands, which 
erupted in 2007 when the northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) stock 
shifted its distribution towards the north-west of the Nordic Seas and their 
surrounding waters. The conflict has had disruptive social and ecological 
consequences: it resulted in the overfishing of the mackerel stock, undermined the 
coastal states’ management plans, and even contributed to Iceland withdrawing its 
application to become an EU member state (Spijkers & Boonstra 2017). Another 
prominent example is that of the South China Sea, where fishers often find 
themselves on the frontlines of international disputes over fishery resources as 
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei fail to resolve 
competing claims over parts of the area (Dupont & Baker 2014). Although these 
fisheries conflicts are linked to a larger territorial struggle in the region (with China 
increasingly militarizing what it has determined to be its maritime sphere of 
influence), the rich fishing grounds are an important, strategic commodity for 
surrounding states given that fisheries play a vital role in ensuring food security in the 
region (Dupont & Baker 2014). Some scholars even claim fish is an ‘overlooked 
destabilizer’ in the region, and that China’s militarization efforts are a power move 
intended to dominate marine harvest (Baker et al. 2016, Thomspon 2019) 
 
Moreover, environmental conditions that might trigger or exacerbate fisheries 
conflict are likely to become more widespread in the future, further heightening 
worries about impending security challenges for ocean governance. First, changing 
ocean conditions are causing shifts in fisheries resources' distribution patterns, 
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affecting potential yields of and revenues generated from exploited marine species 
(Lam et al. 2016, Sumaila et al. 2011). This redistribution of resources is expected to 
result in more fishery disputes, as current fisheries management is predicated on the 
assumption that the geographical distribution of fish populations is largely static 
(Pinsky et al. 2018, Cheung et al. 2010). However, climate change will lead to a 
redistribution of resources and a loss of revenue for the global fishing industry (Lam 
et al. 2016, Sumaila et al. 2011). Such shifts in resources might become a particular 
menace for countries with a high dependence on fish protein for nutritional security 
with countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati likely to experience the largest decreases in 
their maximum catch potential due to climate change (Blasiak et al. 2017, Lam et al. 
2016). Depending on how the impacts of anthropogenic climate change play out in 
the global ocean, 23-35% of global Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are projected to 
receive new transboundary fish stocks by the end of the century (Pinsky et al. 2018). 
In some EEZs in the already troubled maritime region of East Asia, 10 new stocks are 
projected to enter as a consequence of climatic changes (Pinsky et al. 2018). In 
summary, the changes fishery systems will undergo due to climate change are likely 
to cause disruption to fisheries management globally, and are feared to spark 
conflict. 
 
Second, the global decline in catches, largely as a consequence of overfishing, is also 
considered to be an accelerating driver of conflict. The abundance of available fishery 
resources has decreased substantially: 33.1% of fish stocks were fished at biologically 
unsustainable levels in 2015 (in 1974, this was 10%), and 59.9% fished at their 
maximally sustainable level (FAO 2018). While effort has increased since the 1950s, 
catches have stagnated and then slowly declined since the late 1980s (Pauly & Zeller 
2017, Pauly & Zeller 2016, Watson et al. 2013). Simultaneously, consumption of and 
demand for fish is steadily increasing, and the average annual increase in global fish 
consumption (3.2%) outpaced population growth (1.6%) between 1961 and 2016 (the 
average annual increase in meat consumption, for example was 2.8% during that 
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same period (FAO 2018)). In combination with disputed maritime boundaries, this 
increased competition may contribute to volatile situations.  
 
International fisheries conflicts are considered a threat to maritime security as they 
can have far-reaching impacts on marine safety, resource sustainability, geopolitical 
relations and food security. For example, geopolitical stability and marine safety 
(safety of seafarers and passengers (Bueger 2015)) were compromised during the 
infamous Cod Wars that occurred between Great Britain and Iceland during the 
1950s and 1970s. The two countries were embroiled in a string of confrontations 
over fishing rights in the North Atlantic, where Iceland wanted to extend its fishing 
limit, but Great Britain did not recognize their right to do so. The consequences for 
geopolitical stability and, at certain stages, marine safety (Bueger 2015) were severe: 
flash points of the conflict included the use of military vessels to patrol the area and 
defend fishing boats, patrol boats cutting the nets of trawlers, ships ramming 
trawlers and frigates, and, ultimately, Iceland threatening to leave NATO (Bakaki 
2017). An example of compromised resource sustainability due to an international 
fisheries conflict is the previously discussed northeast Atlantic mackerel dispute. As a 
result of the conflict, there are no comprehensive management plans for the stock, 
and the mackerel has become severely overfished. With countries setting unilateral 
quotas, their combined catch in 2018 was twice that recommended by the 
International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and the fisheries had their 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certifications retracted (Ramsden 2019, Seamon 
2018). Lastly, food security has also been jeopardized due to international fisheries 
conflict, as exemplified by the incidents taking place in the South China Sea. 
Fishermen from contending countries that operate in the troubled waters, and whose 
livelihoods depend on the rich fishing grounds, have at times decided to leave their 
occupation all together, afraid of going out into the waters without any protection 
(Patience 2013). Moreover, failure to address rising tensions could lead to greater 
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regional instability and severe environmental degradation, further compromising 
regional food security (Zhang 2016, deLisle 2012). 
 
Due to the pervasive impacts human activities and climate change have on fish 
stocks, policy makers around the world are considering conflicts over fish to be an 
increasing challenge. The maritime security strategies outlined by the EU and France, 
for example, reflect the nations’ increased concern over the altered biophysics and 
economics of our world’s fisheries and how these changes might spark or exacerbate 
fishery resource conflicts (Silveira 2019, Council of the European Union 2014, 
République Française 2015). The EU has designed a maritime security strategy as a 
comprehensive framework to ensure a stable and secure global maritime domain, 
and pinpoints interstate conflict as a threat to the EU’s maritime interests (Silveira 
2019). These concerns have also started to find voice in the media: The Independent 
warned of ‘global fish wars’ as a consequence of increased competition (Johnston 
2017), National Geographic reported on the threat of climate change in sparking fish 
wars (Welch 2018), and the Washington Post alerted its readers that - “the fishing 
wars are coming” (Stavridis & Bergenas 2017). However, despite the apparent 
certainty with which many media pieces warn of the impeding advent of future fish 
conflicts, there remain many unknowns about the patterns, occurrences and drivers 
of fisheries conflict. For scholars to make better assessments concerning the 
potential gravity of the threat fisheries conflicts represent to society, and for 
policymakers to be able to prevent or de-escalate emerging conflicts, a more detailed 
understanding of the complex nature of fisheries conflict and its causes are needed.  
 
I start by giving an overview of the theoretical background that informs my thesis, 
which hinges on three different literatures: complex adaptive systems (CAS), 
environmental security, and maritime security. First, the CAS framework, itself 
embedded in social-ecological systems (SES) thinking, allows me to understand the 
complexity and dynamics of marine SES and how conflict is embedded within that 
system (section 1). CAS thinking informs how I conceptualize fisheries conflict 
 6 
throughout the thesis. Second, the literature on environmental security embeds the 
issue of fisheries conflicts in the larger context of natural resource conflicts, such as 
those over fresh water, oil or minerals. The literature on water conflicts in particular 
offers important findings on the link between natural resources and conflict, which 
informs my understanding of, and approaches to, analyzing the drivers of fisheries 
conflict (section 2). The environmental security literature is, in addition to a reference 
literature that shapes my research questions and analytical approaches, a body of 
work I aim to contribute to. Last, the concept of maritime security helps me to zoom 
in on the security threats that exist in the maritime domain in particular, and how 
fisheries conflict relates to those others threats (section 3). This thesis not only uses 
the concept of maritime security to set the context for fisheries conflict, but it also 
aims to contribute to our understanding of the linkages between conflict and other 
security threats over time. For a conceptual view of how the three literatures are 
used to inform this thesis, see Figure 1. Definitions and clarifications of key terms 
related to the theoretical background are listed in Table 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical background components on which the thesis hinges 
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Table 1: Definitions and clarifications of key terms 




Many different conceptions exist as the literature is 
multidisciplinary and conceptually eclectic (Watts in Floyd 
& Matthew 2013). In this thesis, it is defined as “protection 
from environmental dangers, the lack/depletion of 
strategic resources and conflict over these resources” (Koff 
2016, pp. 665). 
 
Maritime security  Commonly defined by the absence of the following threats 
- maritime interstate disputes; maritime terrorism; piracy; 
trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods; arms 
proliferation; illegal fishing; environmental crimes; or 
maritime accidents and disasters (Bueger 2015, UN 2008). 
Sometimes also defined as a “stable” or “good” order at 
sea (Vrey 2013). 
 
National security Traditional conceptualization of ‘security’, where threats 
are viewed through the prism of state survival (e.g. 
territorial conflicts, threats to infrastructure or violent 
interstate conflicts) (Hameiri & Jones 2013). 
 
Human security Often described as a concept that transcends the 
traditional view of national security, as it focuses on the 
security of the individuals, their protection and 




Following Preiser et al. (2018), CAS are systems exhibiting 
the following six features: they are constituted relationally, 
adaptive capacities, dynamic processes, radically open, 
contextually determined and novel qualities emerge 




Interdependent human and ecological systems. SES are 




Area 200 nautical miles off the coast over which a coastal 
state has sovereign rights over the exploitation, 
conservation and management of natural resources (living 
and nonliving), the seabed and its subsoil, as well as 







An intergovernmental organization dedicated to the 
sustainable management of fishery resources. RFMOs 
range widely in terms of institutional procedures and 
regulatory measures, though many of them have 
management powers regarding fisheries such as setting 
catch limits. RFMOs are comprised of member nations that 
share practical and financial interests in a particular region 
of international waters or of highly migratory species 
(Ásmundsson 2016). 
 
Distant Water Fishing 
(DWF) 
Many countries have DWF fleets, which fish great distances 
from their home waters (Watson et al. 2017). While some 
DWF fleets fish the high seas (for example for tuna), others 
fish in the richer inshore areas of foreign countries (Watson 
et al. 2017). DWF fleets are often highly subsidized 




























1. Complex Adaptive Systems thinking 
The overarching lens that informs how I conceptualize fisheries conflict within the 
marine environment is complex adaptive systems (CAS) thinking (Preiser et al. 2018, 
Levin et al. 2012, Scheffer et al. 2012, May et al. 2008, Hartvigsen et al. 1998). CAS 
thinking describes the characteristics of a system as emerging from the interactions 
and patterns within that system, and explicitly addresses nonlinear feedbacks, 
multiple causes, effects and intervening variables (Preiser et al. 2018, Lubchenco et 
al. 2016, Levin et al. 2012, Cumming et al. 2013). CAS draws attention to how 
behaviors of individual processes at the local scale influence emergent properties at 
the regional or global scale, and how they in turn can impact behaviors of the 
contextual, local processes at smaller scales (Preiser et al. 2018, Levin et al. 2012). 
The constant mutual adaptations that take place between its components make for a 
constantly evolving system (Levin et al. 2012). Managing such systems requires more 
creativity and experimentation, as uncertainty and unpredictability is inevitable 
(Hendrick 2009). This line of thinking has been implemented for decades by 
ecologists who started applying it to understand social-ecological systems (SES) - 
coupled human-natural systems, and how to manage them (Hartvigsen et al. 1998).  
 
Marine SES are CAS, as they exhibit complex and interdependent interactions 
between the social and ecological subsystems through activities such as fishing 
pressure, tourism, gear use or market dynamics (Lindkvist et al. 2017, Österblom et 
al. 2013, Mahon et al. 2008). Marine CAS, and the fisheries systems within them, are 
neither predictable nor controllable but are open systems that respond to internal 
and external stimuli (Mahon et al. 2008). Human activities have increasingly become 
embedded parts of marine CAS as a growing range of actors, operating at various 
scales and in different sectors, interact with marine ecosystems (Österblom et al. 
2016). By viewing marine SES as CAS, I can conceptualize international fisheries 
conflict as a feature of marine CAS that exhibit ‘systemic instability’, this is “a state in 
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which things will inevitably get out of control sooner or later” (Helbing 2013, pp. 51). 
Here, instability (a state of the system over which one fails to have control, such as 
financial crises, epidemics or breakdowns in cooperation) is the result of amplifying 
(positive) feedback effects that intensify changes in processes that destabilize the 
system (Helbing 2013, Nyström et al. 2012). Increasingly interconnected systems 
offer a greater number of perturbation sources, potentially rendering the system 
more unstable and prone to emergent conflict outcomes (Hendrick 2009). Conflict 
has also been described as an emergent property by Lederach (2003), who 
understands system properties as the context of relationships out of which conflict 
episodes emerge. To understand why conflict emerges, discovering the underlying, 
longer-term patterns of change in the system (such as dramatic shifts in conflict 
intensity) is important (Hendrick 2009, Lederach 2003) (Paper II, Paper III).  
 
In particular, using the CAS lens in the thesis to understand conflict helps avoid the 
oversimplification of fisheries conflict in terms of its nature, its drivers and its effects. 
First, it allows for an explicit recognition of the different forms fisheries conflict can 
take (e.g. the different observable behaviors or actions that constitute conflict), but 
also that the nature of fisheries conflict and its drivers is likely not static throughout 
time (Paper II, Paper III). This follows from the fact that the behavior of marine CAS 
has a temporal dimension (Österblom et al. 2013, Liu 2007), which means the nature 
of the properties emerging from marine CAS, such as fisheries conflict, will too. For 
that reason, a longitudinal, database approach to uncover the nature of fisheries 
conflict can be helpful to understand the phenomenon.  
 
Second, in terms of drivers of conflict, CAS allows me to go beyond a single-causation 
explanation for conflict in the thesis, and rather recognize multiple possible causal 
pathways and to forego the often reductionist nature of linear thinking (Preiser et al. 
2018, Levin et al. 2012). I view conflict as an emergent property of a marine CAS due 
to many different interactive processes between, for example, high demand for 
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fishery resources and increased pressure on the marine ecosystem; and I incorporate 
the idea of non-linear relationships between independent variables and conflict 
(Paper III). Through the use of CAS, fisheries conflict can then be understood as the 
result of nonlinear feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and intervening variables; as 
well as the internal randomness of the system or stochasticity (Paper I, Paper III).  
 
Third, depicting conflict as an emergent feature of unstable CAS means conflict can 
not only be an outcome, it can also be a cause on its own and feed back into the 
system by affecting regional political processes or sustainability (Paper IV) (see for 
example Daskin & Pringle (2018) on the negative effects of conflict on wildlife 
populations). The concept of ‘systemic risk’ illustrates how risk in one domain, such 
as food supply, can increase risk in another domain, such as geopolitics, through 
complex feedbacks and interactions in interdependent systems (Galaz et al. 2017, 
Frank et al. 2014, Helbing 2013). International conflicts over fish can become 
systemic risks and create cascading ruptures in humanity’s highly interconnected 
social systems. In the northeast Atlantic mackerel conflict, for example, the 
international disagreement affected the accession process of Iceland to the EU, as 
well as fishery sustainability and mackerel prices (Seamon 2018, Spijkers & Boonstra 
2017).  
 
2. Environmental security 
The environmental security literature provides an important underlying theoretical 
background for my papers, as it allows me to draw inspiration from previous work on 
resource-conflict connections. It informs the methodological approaches I use to 
analyze fisheries conflict over time (Paper II), and it is used as a reference point to 
analyze what could be driving fisheries conflict (Paper III). Here I give a brief overview 




Conflicts over natural resources have been an inextricable part of human history. Civil 
wars linked to the diamond industry in West Africa, oil-related conflicts in the Niger 
delta; interstate fresh water conflict between Israel and Palestine; or between Egypt 
and Ethiopia relating to the Nile Basin; and local forest conflicts in Indonesia are just a 
few recent illustrations of the social strife the presence, absence or distribution of 
natural resources has caused or fueled (Le Billon 2014, Peluso & Watts 2001). 
Growing worries about humankind’s impact on the planet and its resources placed 
the issue of resource-related conflict at the forefront of the international policy 
agenda in the 1970s, where such emerging concern led to the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 (contemporaneous important 
literature include amongst others Garrett Hardin’s ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ 
(1968) and Meadows et al. ‘The Limits to Growth (1972)) (Floyd & Matthew 2013). 
Environmental security, defined as “protection from environmental dangers, the 
lack/depletion of strategic resources and conflict over these resources” (Koff 2016, 
pp. 665; see also Graeger (1996) for an early exploration of the concept), has, 
according to Koff (2016), subsequently emerged as a global, rights-based norm. 
Environmental security threats are best described as a form of ‘soft security threat’ 
that stands separate from more traditional security threats, as they spill across 
national borders and conventional single-state action often does not suffice when 
attempting to address them (Koff 2016, Hameiri & Jones 2013, Graeger 1996). The 
emergence of environmental security as a concept is important to this thesis as it 
recognizes the role of environmental resources in transnational conflicts (Koff 2016, 
Floyd & Matthew 2013). 
 
The Brundtland report, produced in 1987, set much of the agenda for research on the 
links between natural resources and security (Dabelko 2008), now labelled the 
‘environmental security literature’. Both renewable and non-renewable resources, 
such as oil, diamonds, minerals or water, have been identified as having a possible 
role in driving conflicts, with the literature possibly most developed with respect to 
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freshwater resources such as river basins - in which surface freshwater is shared 
between two or more states (Bernauer & Böhmelt 2020, Bernauer & Böhmelt 2014, 
Devlin & Hendrix 2014, Brochmann 2012, De Stefano et al. 2010, Yoffe et al. 2003, 
Wolf et al. 2003). In the early years of the literature’s development, the main focus 
was on the concept of ‘eco-scarcity’, holding that a shortage of resources is the 
sole/main driving factor of (violent) conflict (Theisen 2008). This thinking has its roots 
in neo-Malthusian thought, the idea that environmental degradation of natural 
resources sparks conflict as population growth and consumption approach natural 
limits (Fischer et al. 2018, Devlin & Hendrix 2014).  
 
After nearly three decades of scholarly interest in links between the environment and 
security, the field has not evolved to become a homogenous literature, but rather 
includes many different analytical and theoretical approaches (Floyd & Matthew 
2013). It is beyond the scope of this kappa to provide a full overview of this broad 
literature (see for example Floyd & Matthew 2013), with the aim rather to focus on 
giving a very succinct summary of the scholarship on natural resources and conflict 
within the environmental security literature. The early literature, which proposed a 
direct, linear causal relation between natural resources and conflict, attracted much 
critique. Political ecology scholars claimed it failed to account for the complexities 
and dynamics of processes of social-ecological change (Fischer et al. 2018, Spijkers & 
Boonstra 2017, Peluso & Watts 2001, Gleditsch 1998), and that changes in natural 
resources alone seldom lead to conflict. Rather, there are strong interactions with 
other political, economic, and social factors. The environmental security scholarship 
started identifying the many variables that mediate the pathway from natural 
resources to conflict, with development, state strength, poverty, migration or 
dysfunctional institutions drawing substantial attention (Ide 2015, Theisen 2008, 
Barnett & Adger 2007, Humphreys 2005). Moreover, not only scarcity but also the 
abundance of resources has been linked to outbreaks of conflict, sometimes linked to 
the argument of the ‘resource curse’ where resource abundance can lead to local 
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corruption and conflict (Floyd & Matthew 2013, Collier & Hoeffler 2005). Although 
the debate has generally become more nuanced, still much of the academic work, 
particularly on fisheries conflict, emphasizes how environmental change, and in 
particular competition over increasingly scarce resources, will directly trigger conflict 
in the future (Mendenhall et al. 2020, Cook 2020, Glaser et al. 2018, Pomeroy et al. 
2007). 
 
In later years, much of the scholarship evolved to take on an explicit climate-security 
framing (Dalby 2009). The focus on the security impacts of climate change was 
reflected in global security debates, as exemplified by Conference of Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21), which heavily 
focused on this issue (Koff 2016). Within the environmental security literature, 
several papers used correlations attempting to establish a causal relationship 
between climate change and conflict, at different scales (see overview paper by 
Salehyan 2014). Some scholars have made the case for a direct link, with warmer 
temperatures thought to increase the risk of many types of conflict (Hsiang 2013), 
though such work has been critiqued as suffering from bad sample selection and poor 
analytical coherence (Buhaug et al. 2014, Nordås & Gleditsch 2007). While research 
on climate and conflict has produced mixed and inconclusive results, and the causal 
link between climate change and conflict remains a point of discussion, most experts 
agree that climate change’s role in triggering (violent) conflict cannot be generalized: 
when, and how, climate influences conflict is highly dependent on social, economic 
and political contexts (Adams et al. 2018, Abrahams & Carr 2017, Buhaug et al. 2014, 
Scheffran et al. 2012, Barnett & Adger 2007).  
 
I use the theoretical and empirical developments made within the environmental 
security domain not only to as a reference literature to inform how I analyze fisheries 
conflict (for example, I consult the literature to gather which variables have been 
commonly analyzed for their potential causal relationship with resource conflict), but 
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also with a view to contribute to the literature itself. As summarized above, although 
the existing body of work showcases a great deal of progress in how we view the links 
between natural resources and conflict, the debate about the role of resource 
scarcity in particular has not been settled and remains a topic of discussion. 
Moreover, fisheries conflict has not been researched as extensively nor with the 
same analytical rigor as other resource conflicts have (see aforementioned fresh 
water studies, or Rustad et al. 2008 for forest resources; further arguments provided 
in Paper I). For that reason, analyzing if some of the drivers commonly linked to 
conflict over other resources also play a significant role in predicting fisheries conflict 
(Paper III) could offer valuable insights for that literature as a whole. 
 
3. Maritime security 
Fisheries conflict is considered a threat to maritime security. Though it still lacks a 
widely agreed upon definition, maritime security has become a much-used term in 
both the realm of international politics and within the research community. As 
reported by Bueger (2015), a leading scholar in mapping out the meaning and usage 
of maritime security, the concept is mostly applied as an umbrella term that includes 
the following range of activities (many of them illegal) occurring at sea: “(…) maritime 
inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and 
illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime 
accidents and disasters” (Bueger 2015, pp. 159). The rising academic and policy 
awareness surrounding maritime security threats is largely a consequence of oceanic 
changes attributable to anthropogenic impacts as well as our increased usage of and 
demand for maritime space and resources (Jouffray et al. 2020) (see for example 
Germond & Mazaris 2019, Song et al. 2019, Aleskerov & Shvydun 2018, Belhabib et 
al. 2018, Zervaki 2018, Pinsky et al. 2018, Pomeroy et al. 2016, Warner & Schofield 
2012; see also Stephenson Ocean Security Project launched in 2018). There are 
different aspects of maritime security that scholars focus on: those threats relating to 
living and non-living oceanic resources (fish, oil or minerals for example); the 
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activities that take place within the maritime space (such as transport, tourism or 
seabed mining); or the threats produced by a weakened ‘protective function’, which 
the ocean fulfills in the earth’s climate system. Many of these recent works focus on 
oceanic change and climate change as the possible ultimate culprits of insecurity in 
the maritime space.  
 
Although slow in their uptake of the concept, maritime threats are also starting to be 
acknowledged in official national and regional strategic documents (Germond & 
Mazaris 2019). In particular ‘sea-locked nations’, such as the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) in the Pacific, have highlighted illegal fishing as a maritime threat due to 
the problems it poses for the development potential of their maritime domain 
(Malcolm 2017). Larger developed nations such as the USA have also started to 
recognize the maritime security implications of climate change and its effects on the 
ocean, and have commenced planning military policies, investments and actions 
(Ayyub & Kearney 2012) according to the recognition of climate change as an explicit 
security concern. In 2009, the US Navy established Task Force Climate Change, 
assigned with assessing climate change implications for strategy, policy and plans 
(Warner & Schofield 2012). While the US Navy puts heavy emphasis on an increased 
presence in the Arctic, for example, due to the region’s rapidly changing 
environment, other threats such as “changing fish stocks in Asia” and “more intense 
hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean” are also on their radar (Ayyub & Kearney 2012, pp. 
41).  
 
This thesis focuses on the first maritime threat highlighted by Bueger: maritime 
interstate disputes. Particularly, this thesis explores interstate disputes that center 
around the ownership or management of marine fishery resources. Those conflicts 
are considered threats because they challenge both more classic forms of national 
security (this is, sovereignty over delineated territory) through, for example, 
emerging sovereignty claims, disputes or military activities between states as 
 17 
consequences of maritime inter-state disputes. Additionally, fisheries conflicts can 
jeopardize many aspects of human security such as food, economic and personal 
security through, for example, a decline in access to food or revenue (Germond & 
Mazaris 2019, Krampe & Mobjörk 2018). I apply a specific definition of international 
fisheries conflict in this thesis. An international fishery conflict is a dispute: 
(a) actualized through ‘conflict events’, which are actions or behaviors ranging 
from an exchange of statements to severe military involvement and casualties 
(as defined by the ‘intensity of observed behavior’ scale, see Table 2). 
(b) occurring between two or more states and/or vessels that fly their flag; 
(c) related to the access to a fishery resource or management of a fishery 
resource; 
(d) potentially occurring in the larger context of a maritime territorial conflict, 
where the fishery resource contributes to some degree to that territorial 
conflict; 
(e) spanning over any length of time. 
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Table 2: Intensity of observed behavior/action. Source: Spijkers et al. 2018 (Paper I). 
 
 
International fisheries conflict can co-occur or be triggered by other maritime 
security threats. First, fisheries conflict often co-occurs with ongoing interstate 
territorial disputes. The Scarborough Shoal, for example, is claimed by China as a 
traditionally Chinese fishing ground, and touted to be an important part of China’s 
territorial integrity. Simultaneously, the Philippines claims the area, yet Filipino 
fishers are often prevented from fishing in the area, with reports indicating 
harassment by Chinese coastguard vessels (for example by ramming vessels or using 
water cannons) (Beech 2020, Fabinyi 2020, Bloomberg 2018, Zhang 2016). The 
Philippines filed a case against China through the UN in 2013, but despite the Court’s 
ruling in favor of the Philippines in 2016, China never recognized the process nor the 
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outcome (Fabinyi 2020). Second, international fisheries conflict can be triggered by 
(repeated) instances of illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) fishing. In Somalia, 
for example, illegal fishing by foreign vessels has been causing violent outbreaks of 
conflict with the domestic fishing sector for decades (Glaser et al. 2019). In the Yellow 
Sea, repeated illegal incursions by Chinese fishing vessels into the South Korean EEZ 
has led to numerous instances of conflict (Zhang 2016, Carolin 2015). South Korean 
coast guard officers as well as Chinese fishermen have lost their lives in several 
confrontations, and at-sea incidents have led to diplomatic tensions between China 
and South Korea (Zhang 2016, Kim 2012). There also exists a direct connection 
between territorial disputes and IUU, as pending sovereignty disputes and maritime 
delimitation conflicts lead to difficulty in defining IUU fishing (Li & Amer 2015)).  
 
It should be noted that within the recent literature on maritime security, one finds 
several connections amongst the other security threats outlined previously (Bueger 
2015). For example, in Somalia, research shows that conflicts over space and fish 
stocks (which can be a consequence of reduced fishing opportunity) can trigger 
instances of piracy (Belhabib et al. 2018). Fish stock collapse, which can be driven by 
high levels of illegal fishing, in Senegal has spurred the trafficking of people, illegally 
crossing over borders into Europe to flee economic hardship (Belhabib et al. 2018). 
However, discussing all such ties not directly related to fisheries conflict goes beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
Overall, the literature on maritime security is useful to this thesis both because it 
outlines how fisheries conflict can compromise security at sea, and because it 
situates fisheries conflict in relation to other maritime threats. However, although 
there is a recognition that fisheries conflict can be inextricably linked with both 
territorial disputes and IUU, there is very little evidence of how often fisheries conflict 
is in actuality triggered by IUU, nor does existing literature provide information where 
and how often conflicts occur in the grander scheme of ongoing territorial disputes. 
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The database presented in Paper II outlines the prevalence of those relationships 
over time, and indications of where those co-occurring threats are most prevalent. 
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International fisheries conflict, a growing security threat? 
Is international fisheries conflict a growing security threat? From the literature on 
maritime security, we understand that, due to the implications such conflict holds for 
different facets of national and human security, as well as due to its links to other 
maritime security threats, fisheries conflict can indeed be considered a threat to 
multiple conceptions of security (national, human and maritime). Moreover, some of 
the intellectual tenets offered by the environmental security literature, including the 
idea of increased resource scarcity as a driver of conflict, might also lead us to 
conclude that fisheries conflict is indeed a growing security risk as global fishery 
resources dwindle. However, to more rigorously understand if fisheries conflict can 
be labeled a growing security threat, we lack systematically collected data on the 
phenomenon. As opposed to data that is available on water conflicts, we do not have 
large-scale datasets that can help us understand the prevalence of fisheries conflicts 
over time, what might be driving the patterns we are seeing, and what might be the 
nature of potential future fisheries conflict. The methodological and theoretical gaps 
in our understanding of fisheries conflict are outlined in more detail in Paper I. 
 
This thesis contributes to those unknowns by addressing the following research 
questions: 
1. What are the gaps in the fisheries conflict literature from the CAS and SES 
perspective, and how might one improve on the existing literature? Paper I 
2. How prevalent has international fisheries conflict been over time and space? 
Paper II 
3. What has driven past fisheries conflict? Paper III 
4. While exploring the future for fisheries conflict, what governance insights can 
be gained for conflict mitigation? Paper IV 
In combination, the questions are designed to provide information on whether or not 
international fisheries conflict should be considered a growing security threat. 
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Answering these four research questions can also contribute to broader ongoing 
debates discussed in the previous two sections, and provide new analytical and 
theoretical insights for broader applications in the fields of environmental security 
and maritime security.  
 
First, this thesis can contribute to the ongoing debate pertaining to the drivers of 
resource conflict, with particular attention to the resource scarcity hypothesis (i.e. 
the declining availability of natural resources causes conflict), which remains 
contested yet is ubiquitous, including in the fisheries conflict literature (see Paper I). 
Fishery resources have not been researched as extensively nor rigorously compared 
to other resources for their links to conflict (see Paper I) and therefore analyzing the 
drivers of fisheries conflict can offer some additional evidence to refine the resource 
scarcity hypothesis (Paper III). Moreover, exploring these research questions present 
us with some insights to debate whether some resources are more prone to lead to 
conflict than others.  
 
Second, the CAS lens informs how I conceptualize conflict and consequently informs 
my methodological choices to analyze conflict emergence. Those methodological 
choices could be of interest for application to other environmental security questions 
and the field as a whole. I dive deeper into these two additional contributions to the 
environmental security literature in the discussion section. Third, though the 
maritime security literature offers important insights on the linkages between 
recognised key maritime security threats, there is little data available on those 
relationships over space and time. Paper II offers specific insights on the spatial and 







Data collection and methodology 
This thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches to answer the four 
research questions outlined above.  
 
In Paper I I employed a broad and in-depth literature review to make a theoretical 
contribution to the fisheries conflict literature. The broad literature review consisted 
of a text mining process where, through a broad title–abstract keyword search of the 
Scopus database, relevant fisheries conflict articles were identified and analyzed 
using data mining tools. This process allowed for the identification of the geographic 
focus of those papers. I then performed an in-depth literature review of 31 papers, a 
number I came to when including only those articles within the subject areas of social 
sciences and economics (excluding papers from disciplines with a less clear 
connection to conflict) and only those that directly dealt with the causes of past or 
ongoing conflict over a specific marine fish or fishery.  
 
Those papers were analyzed to understand the degree to which integrative SES 
thinking is applied in the fisheries conflict literature by assessing four criteria: 1) 
clarity in definitions and applications of key terms; 2) consideration of feedbacks, 
thresholds and nonlinearity; 3) use of comparative approaches and suitably 
integrative methodologies; and 4) use of higher order systems concepts, as indicated 
by the presence of associated terminology such as ‘feedbacks’ or ‘vulnerability’.  The 
conflict intensity scale I present in that paper was built by drawing on the work of 
Yoffe et al (2003) and Wolf et al (2003) in their development of the BAR Scale of 
Intensity of Conflict and Cooperation. Their categories were re-interpreted to make 
sense in an international fisheries context.  
 
In Paper II, the data collection consisted of developing a database currently 
containing 542 reported international fisheries conflict events between 1974 (the 
first year for which we retrieved conflict event data from LNA) and 2016. Labelled the 
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International Fishery Conflict Database (IFCD), the database was set up to explore 
international conflicts over fishery resources by using event data, i.e. conflict events. 
Those conflict events, linked to a scale of conflict intensity presented in Paper I (see 
Table 2 above), were identified through the LexisNexis Academic (LNA) database, the 
world's largest repository of media reports. From the results returned in the search 
queries, I collected data on the following variables for each conflict (event): number 
of countries involved; the species mentioned; date; the intensity of the observed 
behavior or action; whether a specific territory under dispute was mentioned; and 
whether or not it was linked to IUU fishing.  
 
To understand the patterns of the frequency, occurrence and nature of international 
fisheries conflict over time, several analyses were conducted. First, descriptive 
statistics were employed to identify the frequency of conflict (events) over time. 
Second, to distinguish between different types of fisheries conflict, non-metric 
multidimensional scaling complemented with hierarchical cluster analysis was used 
to categorize different types of fisheries conflict based on the variables that 
characterize the conflicts (i.e. the characteristics described above, except for the 
event date). Third, a time series analysis of the clusters was undertaken to 
understand when in time the clusters were more or less present. When combined 
with the place-specific conflict data (i.e. continents), it was possible to discern which 
combination of continents is most represented in the conflict clusters. 
 
Additionally, three analyses were run to understand if the IFCD was biased by the 
media sources I extracted data from. To explore if there was a relationship between 
the number of reported conflict events and the level of English media output in 
different countries, two regressions were conducted against reported conflict events 
with two different sets of data: 1) the media output dataset (extracted from the LNA 
website); and 2) the Press Freedom Index. Applying robust regression with 
downweighed outliers and heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors, I found no 
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evidence that recorded conflict within and among countries were the result of 
national differences in media reporting. Third, to analyze if the conflict data per year 
is correlated to the level of English media coverage per year, I ran a cross-correlation 
after making the conflict data stationary. There was no significant relationship 
between conflict and media coverage. 
 
In Paper III, I use a multi-model approach to identify significant predictors of conflict 
(see Table 3 for predictors). The model ensemble consists of three models: boosted 
regression trees (BRT), a zero-inflated negative binomial generalized linear model 
(ZINB GLM), and a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM). BRT is a nonparametric 
tree-based model, which recursively fits multiple trees with samples randomly drawn 
from the original data set. Importantly, BRT can capture nonlinear relationships. ZINB 
GLM, is a two-component model where the first component is a count model and the 
second a zero-inflation binary model. The ZINB GLM can account for situations where 
countries were not able to experience fisheries conflict at a given point in time. 
GLMM, an extension to GLM, allows for the incorporation of random effects in 
addition to fixed effects, so that I can account for any non-independence within a 
country (i.e., within-country correlation due to, for example, unaccounted for 
political or cultural factors). 
 
Table 3: Hypotheses and linked predictors tested in Paper III. 







The apparent consumption is calculated as 
production minus non-food uses and fish exports. 
Fish imports are added, and changes in stocks taken 
into account. Measured in grams per capita per day 








This variable includes all commercial, industrial and 
subsistence fishers, operating in freshwater, 
brackish water, and marine waters to catch and 
land any aquatic animals and plants. Because the 
dataset was only available from 1995, we only 
tested this predictor for the second time period. 















The quantity of fishery products for domestic 
utilization is calculated by adding the production of 
fisheries products to imports of fisheries products, 
subtracting fishery exports and taking into account 
the changes in stocks. Fisheries products 
encompass both wild caught fish as well as cultured 
fish. Measured in tons.  
 
Democracy Level of 
democracy 
 
Scale ranging from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic 
and 10 most democratic, covering both procedural 
(e.g. electoral process) and structural (e.g. rule of 














Measured in percentage of GDP. 
 
 
I used three models to avoid misleading results. Fisheries conflicts occurs in complex 
SES and have been described with numerous predictor variables attributed to the 
individual cases. Fisheries conflict has yet to be explored with quantitative methods, 
however, and selecting a single ‘best’ model can lead to high uncertainty (i.e. 
parametric uncertainty about what variables to include in a model, and structural 
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uncertainty related to choosing model design). Moreover, individual model 
approaches incorporate different elements of critique common to positivist 
approaches to understanding conflict. BRT can model non-linear relationships 
between the independent and dependent variable; the ZINB GLM helps incorporate 
instances where countries don’t experience conflict instead of only looking at years 
when they do experience conflict to find predictors; and the GLMM allows us to 
account for country-specific characteristics that we do not have data for that might 
influence their propensity for conflict. 
 
Lastly, in Paper IV, I build four future fisheries conflict scenarios by integrating 
longitudinal evidence on international fisheries conflict and expert data on fishery 
conflict trends and drivers. The longitudinal data originates from the IFCD, and was 
used as an axis in case study selection. The expert data was drawn from a workshop 
on fisheries conflict, where eleven participants identified key drivers and conditions 
that contribute to conflict. The expert data was complemented with findings from the 
scientific, technical and policy literature to validate conflict drivers and conditions 
resulting from the workshop, and to identify the trends for all drivers in each of the 
four case study areas. Additionally, one regional expert for each scenario was 
selected to review the narrative to enhance its validity and robustness, as well as 
asked to identify 1-3 points in the narrative where the scenario would, or could have, 
taken a different path. This was done to enhance the breadth of scenario diversity 









RQ1: What are the gaps in the fisheries conflict literature from the CAS and SES 
perspective, and how might one improve on the existing literature? 
 
The results presented in Paper I constitute a theoretical contribution to the field of 
fisheries conflict by identifying four substantial scientific gaps from the perspective of 
SES and CAS in the existing literature that need to be addressed to improve our 
understanding of the nature and drivers of fisheries conflict: 
1. The literature lacks fishery conflict definitions that are precise, that 
distinguish among degrees of conflict intensity and that specify which actions 
or behaviors are indicative of different levels of conflict intensity;  
2. There is an absence in the literature of (large sets of) comparative conflict 
data, and consequently there is a lack of diversity in the methods used to 
assess the drivers of fishery conflict; 
3. There is a lack of theoretical framings in the literature that explicitly 
recognize nonlinear and dynamic feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and 
intervening variables; and that are translated into appropriate methodologies 
for complexity; 
4. There exists a much wider scope in the literature to use higher order 
concepts and associated terminology. 
I also make concrete suggestions as to how scholars can address certain gaps, such as 
through the fisheries conflict intensity scale (for international conflict) (Table 2).  
 
RQ2: How prevalent has international fisheries conflict been over time and space?  
 
In Paper II, through analysis of the IFCD, I find that international fisheries conflict 
increased between 1974 and 2016. Intra-continental conflict (65.7% of all conflict 
events) was more common than inter-continental conflict (34.3% of all conflict 
events) during the entire time period. Many of the countries most frequently 
involved in conflict are large industrial fishing powers known to dominate global 
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fishing efforts (McCaulley et al 2018). The USA was involved in most conflicts over 
time, followed by Canada, Japan, China and the EU. The conflicts collected in the 
database fall into eight distinct types of fisheries conflict, which vary in their intensity 
distribution, whether or not the conflict centred around a given species or multiple 
species, whether it was linked to illegal fishing, and whether or not it was connected 
to a larger territorial dispute (see Figure 2).  
 
For the entire time period, I find that fisheries conflicts shifted largely from occurring 
between and amongst countries within North America and Europe to countries 
within Asia. Before approximately 2000, fisheries conflict involved mostly North 
American and European countries fighting over specific species. Since then, 43.0% of 
all international fisheries conflict events primarily involved Asian countries clashing 
over non-specific species, with conflicts often linked to illegal fishing practices. A 
notable exception includes Europe, where fishery disputes surrounding the northeast 
Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) and Atlanto-Scandian herring (Clupea 
harengus) are ongoing. We also discuss six foundational and specialized risk 
mitigation strategies that have proven useful for resolving certain international 




Figure 2: Eight conflict event types, their narrative descriptions, intensity distribution throughout the database 
and number of records (events) under each type 
 
 
RQ3: What has driven past fisheries conflict? 
 
In Paper III, I find that no single indicator (Table 4) is able to fully explain historical 
international conflict over fishery resources. For the first time period (1975 to 1996), I 
find no evidence that any type of scarcity, neither demand-nor supply-induced 
scarcity, is a significant predictor for increased conflicts over fishery resources. 
Rather, the results indicate that during this time, higher macroeconomic 
development of a country was a strong predictor for it to experience more conflict. 
For the second time period (1997 to 2016), over which the global availability of wild 
fishery resources leveled off and then declined, I do find support for the demand-
induced scarcity hypothesis, which postulates that increased demand drives conflict 
over resources. I also find evidence counter the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis, 
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indicating that higher domestic supplies of fishery resources (i.e. the quantity of 
fishery products available for domestic utilization) are linked to an increase in conflict 
occurrence. In the paper I discuss how to make sense of these findings. Briefly, it is 
possible that, although total national-level supply of fish is increasing, a decline in 
availability of marine, wild-caught fish in combination with growing demand is 
spurring on conflict, which would confirm the scarcity hypothesis. However, as 
discussed in the paper, the relationship between availability of fishery resources and 
conflict might be more complex than represented in some fishery conflict studies. 
Additionally, for both time periods, experiencing conflict in the previous year is a 
significant predictor for experiencing more conflict in the following year. 
 
Table 4: Summary of the findings for time period 1 (1975-1996) and time period 2 (1997-2016). 
 
 
RQ4: While exploring the future for fisheries conflict, what governance insights can 
be gained for conflict mitigation? 
 
In Paper IV I develop four exploratory scenarios to build an understanding of 
potential futures for fisheries conflict taking into account context-specific dynamics in 
complex systems in a way that is not possible with current modelling approaches. 
These scenarios incorporate findings from both the expert workshop and the 
scientific, technical and policy literature. I showcase the 23 economic, social, political 
and environmental drivers and conditions that participants in the expert workshop 
identified as linked to the onset of fisheries conflict. The importance of those 
Predictor Level of support Relationship 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Domestic supply Low Moderate Positive Positive 
Protein quantity None Strong None Positive 
Fishery employment NA None NA None 
Population growth None Low None Positive 
GDP per capita High None Positive None 
Democracy level None None None None 
Military expenditure None Low None Positive 
Lagged conflict High High Positive Positive 
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underlying drivers and immediate conditions for conflict vary across time and space, 
as regions exhibit varying levels of vulnerability to fisheries conflict. Although conflict 
is not always the outcome of biophysical triggers, we stress that pervasive and often 
unpredictable impacts from climate change could increase the likelihood of conflict in 
least-likely cases, but it can also be a catalyst for positive transformation (such as 
bottom-up policy development). I find that the combination of participatory elements 
with imaginative approaches can boost the utility and relatability of future scenarios 























In this section, I touch on a few important discussion points related to my thesis. I 
first examine how my thesis can inform policies for conflict mitigation and 
prevention. This is followed by a discussion of some of the limitations of my work and 
the implications for how one interprets the results. I then discuss my findings related 
to the nature and drivers of fisheries conflict in the context of the environmental 
security literature. I finish off with some recommendations for future research, and a 
personal reflection on my PhD process. 
 
Contributions to policy 
The research questions addressed in this thesis aim to provide information on 
whether international fisheries conflict constitutes a growing security threat. From 
developing and analyzing the IFCD I found that international fishery conflict events 
did increase over time, in particular during the last decade in Asia. There are 
indications it might be in part driven by growing demand for fish, indicating conflict 
may become a bigger issue in the future as demand grows, yet, particularly by 
incorporating cultured fish into the analysis, the picture is likely more complex. Aside 
from providing a first assessment of the nature, driver and future for fisheries 
conflict, this thesis also offers some insights in terms of conflict prevention and 
mitigation strategies for policy makers.  
 
I provided an overview of historical strategies used for conflict mitigation and 
prevention (Paper II), which can provide policy-makers with recommendations for 
action, dependent on the type of conflict. I pinpoint six strategies, all related to 
strengthening fisheries management: building a shared scientific understanding, 
shared enforcement activities, side payments, long-term management plans, 
provisional fishery agreements, and stringent IUU policies. Some of those strategies, 
such as side-payments and coordinated scientific efforts, are deemed to also be 
useful conflict mitigation strategies in the context of shifting species’ distributions 
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due to climate change (Mendenhall et al. 2020, Pinsky et al. 2018). Recent studies 
have especially emphasised the importance of international cooperation related to 
scientific collaboration (collecting and sharing information and data) (Mendenhall et 
al. 2020, Pinsky et al. 2018). Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) 
are often put forward as the primary administrative bodies to implement some of the 
suggested strategies, for example the deployment of flexible mechanisms such as 
tradable rights schemes to address catch allocation conflicts between states 
(Mendenhall et al. 2020, Pinsky et al. 2018, Cox 2009). However, much rests on the 
will and power of the nation state, which ultimately has control over critical 
resources (Morrison et al. 2017). 
 
Aside from suggesting ways to strengthen fisheries management for conflict 
mitigation, knowing what predictors might be linked to conflict can be useful for 
policy makers. Understanding what might be driving conflicts can give policy makers 
indications regarding which stressors they might want to pay close attention to to 
avoid conflicts. Particularly the finding that increased demand for fish is significantly 
linked to increased conflict over fish could, if confirmed by further studies, offer 
interesting insight into conflict prevention. It could indicate that focusing primarily on 
fisheries management from the production and supply side (such as tougher 
penalties for IUU) might not be enough to curb fisheries conflict (Zhang 2016). It is 
promising that aquaculture might increasingly meet the rising demand for fishery 
resources, taking some pressure of wild capture fisheries and potentially diffusing 
conflict. However, shifting the bulk of fish supplies from being produced by wild 
capture fisheries to aquaculture could be meaningless to diffuse conflict if: a) the 
aquaculture sector continues to rely heavily on wild-caught fish; or b) aquaculture 
does not (fully) replace or supplement those marine fishery resources for which there 
is a high demand; or c) aquaculture impacts consumer demand in such a way that it 
exacerbates conflict.  
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On the first point, current developments seem positive. Although dependency on 
protein from wild-caught fish, primarily small pelagic fish for fishmeal and fish oil, is 
still a challenge for aquaculture, a declining, proportion of world fisheries production 
is processed into fishmeal and fish oil (FAO 2018). Moreover, novel aquaculture feeds 
such as microbial seaweed and insect sources are being developed (FAO 2018). On 
the second point, squid (families Gonatidae, Loliginidae, Ommastrephidae, 
Onychoteuthidae) is a good example of how aquaculture might not meet demand for 
certain species, resulting in (continued) conflict over the wild-caught variant. Squid is 
in high demand in China and Japan, for example, and is heavily exploited by China’s 
Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleet (Mallory 2013). Global catches of the three major 
squid species (jumbo flying squid (Dosidicus gigas), Argentine shortfin squid (Illex 
argentinus) and Japanese flying squid (Todarodes pacificus)) declined by 26, 86 and 
34 percent, respectively, between 2015 and 2016 (FAO 2018). Currently, about 14 
percent of global squid production is recognized as sustainable or improving 
(Sustainable Fisheries Partnership 2019). In the last few decades, squid fisheries have 
grown to play an increasingly important role in the global seafood market and this 
trend is likely to continue (Arkhipkin et al. 2015). There is currently no substantial 
cephalopod aquaculture production to alleviate this demand-supply gap (Cai & Leung 
2017). The IFCD includes numerous conflict events related to squid, triggered by 
illegal fishing, and such conflicts seem unlikely to diminish if consumer demand for 
these products is not curbed, although consumer preferences may change. On the 
third point, there are examples of aquaculture successfully being able to meet 
demand in terms of volume, yet increasing demand for the wild-caught version of a 
species exacerbates overfishing. Successful aquaculture production of the large 
yellow croaker (Larimichthys crocea), for example, created a large price difference 
between the rarer and more preferred wild-caught version, which motivated more 
fishermen to go after the wild croaker (Zhang 2016, Liu & Mitcheson 2008). Yellow 
croaker conflicts between China and Japan, for example, date back decades 
(Muscolino 2008), with recent high demand for the wild variant encouraging illegal 
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fishing for the species off the coast of West Africa and prompting conflicts (BBC News 
2016). To summarize, my work can help to inform a debate amongst policy makers on 
how shifting demand, rather than managing supply, might be a conflict mitigation 
tool as it can help reduce incentives for overfishing and illegal fishing, shown in Paper 
II to trigger conflict. 
 
Last, the narrative scenario approach I used in the last paper can be useful to policy 
makers to identify contextual factors that contribute to conflict, but that might 
showcase high regional variability. This method allows one to consider the different 
proximate and remote drivers of fisheries conflict and to parse out how different 
interventions can lead to diverging future scenarios for conflict (inspired by the 
approach in Merrie et al. 2017). Replicating this exercise, where one discusses the 
drivers of a system and their potential future pathways together with regional 
experts, can provide valuable insights for intervention in geographical areas that are 
particularly vulnerable to future fisheries conflict, such as the coast of West Africa or 
the Arctic.  
 
Considerations and limitations of my work 
First, there are a limitations related specifically to using media as the source of 
conflict events to set up the IFCD. The data on conflict events was extracted from 
news reports, which can be prone to misreporting. All news searches were conducted 
in English, which means there can be bias in the coverage of conflict events. For 
example, I have very limited data for South American and African countries, although 
Belhabib et al. (2018) do report that perhaps there are less conflicts involving African 
nations due to lower levels of enforcement and easier access for foreign vessels to 
obtain licences due to corruption. Nonetheless, there is likely underreporting of 
(minor) conflicts in regions with non-English speaking news media, particularly during 
the early part of the period covered. To counter this availability bias, conducting 
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searches in other languages and producing collaborative research with experts from 
other regions would help gain a broader perspective and understanding of trends.  
 
Second, I employ a very specific definition of an international fisheries conflict. While 
this is not a limitation per se, it does frame the manner in which to interpret the 
results. Conflict can be conceptualized in different ways, and studied from a 
multitude of scales. Conflicts vary widely in their form and intensity, and, 
consequently, scholars have taken different approaches to defining what conflict over 
natural resources means in their work. In studies on forestry disputes, ‘forestry 
conflict’ has been defined as :‘where one group impairs the activities of another by 
restricting their access to the resource or excluding them from the decision-making 
process’ (Yasmi 2007); ‘a context of different approaches in setting forest 
management or caused by conflicting forestry legislation on one side and 
environmental and nature protection legislation on the other side’ (Vuletić et al. 
2013); and as ‘conflicts of interest (…) [such as between] conservation and local 
people’s livelihood’ (Hares 2009). In fresh water research, conflict has been 
conceptualized as ‘a conflict of interest’ (Giordano et al. 2005), while others exclude 
all but violent conflict incidences from their analysis (Sawyer 2004). Many scholars 
study only armed conflict, and its relation to different natural resources (Le Billon 
2001, Welsch 2008). Some of the disparate findings on the links between resources 
and conflict are attributable to differences in operationalizing conflict, both regarding 
the intensity of conflict as well as the scale of analysis scholars select for their study 
(Devlin & Hendrix 2014).  
 
Consequently, it is important that conflict scholars make their definition, and its 
implications for findings, clear. I follow the FAO in its conceptualization of conflict, 
this is that natural resource conflict is based on disagreements and disputes 
regarding access and management of the resources (which can manifest itself in a 
multitude of ways) (FAO 2000). I operationalized that definition by linking it to a scale 
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of actions and behaviors, inspired by Yoffe et al. (2003) and Wolf et al. (2003) (Table 
2). I find it important to use a full spectrum of interactions (from militarized conflict 
to a failed negotiation), because all of those interactions have social and/or 
environmental repercussions, and can indicate hampered cooperation around fishery 
resources. Using such a wide scale of how international fisheries conflict can manifest 
itself, however, means that there is a range of events that are included in the IFCD. As 
a consequence, all three terms in the concept of ‘international fisheries conflict’ 
include a spectrum (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Range of events in the International Fishery Conflict Database 
This particular definition is not a limitation, but a consideration, as it needs to be 
made clear that the results related to what drives conflict (Paper III) ultimately rest 
on how one defines conflict. There is a genuine debate to be held on whether or not 
it makes sense, for example, to aggregate violent and non-violent fisheries conflict; or 
to aggregate disputes over access to a resource with conflicts over how to manage a 
resource. It is possible that these different kinds of conflict have their own unique 
driver sets rather than being produced by the same mechanisms. 
 
Third, in Paper III, it can be argued I use a positivist approach to understanding what 
drives conflict, and this approach, in particular large-N quantitative studies, has 
International
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attracted (valid) criticism in the environmental security literature (Selby 2014, 
Vivekananda et al. 2014). The goal here is not to list them all, yet I want to offer a few 
common criticisms that are relevant for the work I present in this thesis, and provide 
some of my own thoughts on them. First, the predictive value of large-N quantitative 
studies is often questioned on theoretical grounds. It is argued that, because 
environmental change repeatedly creates new context for social behavior, the future 
is never like the past (Ide 2015, Selby 2014, Floyd & Matthew 2013). Moreover, it is 
argued that positivist causal conflict studies are focused on what or why something is 
happening rather than on what should happen, and that they therefore do not 
advance a comprehensive case for why one set of policies should be adopted over 
another (Floyd & Matthew 2013). On the first point, I agree as far as that the future 
will remain fundamentally unknowable. However, an alternative viewpoint would be 
that analyzing historical data (be it in a quantitative or qualitative manner) is likely to 
remain our only way to make assumptions about future risk and to derive valuable 
lessons that are still likely to bear impact. On the second point, I find that this can in 
fact be a strength: a desirable outcome or ‘what should happen’ is inherently 
contested, and ever-changing. Presenting data on the phenomenon up for discussion 
can provide a starting point to reboot more normative discussions of what is 
desirable, and how to work towards that. 
 
Aside from more theoretical considerations; positivist, large-N conflict studies are 
often criticized on methodological grounds. For one, scholars usually employ linear 
models to explain what causes conflict, which is pinpointed as being at least partly 
responsible for the non-replicability of results within the environmental security 
literature (Le Billon & Duffy 2018, Ide 2015, Selby 2014, Floyd & Matthew 2013). 
Because I use the CAS perspective to conceptualize marine SES and conflict as a 
phenomenon embedded within that framework, I find this criticism legitimate and 
agree that the methodologies typically used do not reflect the likely non-linear 
relationships between cause(s) and conflict. I tried to address this methodological 
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issue in my own work (Paper III), which I discuss in more depth in the next 
subsection. Second, studies connecting climate change and conflict often are 
questioned for deriving predictions from correlations alone (Selby 2014). I would 
indeed not want to be making any predictions about future fisheries conflict solely 
based on the outcomes of Paper III. For that reason, I use a non-positivist approach in 
Paper IV to explore a diversity of potential future pathways for fisheries conflict that 
combine findings from my previous, more positivist work, with more qualitative 
findings from an expert workshop. Third, the significant issues around temporal and 
spatial assumptions are often raised (Le Billon & Duffy 2018, Selby 2014). Much of 
the quantitative work on the resource-conflict connection, as well as the climate-
conflict connection more specifically, makes assumptions in regards to the temporal 
and spatial connections between cause and effect. Oftentimes this translates into 
analysing connections between cause and effect within the same year and within the 
same spatial location (e.g. decrease or increase in precipitation in a particular year 
gets linked to conflict in that same year), an approach I use in Paper III. This is an 
assumption that would benefit from more theoretical and analytical exploration, 
because it is conceivable that those connections operate on much longer temporal 
scales and wider geographical areas.  
 
The final limitation of my thesis up for discussion here relates to climate change as a 
potential (future) cause of fisheries conflicts. Although I discuss climate change as a 
potential cause of fisheries conflict in all the papers (and in this kappa), I do not 
directly test for its causal links to conflict in Paper III in the same way I do test for 
other common hypotheses, such as resource scarcity. This means climate change as a 
predictor feels somewhat absent from the quantitative, analytical side of this thesis. 
This is mainly due to the lack of data to actually test this hypothesis. To test in detail 
if spatial changes in stock distribution are linked to conflict, I need access to a large 
amount of historical data on the spatial locations of different fish stocks and link 
them to conflicts over those same fish stocks (although one supposedly could take a 
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more general approach and build a non-stock specific, global map of the rate of 
species distribution changes overall in certain oceanic areas and overlay it with a map 
of conflict, but that would certainly be less informative). Moreover, although climate-
driven stock redistribution is a phenomenon that is already being observed (Cheung 
et al. 2015), the speed and extent of the phenomenon is expected to increase 
strongly in the future depending on the degree of warming, which diminishes the 
value of testing the hypothesis on historical conflict data (Pinsky et al. 2018, Cheung 
et al. 2015). For that reason, I only explicitly incorporate climate change as a future 
driver of fisheries conflict in Paper IV, where the methodology of narrative scenario 
building allows me to bring in more qualitative aspects of fisheries conflict. I do think, 
however, that Paper III delivers relevant insights for the climate change-fisheries 
conflict connection, as it allows us to consider how climate change might impact 
those predictors that are significantly linked to increased fisheries conflict, such as a 
rise in demand. Moreover, although it is not a paper featured in this thesis, I did 
contribute to research on the climate change-fisheries conflict connection led by Dr. 
Malin Pinsky (see Pinsky et al. 2018). 
 
Insights for the environmental security literature 
The first contribution my thesis can make to the larger environmental security 
literature relates to the critiques laid out in the previous section. I addressed some of 
the methodological limitations through my CAS-informed perspective on fisheries 
conflict, and my methodological choices in Paper III may be relevant for the wider 
environmental security literature. First, the methodology I employ explicitly 
recognizes that drivers of conflict might change over time (CAS adapt over time in 
response to feedbacks) by examining if my dependent variables, international 
fisheries conflict, had a continuous trend over time (by running a piecewise 
regression model). I did find breakpoints in the data, indicating that fisheries conflict 
might not be a static phenomenon throughout time with constant, time-invariable 
drivers; and thus I examine the time periods separately. Second, the method used in 
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Paper III incorporates the notion that conflict likely has multiple causes, and that 
interactions exist between them. Not only do I test for multiple social, political and 
ecological driving variables to uncover their relationship with conflict over time, but 
BRT also allows me to quantify the relative interaction strength between the 
predictors. Third, the methodology used incorporates the possibility that the 
relationships between cause and effect (conflict) might be marked by non-linearity 
and stochasticity. This is done by pooling together linear models such as GLM with 
BRT, a tree-based model which, by using only a random subset of data to fit each new 
tree (controllable by the ‘bag fraction’ parameter), introduces randomness in the 
process (which is why the final model is slightly different each time you run it) (Elith 
et al. 2008). However, some challenges remain, mainly related to incorporating cross-
scale spatial and temporal interactions (such as time lags), a feature of CAS. Overall, 
although the approach of taking a multi-model ensemble is in some ways more 
advanced than the methodological approach usually taken to investigate causal 
resource-conflict links, I would also note that it remains correlation-based which, 
when it is used for direct prediction, as discussed, has been criticized. 
 
The second contribution this thesis can make to the wider environmental security 
literature is less direct, but can provide food for thought. It relates to the conflict 
potential different natural resources may hold, and much of what follows is largely 
based on questions and points of confusion that have arisen at multiple times during 
my PhD while reading some of the environmental security literature. As discussed, 
the answer to whether or not a particular (set of) driver(s) is causally linked to 
conflict likely depends on one’s particular conceptualization and definition of conflict. 
That definition includes different facets, such as the scale of the conflict (i.e. who is 
the conflict between, for example between communities or states), an intensity (i.e. 
what are the actions/behaviors observed in this conflict, for example a verbal 
disagreement or violence), and the object under conflict (i.e. what is the issue 
creating the conflict, e.g. a particular resource such as water or fish). It could be 
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nonsensical to aggregate across different conceptualizations and definitions of 
conflict to find a set of drivers for all of them (although perhaps some intensities, 
scales or subjects of conflict might have similar drivers connected to them). In 
particular, reading through works in the environmental security literature, it seems 
the object under conflict (such as a particular resource) sometimes is spoken of in 
general terms (e.g. just ‘natural resources’ all together), and I do not find many 
studies that explicitly discuss how characteristics of different resources might affect 
the likelihood of conflict. Nonetheless, it is likely that questions such as “will fewer 
resources lead to more conflict?” might warrant very different answers depending on 
the resource one looks at. Therefore, I think a more detailed, theory-informed 
discussion juxtaposing different characteristics of resources and how they might 
influence conflict propensity can be useful.  
 
First, a note on the mobility of different renewable natural resources and how it plays 
in to conflict is warranted. Changes in the access to natural resources such as fresh 
water, fish, forest or agriculturally productive land (which can happen for many 
reasons, such as climate change impacts) can cause conflict in certain contexts, as it 
could create incentives for communities to physically secure access over valuable 
resources (e.g. looting of resources on land or illegal fishing) (Bowles et al. 2015). 
More dynamic, mobile renewable resources might be of even more cause for concern 
in that regard as changes in relative access might be more abrupt and geographically 
extensive for such resources. Moreover, as the mobility of the resource increases, the 
number of actors that could find themselves in conflict over the resource could also 
be larger and more variable, and might therefore more easily cause regional 
instability. Fisheries conflicts, for example, can play out between multiple countries in 
a region, as was the case with the northeast Atlantic mackerel or the conflicts in the 
East and South China Seas. The latter point is particularly important in light of climate 
change, as climate change is set to trigger large geographic shifts in distribution for 
highly mobile resources such as fish (Cheung 2018). Global warming also impacts 
other natural resources such as fresh water greatly as it will reduce their availability, 
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potentially increasing the likelihood of conflict (Bowles et al. 2015). However, the 
mobility of fishery resources means climate change not only reduces the total 
availability of fishery resources (due to effects on the physiology and biology of 
marine organisms, affecting, for example, their growth or reproduction (Cheung 
2018)), but also impacts strongly on the geographical locations of the resources. 
Moreover, higher mobility hampers our ability to easily monitor and manage the 
resource which increases the potential for conflict. It is, for example, much more 
technically feasible to measure water stocks and flows than it is to estimate the 
number of fish, solely due to their high mobility (Cox 2009). 
 
Second, it might also be valuable to consider which natural resource can become 
largely substitutable through (future) technological developments. There are those 
scholars that hold there is little evidence to suggest natural resources are even 
becoming scarce globally as there are various forms of technology that can displace 
them, and there have been many examples of that during human history (e.g. natural 
fibers being replaced by synthetic materials such as plastic) (Floyd & Matthew 2013). 
Wild-caught fish, for example, could be substituted, or at the very least 
supplemented, by cultured fish (Crona et al. 2016), which might diffuse conflict 
potential over dwindling marine fishery resources. Similarly, although oil, coal and 
natural gas remain the primary energy sources for now, renewable sources of energy 
are in a rapid growth phase and are forecasted to continue their market expansion. 
Fresh water, however, is a unique and vital resource for which there is no substitute 
at the current time. For that reason, the future potential for conflicts over water 
could perhaps be considered greater. From the results of Paper III, however, I find 
that scarcity of resources does not fully explain conflict. It can therefore nonetheless 
be true that, despite technological developments and increased availability of 
resources through technological means, we might still witness conflicts over natural 
resources (as exemplified by the price difference example between wild-caught fish 
and cultured fish), or that we shift potential conflicts to other types of valuables 
resources or possessions. The latter option seems especially realistic if we continue 
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to conceptualize nature through a traditional capitalistic lens and regard it as free and 
inexhaustible. 
 
Suggestions for future fisheries conflict research  
I have a few suggestions for future research on fisheries conflict which relate to 
further methodological improvements and increased data collection efforts in 
particular. First, fisheries-related conflict occurs at different geographic scales, from 
conflict between fisherpeople located in the same village to conflict between states. 
The different environmental pressures that affect the ocean (such as climate change), 
and by consequence fish stocks, might very well lead to an increase in more localized 
conflicts rather than international conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to expand our 
data collection efforts to cover those conflicts as well and monitor their frequency. 
Aligning data-gathering methods and compiling larger datasets across those scales 
will greatly improve our understanding of conflict drivers across time, scales and 
geography.  
 
Second, the IFCD currently does not include cooperative events over fishery 
resources, which is an important aspect if we truly wish to understand if fisheries 
conflict is a security risk. This thesis offers no quantitative evidence on the prevalence 
of international fisheries cooperation (it is possible, for example, that international 
cooperation over fishery resources has increased over time as well, and perhaps even 
more rapidly than conflict), nor what conditions might promote it. However, the 
options for conflict transformation and consequently deepened cooperation is 
explored in different geographic regions in Paper IV by using narrative scenarios as a 
tool. Indeed, previous work on environmental peacemaking shows cooperation can 
occur in the face of environmental change and resource scarcity, though likely this is 
contingent on contextual factors (Ide 2019, Conca & Dabelko 2002). Particularly the 
literature on fresh water conflict (which has found there are comparatively more 
cooperative water events internationally than conflict-ridden ones (Yoffe et al. 2003)) 
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can again be consulted to set up data collection efforts on (international) cooperative 
fisheries events (Yoffe et al. 2004).  
 
Third, looking in-depth at characteristics of different fishery resources themselves 
and how they might influence conflict is an unexplored avenue. Characteristics such 
as the fish species’ value, its spatial mobility, or its substituteability by other produce 
could be informative for its relationship to conflict and can help move us further 
beyond simply scarcity narratives. Working hypotheses could for instance include: 
the higher the consumer demand for a particular species, the more likely conflict 
over that species is; or the more spatial mobility a species exhibit, the more likely 
conflict over that species is. Exploring such hypotheses would require data on a more 
granular level than aggregated ‘conflicts over fish’, as one would need to compare 
‘conflicts over tuna’ with ‘conflicts over whitefish’, for example. That level of 
granularity is in part limited in using media reports as the source of information, as 
the reports can vary widely in the amount of detailed information supplied. 
Addresing such questions can provide us with more nuanced insight into what drives 
conflicts over fish, and if certain species are linked to greater conflict than others, and 
in light of that, if such conflicts have the potential to become more widespread in the 
future. 
 
Personal reflection on the PhD process 
Finally, I briefly reflect on how this thesis has contributed to my academic 
development. When I made the decision to pursue a PhD degree, I wanted it to be 
difficult and challenging. I had wanted to acquire more analytical and methodological 
skills ever since I did my Master’s at the Stockholm Resilience Centre; and in 
particular I wanted to learn how to put together and analyze large datasets. I enjoy 
writing data-driven papers, and in some strange way I like the suffering involved in 
figuring out analyses and coding problems because it signals: “You are learning 
something!”. However, there have been a few times where I felt that by choosing to 
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build a PhD around the emerging topic of fisheries conflict, using methods I had not 
used before, and putting together a first database on the matter, the thesis was in 
fact too challenging. The IFCD went through several iterations, reflecting my winding 
thought process whilst setting it up and the numerous times I changed my opinion on 
what types of conflict events should be included in the database and which ones fell 
outside of its scope. To claim that I now have the exact same idea of how to set up 
the database and what to put in it as I did even a mere year ago would be false. In 
particular, choosing the exact definition of fisheries conflict and deciding what 
characteristics to gather data on felt particularly challenging at times as there was 
not much literature on the topic to guide me. When it came to analyzing the dataset, 
there were many grand ideas at the start of the PhD that have remained just that: 
unexecuted ideas.  
 
However, I am pleased that I have acquired analytical and methodological skills in the 
process of making the thesis, and that I have developed an understanding of what 
certain approaches can in reality provide you with. Perhaps the most important 
lesson I learnt from analyzing the database is: results provided through statistical 
analyses are not black and white. Dig deep into the data, combine different ways to 
analyze the data, and be conservative in what you think the data can actually tell you. 
Those insights may well be obvious to experienced academics, but they are important 
lessons to be learnt by students. Additionally, from hosting the workshop and writing 
the last paper, I was somewhat stunned to find out that you can be an expert in the 
same subject area as other academics and still hold wildly diverging opinions in the 
same arena. However, discussing where the divergence comes from, being engaged 
in constructive conflict, has led to real knowledge creation and tangible 
improvements for the field.  
 
The PhD process was also special for me as it involved a lot of travel and personal 
development due to the cotutelle. I feel I am very lucky to have been admitted as a 
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PhD student at two different universities, and to have access to supervisors from 
both locations with different yet complementary skill-sets. The cotutelle PhD was not 
always straightforward though, and not only because of the practicalities involved in 
living, studying and travelling between two geographical regions that are on opposite 
sides of the world (and with the most dissimilar climates imaginable). Balancing the 
expectations and obligations of two universities, maintaining strong communicative 
ties with the whole supervisory team, and ensuring I hit all of the milestones in a 
timely manner has been challenging. Nonetheless, because of the strong support I 
have received from both my JCU and SRC supervisory team and the many networks 






















Is international fisheries conflict a growing security threat? In a nutshell, from 
building the International Fishery Conflict Database, I find that the number of 
conflicts has increased between 1974 and 2016, with a more rapid increase in recent 
years particularly between Asian states. Those more recent conflicts are often linked 
to illegal fishing, and have a tendency to become more intense in nature. According 
to my analyses, conflicts from 1997 onwards are in part driven by increased demand 
for fishery resources, which, in light of prospected continued growth in demand for 
seafood, might confirm concerns that we will witness more conflicts over fishery 
resources in the future. However, the latter finding needs to be critically examined, 
particularly considering the growth of aquaculture as a potential substitute for wild-
caught fish. Overall, this thesis is a first attempt at examining the nature and drivers 
of international fisheries conflict over time by use of comparative, large scale data on 
fishery conflict events. However, more work is needed both methodologically and 
theoretically to confirm or dispute some of the findings presented here, and to form 
a more detailed understanding of the potential for fisheries conflict to become a 
security threat. For that reason, I hope to continue the development of the IFCD in 
such a way that it increasingly accurately reflects trends and patterns in international 
fisheries conflict, so its analysis can aid both theoretical explorations as well as policy 
making. 
 
Moreover, I find that integrating large-scale, quantitative data and modeling on 
conflict with more context-specific information on particular spatial areas (gathered 
through, for example, an expert workshop) can offer more nuanced and policy-
relevant insights. Though analyzing historical data is likely to remain our only way to 
make assumptions about future risk, predicting with precision the future by use of 
quantitative historical data can seldomly be done, even when such data has the most 
robust empirical backing. The future remains fundamentally unknowable, particularly 
when it comes to social-ecological CAS, so there is unlikely to be a silver bullet for 
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mitigatating conflict. Perhaps variables such as fisheries scarcity seem to have had 
limited, or at the very least contested, influence in producing the conflict events I 
compiled and analyzed, yet this does not mean those factors will not play a big role in 
sparking future conflict. It is for that reason that imaginative scenarios that bring 
together stakeholders have an important role to play in understanding and preparing 
for possible futures for complex systems. Focusing on potential geographical hotspots 
for continued and future fisheries conflict such as the Arctic or the East and South 
China Seas can be of particular interest to policy makers in that regard. Although 
shedding light on the nature and prevalence of conflict and the (relative) effect of 
certain mechanisms producing such trends might not lead to perfect decision-making 
to avoid, de-escalate or transform future fisheries conflict; I hope it can help us think 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Policymakers are growing increasingly concerned about conflicts 
overfishery resources (Germond, 2015; Hassani- Mahmooei & Parris, 
2013). Wild capture fisheries production has stagnated over the last 
20 years (FAO, 2014; Pauly et al., 2003, Worm, 2016), and climate 
change is expected to alter the distributions and potential yields of 
exploited marine species (Cheung et al., 2010; Miller, Munro, Sumaila, 
& Cheung, 2013; Sumaila, Cheung, Lam, Pauly, & Herrick, 2011; UNEP, 
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Abstract
Conflict over marine fishery resources is a growing security concern. Experts expect 
that global changes in our climate, food systems and oceans may spark or exacerbate 
resource conflicts. An initial scan of 803 relevant papers and subsequent intensive 
review of 31 fisheries conflict studies, focused on subnational and international con-
flicts, suggests that four substantial scientific gaps need addressing to improve our 
understanding of the nature and drivers of fisheries conflict. First, fisheries conflict 
and levels of conflict intensity are not precisely defined. Second, complex adaptive 
systems thinking is underutilized but has the potential to produce more realistic 
causal models of fishery conflict. Third, comparative large- scale data and suitably 
integrative methodologies are lacking, underscoring the need for a standardized and 
comparable database of fisheries conflict cases to aid extrapolation beyond single 
case- studies. Fourth, there is room for a more widespread application of higher order 
concepts and associated terminology. Importantly, the four gaps highlight the ho-
mogenized nature of current methodological and theoretical approaches to under-
standing fishery conflict, which potentially presents us with an oversimplified 
understanding of these conflicts. A more nuanced understanding of the complex and 
dynamic nature of fishery conflict and its causes is not only scientifically critical, but 
increasingly relevant for policymakers and practitioners in this turbulent world.
K E Y W O R D S
climate change, complex adaptive systems, disputes, fishery resources, scarcity, security
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et al., 2015), particularly in vulnerable regions that depend on fish for 
food security (Allison et al., 2009; Blasiak et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 
2015). A number of militarized international post- World War II con-
flicts have already been driven by disagreements overfishing quotas 
and maritime boundaries (Mitchell & Prins, 1999), including many on-
going, high- profile disputes (Box 1). The occurrence of conflicts over-
fisheries is thus expected to become more common (EFARO, 2012).
However, there is still limited consensus on the fundamental 
causes or mechanisms connecting natural resources to conflict, and 
linkages between changing climate conditions and security issues 
remain unclear (Gemenne, Barnett, Adger, & Dabelko, 2014). Efforts 
to describe such linkages in the case of fishery resources have been 
criticized as overly simplistic (Penney, Wilson, & Rodwell, 2017). This 
growing criticism stems from the increased understanding that ma-
rine social–ecological systems (SESs) are complex adaptive systems 
(CAS), characterized by nonlinear dynamics and multiple possible out-
comes (Hughes, Bellwood, Folke, Steneck, & Wilson, 2005; Morrison, 
2017; Österblom et al., 2013), and that conflict over marine resources 
can itself be an outcome as well as a driver within those systems 
(Pomeroy, Parks, Mrakovcich, & LaMonica, 2016). In this review, we 
test the validity of the claim of simplicity (Penney et al., 2017) by as-
sessing the degree to which the fisheries conflict literature, encom-
passing both subnational and international conflict, has incorporated 
ideas from complexity theory and SESs theory and identifying areas 
within this literature that would benefit from further development.
2  | METHODOLOGY
We used a broad title–abstract keyword search of the Scopus data-
base to identify 1,941 relevant articles, which were analysed using 
data mining tools provided by the R package tm using the search 
phrases: “fish” OR “fishery” AND “conflict” OR “dispute” or “war” 
(Feinerer & Hornik, 2017). This data mining process was executed to 
understand the geographic focus of the papers (Figure S1). We then 
narrowed the scope of the analysis by including only those articles 
within the subject areas of social sciences and economics and ex-
cluding papers from disciplines with a less clear connection to con-
flict (e.g., health sciences). This resulted in a set of 803 articles. We 
reviewed the abstracts of these articles and selected those dealing 
with the roots of past or ongoing conflict over a specific marine fish 
or fishery (excluding, for example, theoretical papers on fishery con-
flict or papers discussing potential future conflicts). For each of the 
resulting 31 papers, we extracted information on their geographical 
focus, species, methodology, data sources and theoretical framing 
(Appendix S1).
Given the concerns raised by Penney et al. (2017), we approached 
the review with an a priori interest in the degree to which integra-
tive SES thinking is applied in understanding fisheries conflict. The 
SES literature deals with questions around sustainable development 
and promotes the idea of holism rather than fragmentation (Hjorth & 
Bagheri 2006, Levin et al., 2012). The literature therefore provides a 
potentially useful integrative lens for a more holistic understanding 
of fisheries conflicts. SES outcomes result from complex interactions 
between social and ecological variables; the literature on SESs strives 
to reflect this complexity through its choice of methodologies, theo-
ries and data sources. Work on SESs seeks to unveil and understand 
the complexity of social–ecological change overtime, accounting for 
feedbacks and path dependency, and uses empirical data to do so 
(Österblom et al., 2013). Taking an integrative SES approach helps us 
understand the diverse social and biophysical outcomes we observe 
in the world, of which conflict over resources is one.
Box 1 Examples of current, unresolved fishery 
disputes
South China Sea: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Brunei currently have competing claims over parts 
of the South China Sea, including the Paracels and Spratlys, and 
dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs (BBC 
News, 2016a; Song & TØnnesson, 2013). In the 1980s and 
1990s, Vietnamese and Chinese fatalities occurred in battles 
over the Paracels and Spratlys. The rich fishing grounds that 
supply the livelihoods of people across the region are a signifi-
cant part of the wealth of the South China Sea, although fisher-
ies are often ignored by conventional narratives which focus on 
the large reserves of natural resources such as minerals and oil 
that the area under dispute is estimated to harbour (BBC News, 
2016a; Dupont & Baker, 2014). In 2016, the Philippines coun-
tered Chinese claims through a tribunal of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which ruled in 
favour of the Philippines (BBC News, 2016a,b). However, China 
continues to regard these fishery resources as critical to its 
food security and thus as a strategic commodity (Dupont & 
Baker, 2014).
Northeast Atlantic: The “mackerel dispute” between Norway, 
the European Union (EU), Iceland and the Faroe Islands erupted 
in 2007 when the northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scom-
brus) stocks began spawning further towards the north- west of 
the Nordic Seas and their surrounding waters (Gänsbauer et al., 
2016, ICES Advisory Committee, 2014; Nøttestad et al., 2014). 
Iceland (which now finds mackerel within its Exclusive Economic 
Zone) did not originally include mackerel in its coastal state 
management plans. The migration not only resulted in increased 
overfishing of the stock, but the subsequent dispute also 
eroded the legitimacy and functioning of existing management 
plans (ICES Advisory Committee, 2014, Spijkers & Boonstra, 
2017, World Ocean Review, 2016). A few years after the shift in 
mackerel distribution, the relevant parties attempted, but 
failed, to include Iceland in the agreement negotiations. At the 
time of writing, Iceland has still not been formally involved in 
the agreements on the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota 
allocations per country.
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To identify gaps in the application of SES concepts and complex 
systems approaches to the fisheries conflict literature, we evalu-
ated existing studies against the following a priori criteria: (i) clar-
ity in definitions and applications of key terms; (ii) consideration of 
feedbacks, thresholds and nonlinearity; (iii) use of comparative ap-
proaches and suitably integrative methodologies; and (iv) usage of 
higher order systems concepts, as indicated by the presence of as-
sociated terminology (e.g., resilience, vulnerability, and emergence).
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Clarity in definitions and applications of key 
terms
Comparison of articles on conflict suggested that current fishery 
conflict typologies often conflate conflicts overfish as a resource 
with general conflicts taking place within the fisheries space, leaving 
the concept “fishery conflict” poorly defined. According to one ty-
pology, for instance, “types of fisheries- related conflicts” encompass 
both conflicts overfish stocks as well as maritime crime and general 
civil unrest (Pomeroy et al., 2016). Another typology (Bennett et al., 
2001) does not distinguish between ownership/management con-
flicts overfish and conflicts between different users of the fisheries 
space. It therefore could include conflicts between fishermen and 
the tourist industry over access and use of coastal areas, although 
such disputes are not necessarily triggered by fish as a resource. 
These typologies may reflect the complexity of conflicts in marine 
areas, but differentiating between conflicts overfish as a natural re-
source and conflicts that simply occur in the same place where fish-
ing is happening is useful if we wish to better understand the root 
causes of conflict. Such distinctions are possible for common pool 
resources: access rights refer to “the right to enter a defined physi-
cal property,” while withdrawal rights describe “the right to obtain 
the ‘products’ of a resource (e.g., catch fish)” (Schlager & Ostrom, 
1993, pp. 14–15; see also Bavinck, 2005). Using the insights from the 
common pool resource literature in marine environments, “physical 
property” relates to the sea space or territory, whereas “products” 
include fish stocks (Bavinck, 2005). Making this distinction is im-
portant when analyzing the different types and potential causes of 
fishery conflict, as conflicts overfish as a resource could have drivers 
(such as the value of a particular stock) that would be largely inde-
pendent of conflicts within the general marine space, where terri-
tory represents the resource.
Second, the term “fishery conflict” is applied to diverse case- 
studies, without explicitly recognizing the differing intensities 
of conflict. Three papers provide typologies of fisheries conflict 
(Bennett et al., 2001; Charles, 1992; Pomeroy et al., 2016), and two 
of these suggest that different intensity levels of conflict exist. But 
none of these typologies explicitly distinguishes among different 
intensity levels of conflict, nor how such levels could be identified 
despite the fact that the existence of a “violence gradient”’ has been 
emphasized “[c]onflicts of this type do not necessarily have to be 
violent nor highly disruptive, in fact many conflicts that arise as a 
result of differing interests are low- level, non- violent phenomena” 
(Bennett et al., 2001, pp. 366). Distinguishing between the differ-
ent amplitudes and impacts of fisheries conflicts would help de-
termine whether there are separate drivers of conflict leading to 
different “intensity outcomes.” For example, extremely violent con-
flicts may exhibit very different causal patterns than non- violent 
disagreements, and cooccur more frequently with certain variables, 
or contextual conditions. Such an intensity scale would also facil-
itate differentiation among various levels of conflict and explore 
patterns and cycles causing non- violent disputes to transform into 
violent conflict (Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Salehyan, 2008). 
Likewise, it could aid the identification of variables that have a 
determining impact on feeding or mitigating conflict, causing co-
operative/peaceful systems to shift into “fishery conflict regimes” 
exhibiting hostility and even violence. A scale of conflict intensities 
would enable analysis of conflict and cooperation across a gradient, 
where certain variables could be “tipping points” for a system to 
shift back into a lesser state of conflict. Researchers dealing with 
other types of natural resource conflicts have already identified 
such conflict gradients, for instance for freshwater resources (Wolf, 
Yoffe, & Giordano, 2003).
Current conceptual typologies of fishery conflict (Bennett et al., 
2001; Charles, 1992; Pomeroy et al., 2016) could be enhanced by 
adding several components that would facilitate comparability in 
the identification and characterization of fishery conflict. These in-
clude (i) a precise definition of what constitutes a fishery conflict; (ii) 
a gradient or categorization of conflict intensity; (iii) a specification 
of which actions and behaviours indicate different levels or types 
of conflict intensity. In Table 1, we propose a new and more gener-
ally applicable typology of potential fishery conflict intensities, ex-
panded from examples from the environmental security literature on 
freshwater resources (e.g., “the BAR Scale of Intensity of Conflict and 
Cooperation” in Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003; Brochmann, 2012; 
Bernauer & Bohmelt, 2014). Drawing on reviewed case- studies of 
fisheries conflicts, we linked five different intensities to observable 
behaviours and actions within international fishery conflicts. The 
South China Sea conflict (Box 1), for example, has seen many mili-
tary interventions with displays of violence (Delisle, 2012), while the 
mackerel dispute has not seen this same level of hostile acts, yet is 
marked by diplomatic–economic hostile acts such as termination of 
agreements and trade/landing bans (Spijkers & Boonstra, 2017).
3.2 | Consideration of feedbacks, 
thresholds, and nonlinearity
Few of the reviewed papers explicitly address causal complexity by 
comprehensively assessing multiple potential conflict drivers and in-
tervening variables that are empirically derived. Several shed light 
on the issue of fishery conflict through the theoretical framings 
of international or customary law, for example (5 of 31). In these 
papers, the focus generally lies on understanding the use and im-
portance of certain legal measures within disputes, not explicitly 
identifying potential causes or contributing factors outside of that 
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realm of study (Appendix S1). Framing an analysis around a particu-
lar concept or variable can result in a linear representation of cause 
and effect, not explicitly recognizing potential feedbacks, thresholds 
and nonlinearity. In some cases, however, these authors point to the 
complex causal reality of conflict; Silk (2001), for instance, uses an 
international law framing, noting that “the issues underlying even a 
single- species fishery dispute are often complex, ranging from legal 
issues, biological issues, and economics, to politics” (Silk, 2001, pp. 
792). Many papers reference a multitude of variables throughout 
the text including poor governance (e.g., DuBois & Zografos, 2012; 
Muawanah, Pomeroy, & Marlessy, 2012) and declining resource 
abundance (e.g., van Herten & Runhaar, 2013; Perez, 2009; Song, 
1997), but these papers never set out to empirically derive these 
variables nor to test for their relationship with conflict.
Another example of a linear and potentially oversimplified idea 
of fishery conflict is the concept of eco- scarcity, according to which 
the scarcity of fishery resources leads to increased competition, 
which in turn leads to conflict. Little empirical evidence currently 
exists within the fisheries conflict literature to support claims of 
eco- scarcity as the driver for conflict (Penney et al., 2017). Yet, it is 
an a priori assumption underpinning much of the work on fisheries 
conflict, including the “fish wars cycle” described by Pomeroy et al. 
(2016). Other scholars have also remarked that “conflicts within fish-
eries can be oversimplified by resource scarcity narratives” (Penney 
et al., 2017, pp. 46) and have called for an investigation of more com-
plex and multidimensional causes of conflict.
The two studies of fisheries conflict that have assessed multi-
ple potential conflict drivers (Muawanah et al., 2012; Pomeroy et al., 
2007) generated a deeper and more nuanced understanding of how 
conflict emerges, and how multiple factors have influenced observed 
conflicts. However, these papers are focused on conflict at the sub-
national scale. At the regional and international scales, the primary 
focus has seldom been to assess the relative importance of an array 
of variables, but instead to tell the story of how the dispute emerged 
and changed over time. Moreover, scholars who have focused on 
international fisheries cooperation have generally based their em-
pirical analysis on a single variable, for instance, the maximization of 
economic incentives in game theoretic applications (Bailey, Sumaila, 
& Lindroos, 2010; Hannesson, 2011). Attempting to retroactively 
understand conflict or to predict it with such approaches, especially 
on international scales, reduces the complexity that underlies such 
conflicts and can result in simplistic conclusions.
We argue that the scholarship could benefit from explicitly ad-
dressing causal complexity. This would require comprehensively 
assessing multiple potential conflict drivers (biophysical, socio- 
political, institutional and economic) that are empirically derived, 
and the relationships between them. Moreover, conflict should not 
be seen as solely the outcome of a process, but also as a variable that 
can feed back into the system. Complex adaptive systems thinking 
can be a useful framing tool, as it recognizes nonlinear feedbacks, 
multiple causes, effects and intervening variables that are linked by 
interactive, synergistic and nonlinear causation that can also oper-
ate across different timescales (Cumming, Olsson, Chapin, & Holling, 
2013; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005; Levin et al., 2012; 
Lubchenco, Cerny- Chipman, Reimer, & Levin, 2016). Researchers 
dealing with other types of renewable and non- renewable resource 
conflicts have applied elements of CAS thinking to varying degrees 
in contexts characterized as complex and dynamic. In the freshwater 
literature, for example, emphasis has shifted from trying to identify 
single causes to instead explore environment- conflict connections 
that are substantially caused or affected by political and socio- 
economic factors (Homer- Dixon, 2001; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014; 
von Uexkull, Croicu, Fjelde, & Buhaug, 2016; Yoffe et al., 2004).
Addressing complexity more explicitly will allow us to dis-
tinguish between “necessary” and “sufficient” causes of fishery 
conflict, and the interactions between the two. In the case of nec-
essary causes, the observed outcome of conflict would not have 
TA B L E  1   Categorization of fishery conflict intensities, linked to 
their observable actions and behaviours. Developed as an example 
for applicability to international fishery conflicts
Intensity of observed behaviour/action
Intensity Description
5 Military acts causing death
Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast 
Guards, with resulting deaths
4 Military acts
Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast 
Guards, no death toll
3 Political–military hostile acts
Sending out police vessels/warships
Seize vessel and/or crew
Gear destruction
Reinforcing borders
2 Diplomatic–economic hostile acts









1 Verbal expressions displaying discord or hostility in 
interaction
Failing to reach an agreement
Making threatening demands and accusations
Threatening sanctions
Condemning specific actions, behaviours or policies
Requesting change in policy
Civilian protests
0 Non- significant acts
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happened in the absence of the cause in question; for sufficient 
causes, the observed conflict outcome might have been the same 
regardless of the cause in question (Mahoney, 2008). Translated to 
the world of fisheries conflicts, in some cases, perhaps a decline 
in the resource is a necessary factor to produce a conflict condi-
tion, while an ongoing jurisdictional boundary conflict could be a 
sufficient one. Understanding the distinction between these two 
types of causes is pertinent for assessing, the growing concern that 
climate change will influence the likelihood of conflict overfishery 
resources.
3.3 | Use of comparative approaches and integrative 
methodologies
From the 31 papers that we reviewed in depth, only four offered an 
analysis across multiple conflict case- studies and only two of these 
used quantitative methods. This means that most papers have ana-
lysed single cases of conflict in a qualitative manner, and that little 
has been done to systematically compile quantitative, historical evi-
dence of fisheries conflict. Although single, qualitative case- studies 
on fishery conflict are valuable, comprehensive quantitative studies 
on fishery conflict could help us understand linkages and dynamics 
across multiple case- studies and over time.
The lack of comparative data and analysis has restricted un-
derstanding of the prevalence and geography of fishery conflicts 
around the world. The majority of the studies assessed here deal 
with conflicts among states in the North Pacific and North Atlantic; 
for instance between the US and Canada (8 of 31) or, more recently, 
conflicts involving Asian actors such as Japan (Appendix S1). Such 
trends are also apparent from the text- mining analysis applied to the 
larger set of 1,941 conflict articles. We found that the majority of 
work has focused on the world’s most industrialized countries, with 
few studies in the least developed countries, a trend that seems to 
be continuing (Figure 1).
Second, the lack of large sets of comparative data means schol-
ars have not been able to test if certain relationships between vari-
ables that have been anecdotally connected to fishery conflict exist 
across a larger set of cases. Case- studies of fishery conflict (e.g., 
in Box 1) suggest general patterns, but empirical analysis of (large) 
comparable datasets is necessary to resolve questions of causality. 
Obtaining such data can help to validate the robustness of the re-
lationships suggested by case- studies on fisheries conflicts, and to 
investigate new potential relationships that would inform a realistic 
model for fisheries conflict. The predominance of qualitative single 
case- studies has generated depth and richness but also represents a 
lack of comprehensiveness in methodologies available to understand 
F I G U R E  1   Frequency with which the fishery conflict literature from 2007 to 2016 referred to countries within specific (a) socio- economic 
groupings; (b) regional groupings. The United Nations has identified 47 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), characterized by low levels of socio- 
economic development; conversely, the 35 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are among the 
world’s most highly industrialized countries. Hierarchical clustering and color- coded frequency (blue representing the lowest frequency and red 
the highest) are provided at the top of each heatmap. Data source: Scopus 2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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and explain fishery conflict. Expanding the methodological toolbox 
to include Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) or agent- based com-
puter simulations could advance efforts to understand the variables 
associated with fishery conflict (Helbing, 2013).
A global database of fishery conflicts would provide the large- 
scale comparative data needed to (i) get an understanding of the 
geography and prevalence of fishery disputes over time; (ii) test for 
relationships between conflict variables across multiple cases; and 
(iii) open the door for a more diversified repertoire of methodolo-
gies. Research on other forms of natural resource conflicts provides 
useful guidance in this respect. The systematic collection of data 
on conflict over freshwater resources (Transboundary Freshwater 
Dispute Database), for example, resulted in a framework for quan-
titative, global- scale assessments of the relationship between 
freshwater resources and international cooperation and conflict 
(Yoffe et al., 2004). Here, the approach was to use a standardized 
event database to move beyond the case- study approach to include 
large sets of GIS and contextual data. This theoretical and empirical 
foundation enabled scholars to use forecasting methods to assess 
the predictive power of selected explanatory factors (Bernauer & 
Bohmelt, 2014). Drawing on some of these tested approaches could 
provide promising avenues for expanding our knowledge of fishery 
conflicts.
3.4 | Usage of higher order systems concepts and 
associated terminology
In SES research, higher order concepts and terminology are used to 
describe pattern–process dynamics that emerge from complex sys-
tem interactions and dynamics. Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, Link, 
and Schilling (2012) have argued that debates describing links be-
tween the climate system, natural resources, societal stability and 
human security lack complexity. In trying to inject some of that miss-
ing complexity back into the research, they use higher order systems 
terminology to describe the links between natural resources, the cli-
mate and conflict, that is the terms “resilience,” “adaptation/adaptive 
capacity,” “vulnerability,” “sensitivity,” “feedbacks,” “tipping points” 
and “thresholds.” We searched our selected review articles to de-
termine whether the literature on conflict overfishery resources had 
implemented this terminology in their analyses.
Twenty of the 31 reviewed papers did not use higher order sys-
tems terminology, and the large majority of those not using any such 
terms are papers from disciplines such as law and international re-
lations. Within those scientific communities, it is not often explic-
itly recognized that there is a complex set of interactions between 
the climate system, natural resources, human security and societal 
stability, as they often approach the topic of fishery conflicts to un-
derstand a single variable such as the effectiveness of a particular 
international regulation. However, several fishery conflict scholars 
have used higher order systems terminology such as “vulnerability” 
and “adaptive capacity” to reflect their recognition of complexities in 
the relationships between natural resources, the climate system and 
conflict; here, we describe a few of these usages.
The first to explicitly acknowledge the complexity of marine SES, 
and conflict as a component within that system, through the usage 
of higher order systems terminology was Charles (1992): “In any bio- 
socio- economic system as complex and as dynamic as a fishery, with 
its many interactions amongst natural resources, humans and insti-
tutions, it is hardly surprising that conflict tends to be prevalent”. 
In that same year, Mirovitskaya and Haney (1992) also recognized 
the complexity of marine SES and threshold within those and explic-
itly mentioned the interconnectedness of conflicts overfishery re-
sources. However, the use of higher order systems terminology was 
restricted to terms merely describing marine systems as complex 
and interconnected, not yet using concepts such as “vulnerability,” 
“resilience” or “adaptive capacity” to describe the internal properties 
of the marine SES.
From 2000, Miller (co)- authored four papers that at first ap-
plied the terms “sensitivity,” “resilience,” and later on used the terms 
“vulnerability,” “adaptive capacity,” and “thresholds” in the con-
text of conflict within marine SES. In the latest paper, for example, 
“resilience” and “adaptability” are used by the authors to connect 
changing dynamics of fishery resources induced by the climate to 
emerging conflict: they argue that to effectively govern shared fish-
eries in the face of changing environmental conditions “(…) mech-
anisms to improve the resilience and adaptability of cooperative 
management arrangements to environmental perturbations” are 
needed (Miller et al., 2013, pp. 326). After Miller, a few authors used 
the term “vulnerability” (albeit exclusively in papers approaching 
fishery conflict from a natural resource management perspective) 
to describe the links between overfishing, vulnerability to climate 
impacts and conflict.
An important contribution in the usage of higher order sys-
tems terminology comes from a paper by Gänsbauer, Bechtold, and 
Wilfing (2016), where it is explicitly recognized that there is a “neces-
sity to acknowledge [the current international fishery management] 
as a complex adaptive system”. They introduce new concepts such as 
“emergent properties” and “nested hierarchies” into the description 
of marine SESs and the role of conflict. However, the terms are used 
only a single time as a descriptor of the system and not as tools for 
analysis. Nonetheless, the paper marks a shift into a deeper scien-
tific understanding of the characteristics of marine SESs that can 
help us to understand conflict overfishery resources.
4  | CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF 
FISHERIES CONFLIC T RESE ARCH
A rapidly expanding body of research dealing with fisheries conflict 
suggests a growing interest and concern over the potential for in-
creased conflict overfishery resources. This concern is justified from 
a historical perspective, as fisheries have been connected to conflict 
through an array of potential mediating variables such as climate 
variability, rapid population growth, social inequality and the expan-
sion of economic zones around coastal nations. All of these factors 
are projected to remain or even intensify in future years. Greater 
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understanding of the risk potential of commonly cited drivers such 
as climate variability will depend on filling in gaps in the fisheries 
conflict literature. The four gaps that we have identified are:
1. The lack of fishery conflict definitions that are precise, that 
distinguish among degrees of conflict intensity and that specify 
which actions or behaviours are indicative of different levels 
of conflict intensity.
2. The absence of (large sets) of comparative conflict data, and con-
sequently narrowness in the methods used to assess the drivers 
of fishery conflict.
3. The lack of theoretical framings that explicitly recognize nonlinear 
and dynamic feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and intervening 
variables; and that are translated into appropriate methodologies 
for complexity.
4. Although the complexity of marine SES and conflict’s role within 
that system is recognized through the use of terms such as “adap-
tive capacity” and “vulnerability,” there is room for a more wide-
spread extension of higher order concepts and associated 
terminology.
As the topic of fishery conflict becomes increasingly salient 
and considering the well- documented importance of fisheries for 
human well- being, researchers focused on fisheries conflict are well- 
positioned to make a practical contribution to more sustainable and 
cooperative use of fisheries resources. Doing so will require supple-
menting individual case- studies with more generalizable approaches to 
develop a deeper understanding of the complex interaction between 
drivers of fisheries conflict and how to avoid or mitigate them. This will 
enable more precision and a deeper understanding that is not only sci-
entifically significant, but increasingly important for policymakers and 
practitioners operating in a turbulent world.
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A B S T R A C T
International fisheries conflict can cause crises by threatening maritime security, ecosystems and livelihoods. In
a highly connected world, the possibility for localized fisheries conflict to escalate into ‘systemic risks’, where
risk in one domain such as food supply can increase risk in another domain such as maritime security and
international relations, is growing. However, countries often choose hard-line actions rather than strategies
initiating or repairing fisheries cooperation. To design, prioritize and implement more effective responses, a
deeper understanding of the temporal and regional patterns of fisheries conflict is needed. Here, we present
novel findings from the first global and longitudinal database of international fisheries conflict between
1974–2016. We explore the characteristics of conflict over time and develop a typology of eight distinct types of
conflict. Fisheries conflict increased between 1974 and 2016, with substantial variation in both the type of
conflict and the countries involved. Before 2000, fisheries conflict involved mostly North American and
European countries fighting over specific species. Since then, conflict primarily involved Asian countries
clashing over multiple and nonspecified species linked to illegal fishing practices. We use this empirical data to
consider potential response strategies that can foster maritime security and thereby contribute to broader so-
cietal stability.
1. Introduction
Fisheries conflict has the potential to reshape global international
relations by threatening maritime security, ecosystems and livelihoods.
Conflict over fisheries in the 1960s and 1970s triggered the establish-
ment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) for coastal states in the
1980s. A single fishery offense over halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglos-
soides) escalated into serious tensions between Canada and Spain in the
mid-1990s (Sullivan, 1997). More recently, conflict over fisheries in the
EU has fuelled British nationalist sentiments and the successful “Leave”
campaign to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union
(EU) (Appleby and Harrison, 2017). Prolonged shifts in the distribution
of the northeast Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in the Atlantic
triggered an international dispute over the stock’s management, re-
sulting in unilateral import embargos, vessel seizures and access re-
strictions, which in turn played a role in Iceland’s decision to withdraw
its application for EU membership (Spijkers and Boonstra, 2017).
Repeated Chinese fishing fleet incursions into foreign waters have
sparked diplomatic and military tensions between China and countries
both near (e.g. Philippines), and far (e.g. Argentina) (Zhang, 2016).
Incursions by foreign trawlers into the Somalian EEZ incited conflict
between Somali and foreign fishers, and, according to some scholars,
contributed to the emergence of piracy in the region (Sumaila and
Bawumia, 2014, Belhabib et al. 2019, for a different view on this link,
see Hansen, 2011). Even seemingly unobtrusive or ‘subdued’ interna-
tional fisheries conflicts, characterized by hostile verbal interactions
and the failure to reach management agreements, threaten trans-
boundary fish stocks (Ishimura et al., 2014).
These examples show how international conflicts over fish can, and
have, created cascading ruptures in humanity’s highly interconnected
social systems (Helbing, 2013). Fisheries conflict is often the outcome
of interdependent failures within our global system due to interactions
between conditions such as climate change, fragile states, food security
concerns, extractivist logics, and unresolved territorial disputes, and
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can escalate to become so-called “systemic risks” (Pomeroy et al., 2007;
Helbing, 2013; Galaz et al., 2017). Systemic risk is here defined ac-
cording to Helbing (2013,pp.51) as “the risk of having not just statis-
tically independent failures, but interdependent, so-called ‘cascading’
failures in a network of N interconnected system components”. The
potential for fisheries conflict to escalate into systemic risk in the future
and trigger cascading shocks throughout the global system is an im-
portant concern for policy makers. Potential developments include, for
instance, that increasing domestic demands for fish in combination with
collapsing stocks could be met with increasingly aggressive resource
grabs and open conflict between states (Higgins-Bloom, 2018). Along-
side oil and mineral resources, fisheries have already proven to be a
common source of international conflict (Mitchell and Prins, 1999).
Although the particular focus in this paper is interstate conflict, sig-
nificant disputes over marine resources also occur regularly between
communities and individuals within states (McClanahan et al., 2015;
Morrison, 2017).
Conditions known to trigger fisheries conflict are likely to become
more widespread and interactive in the future (Pinsky et al., 2018).
Through altered water temperatures, changing ocean currents and
coastal upwelling patterns, climate change is affecting the distribution
and potential yield of marine species (Cheung et al., 2010; Sumaila
et al., 2011; Jones and Cheung, 2017). Shifts in abundance and dis-
tribution are increasingly understood as a security threat, as those
changes are expected to disrupt management of fish stocks (Spijkers
and Boonstra, 2017; Pinsky et al., 2018). Additionally, overfishing and
resulting declines in catches (Pauly and Zeller, 2016) are also con-
sidered to be potential security threats and may directly result in in-
creased levels of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing
(Österblom et al., 2011). Security threats might then arise due to an
increase in frontier-related incidents involving transboundary poaching
and IUU fishing (Boonstra and Österblom, 2014; Yeh et al., 2015;
Hughes et al., 2012). Climate change, increased resource scarcity, il-
legal activity and territorial disputes are just some of the worrying
global conditions and trends that increase the possibility of interna-
tional fisheries conflict becoming a systemic risk in the future, causing
disruptions to propagate through global networks (Pomeroy et al.,
2007; Pinsky et al., 2018; Zervaki, 2018, Belhabib et al. 2019). Mar-
itime security scholars are increasingly recognizing this potential risk,
and have identified that fishery conflicts cannot be grasped in isolation,
but are embedded within broader and often synergetic relations in-
cluding vulnerability, poverty, adaptation, and resilience (Germond
and Mazaris, 2019; Pomeroy et al., 2016).
Hard-line and crisis-driven actions characterizing many interna-
tional fisheries conflicts show us that, currently, governance institutions
often lack an efficient, swift and peaceful approach to detect and re-
spond to conflict in fisheries. Actions range from vessel seizures, to port
closures and even the attack of vessels, and can prolong disputes to the
detriment of international relationships and raise concern for the sus-
tainability of fishery resources (Spijkers and Boonstra, 2017). Pro-
longed conflict and insecurity can open up areas to increased fishing
efforts by third parties as physical control of the territory wanes
(Hendrix and Glaser, 2011), while the potential for conflict can result in
accommodation, co-optation or corruption on the part of enforcement
forces, thereby undermining sound management of fisheries (Sumaila
et al., 2017; Belhabib et al., 2018a,b).
For governance systems to adequately respond to fisheries conflict
and systemic risks in the face of environmental and societal change,
scholars have called for the increased monitoring of system dynamics
(Helbing, 2013; Galaz et al., 2017; Frank et al., 2014) and the collection
of ‘big data’ to develop realistic explanatory models to ultimately better
understand the occurences and drivers of systemic risks (Helbing, 2013;
Spijkers et al., 2018). Monitoring systems and scanning for trends to
detect early warning signals of risks are vital to increase the necessary
institutional capacity to adequately respond, for example by developing
appropriate conflict mitigation measures (Galaz et al., 2017; Boyd et al.,
2015). There has, however, been little monitoring of occurences of
fisheries conflict, and large, comparative datasets have been non-
existent. As a result, we have little knowledge of the diversity, geo-
graphy and frequency of international fisheries conflict (Spijkers et al.,
2018), which raises the risk of leaving these potentially systemic risks
undetected. Moreover, being unaware of the different types of conflict
that might occur raises the risk of implementing ineffective governance
strategies (as strategies tend to be appropriate only for specific kinds of
conflicts (Slimani et al., 2006)).
In this study, we provide the first longitudinal analysis that uses a
large comparative dataset to scan for global patterns and trends in in-
ternational fisheries conflict. We answer the following questions:
1) What is the frequency of international fisheries conflict over time?
2) What types of fisheries conflict events exist internationally and what
actors are involved?
3) What strategies are used to respond to different types of conflict?
To answer these questions, we apply descriptive statistics, ordina-
tion and cluster techniques on novel data from the International Fishery
Conflict Database (IFCD), which was developed from media reports of
fisheries conflict to explore international conflicts over fishery re-
sources between 1974 and 2016, n= 531 fisheries conflict events (see
Materials and Methods). In that database, we tracked six variables: the
countries involved in the conflict event, the species mentioned, the date
of the event, the intensity of the observed behaviour or action in the
event (based on the scale from Spijkers et al. (2018), see Table 1),
whether the event mentioned a specific territory under dispute, and
whether the event was linked to IUU fishing or not. Those variables are
used to analyze which types of conflicts have occurred.
Table 1
Intensity of observed behaviour/action. Source: Spijkers et al., 2018.
Intensity of observed behaviour/action
Intensity Description
5 Military acts causing death
- Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast Guards, with
resulting deaths
4 Military acts
- -Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast Guards, no
death toll
3 Political-military hostile acts
- Sending out police vessels/ warships
- Seize vessel and/or crew
- Gear destruction
- Reinforcing borders
2 Diplomatic-economic hostile acts
- Breaking or not adhering to existing agreement
- Lawsuit
- Trial in court






1 Verbal expressions displaying discord or hostility in interaction
- Failing to reach an agreement
- Making threatening demands and accusations
- Threatening sanctions
- Condemning specific actions, behaviors or policies
- Requesting change in policy
- Civilian protests
0 Non-significant acts
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2. Materials and methods
2.1. The international fishery conflict database
The IFCD contains 531 reported conflict events between 1974 and
2016. It was set up to explore international conflicts over fishery re-
sources by using event data, i.e. detailed records of interactions be-
tween actors (countries) (Shellman, 2004). An international fishery
conflict is a dispute:
(a) actualized through ‘conflict events’, which are actions or behaviors
ranging from an exchange of statements to severe military in-
volvement and casualties (as defined by the ‘intensity of observed
behavior’ scale, see Table 1).
(b) occurring between two or more states and/or vessels that fly their
flag;
(c) related to access to a fishery resource or management of a fishery
resource;
(d) potentially occurring in the larger context of a maritime territorial
conflict, where the fishery resource contributes to some degree to
that territorial conflict;
(e) spanning any length of time.
Event data were identified through the LexisNexis Academic (LNA)
database, the world's largest repository of media reports, using the
following search terms: “trade ban”, “seize AND vessel”, “close w/5
ports”, “no w/5 agreement”, “sanction”, “attack w/5 vessel”, "conflict
AND tribunal" in combination with 28 specific fish species, as well as
the general term of “fish” (w/5 means ‘within five words’). The search
terms were used to detect the actions and behaviors from the intensity
scale (see Table 1 displaying the scale developed by Spijkers et al.
(2018), based on reviewed fishery as well as fresh water conflict lit-
erature). The 28 specific species were selected based on the commercial
groups within the SeaAroundUs database (Pauly & Zeller, 2015) (see SI
Table S1). We entered into the database those results that were relevant
based on our definition of a conflict event. We tracked the following
event characteristics: number of countries involved, the species men-
tioned, the date, the intensity of the observed behaviour or action
(Table 1), whether a specific territory under dispute was mentioned,
and whether or not it was linked to IUU fishing. We tracked territorial
disputes and IUU because those variables spark much concern among
scholars in terms of future maritime security (45), and because they are
maritime security threats that can be a feature of a larger fisheries
conflict. In contrast, we did not track maritime security threats such as
human trafficking or smuggling (Bueger, 2015), because they are not a
direct feature of a fisheries conflict that centers primarily around the
ownership or management of fish. Once the database was assembled,
we grouped different conflict events together that were continuations of
the same conflict over time, which are those that happened between the
same countries or the same species (see SI Methods: IFCD for further
details).
We ran several analyses to understand if the IFCD was biased by the
media sources we extracted it from. Firstly, to analyze if the conflict
data within the IFCD was correlated to the level of English media
output in different countries (see SI Figure S2 for further details on
coverage by LNA), we extracted the content list from the LNA website
(from the European region) for analysis. This content list is available for
download through the database’s webpage and contains information,
amongst others, on the date of addition of all news sources, their cov-
erage start/end, the geographical region covered, and the language of
the news source. This allowed us to assess to what extent media cov-
erage of a given country or year in LNA affects the frequency of conflict
events for that given country or year within the IFCD. We also extracted
the Press Freedom Index scores for the countries in the IFCD (Reporters
Without Borders, 2018). After using robust regression (downweighing
outliers) with heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors, we did not
find that either the media coverage in the LNA or the press freedom
score of a country had a significant relationship with conflict frequency
in the IFCD for that country. We tested this relationship for all countries
in the IFCD, but also looked more closely into that relationship for those
countries in the database where the primary de facto spoken language
or de jure language is English, and ran an analysis for the USA in
particular (as it was an outlier in the previous analyses) (see SI Results:
Media Bias). None of the analyses showed a consistent relationship
between media coverage in the LNA and conflict frequency in the IFCD.
Secondly, to analyze if the conflict data per year is correlated to the
amount of media coverage per year, we extracted the list of publishers
from the LNA website (the European region). Using cross correlation
analysis, we found no significant correlation between conflict and
media coverage, even when taking into account time lags (see SI Figure
S4). Although we found no evidence of undue influence of media
coverage on country or yearly conflict frequency within the IFCD, we
note that this does not mean the database is free of any bias as a result
from searching English media: we warn for the likely underreporting of
(minor) conflicts in regions with non-English speaking news media
within the IFCD, such as countries located in South America and Africa.
For a more elaborate discussion on the media bias analyses, see SI
Results: Media Bias.
2.2. Conflict event categorization
To distinguish between different types of fisheries conflict, we use
non-metric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) complemented with
hierarchical cluster analysis to categorize different types of fisheries
conflict based on the variables that characterize the conflicts (including
potentially causal correlates) (Chatfield, 2018; Dixon, 2003). First, we
use NMDS to visualize conflict event groupings based on multivariate
dissimilarity, and we determined the variables that explain the spread
of conflict events across groups. We chose to conduct our NMDS along
three axes because this was the minimum number of axes where a
computationally stable result was generated with low stress. Our re-
sulting NMDS plot had a stress value of 0.085, indicating low distortion
from 7-dimensional space to 3-dimensional space (see SI Figure S9).
Second, we use hierarchical cluster analysis to determine the
grouping of conflict events and complement the NMDS. For the hier-
archical clustering, we use scree plots of the dissimilarity between
clusters versus the number of clusters to determine a number of clusters
that forms a natural break where there is comparatively not much more
dissimilarity difference by adding an additional cluster (Henry et al.,
2005). We conducted each of the analyses using three widely used
dissimilarity measures (Jaccard’s, Bray-Curtis, and Gower’s), and found
all three to generate the same clusters. We use the results from the
Gower’s dissimilarity as this dissimilarity measure is best suited for
mixed-data situations (Legendre and Legendre, 2012). All categorical
data with two states (IUU fishing and whether an event was part of a
larger territorial dispute) was converted to a binary variable, and ca-
tegorical variables with three states (the type of fishery) was converted
to dummy variables for the analysis.
We then ran a time series analysis of the clusters to understand
when in time the clusters were more or less present, and combined this
with the place-specific data (i.e. continents) to understand which
combinations of conflict between continents are most represented in the
clusters (see SI Figure S10). We used the R package vegan for NMDS
and clustering analysis (Oksanen et al., 2018). We used the R packages
MASS (Venables and Ripley, 2002) and lmtest (Zeileis and Hothorn,
2002) for the regression analysis. From that, we also got the frequency
of continent configurations per conflict cluster (see SI Table S2).
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3. Results
3.1. Fisheries conflict increases over time
The frequency of conflict has increased since 1974, although there
was a period of lower reported conflict between approximately
1998–2007 (Fig. 1). Intra-continental conflict (64.8% of all conflict
events) was more common than inter-continental conflict (35.2% of all
conflict events) during the entire time period. The USA was involved in
most conflict over time, followed by Canada, Japan, China and the EU;
all of these high-conflict countries have been predominantly in conflict
with countries located within the same continent (see SI Figure S1). As
discussed above, we ran analyses, but found no evidence that the da-
taset we developed was biased due to national differences in media
coverage, the degree of press freedom, nor a reflection of the amount of
media coverage per year (Materials and Methods).
3.2. Changes in fisheries conflict types over time
The non-metric multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis
(Materials and Methods) identified eight different types of fisheries
conflict events (Fig. 2).
Despite the eight types of fisheries conflict, there are overarching
general trends across all conflict events. Firstly, Type A (discord over a
particular species), has been the most commonly occurring conflict
event between countries over time (35.0% of all conflict events).
Secondly, almost all deadly conflict events have occurred over non-
specific species (84.6% of all deadly conflict events). Finally, for all
types it was rare for events to take place between more than two
countries, yet if this did occur, the event was most likely to be conflict
Type A (21.0% of Type A events take place between more than two
countries).
The occurrence of the eight different conflict event types within and
between continents are illustrated in Fig. 3. Three different constella-
tions of conflict were particularly frequent: intra-North America con-
flict, intra-Europe conflict, conflict between Europe and North America
and intra-Asia conflict, which collectively represent 74.8% of all con-
flict events. In the following, we examine the conflict trends across each
of those four constellations over time (Materials and Methods).
3.3. Intra-continental conflict in North America and Europe
Conflicts between North American countries (19.2% of all events)
and between European countries (17.1% of all events) have been si-
milar in types observed throughout time. Discord over a particular
species (conflict event Type A) is the main kind of conflict occurring
among North American countries and among European countries, such
as over cod (Gadus morhua), salmon (Salmo salar) or Albacore tuna
(Thunnus alalonga). Those conflicts largely occurred in the past for
North America, while Europe is currently dealing with fishery disputes
surrounding the northeast Atlantic mackerel and Atlanto-Scandian
herring (Clupea harengus). Besides these low intensity discords over a
particular species, North American actors have also been involved in
some shows of force triggered by illegal catches of specific species
(Type C conflict events), which can have a higher intensity. However,
those are no longer very common.
3.4. Europe-North America conflict trends
European and North American countries have often been involved
in international fisheries conflicts (11.5% of all conflict events). Similar
to the intra-Europe and intra-North American conflicts, the conflict is
generally associated with a particular species (Type A conflict events)
such as cod or, more recently, American plaice (Hippoglossoides pla-
tessoides). These events occur relatively consistently throughout time. A
type of conflict event that frequently occurred between European and
North American countries before the turn of the century is the diplo-
matic hostility over a particular fish linked to unresolved territorial
tensions (Type F conflict events). That type is exemplified by the cod
dispute between France and Canada linked to disagreements around the
extent of the maritime jurisdiction of St-Pierre and Miquelon.
3.5. Intra-Asia conflict trends
Intra-Asia conflicts occur most frequently (26.9% of all conflict
events) and the region is most diverse in the types of conflict events
Fig. 1. Conflict events (bars) and conflicts (orange line), 1974–2016. Conflicts are aggregated events part of the same overall conflict (see Materials and Methods).
LOESS smoother (red line) added for visual interpretation of growth in conflicts (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article).
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documented (all different types have occurred for intra-Asia conflict).
Since 2000, 43.0% of all international fisheries conflict events occurred
between Asian countries. The most violent events have also taken place
between Asian countries (sometimes resulting in the death of fishermen
or Coast Guard officials). The most common kind of intra-Asia conflict
event is the acute conflict over illegal catches of non-specific fish spe-
cies (Type B conflict events), which have increasingly occurred since
2004. The second most common type is hostility over non-specific fish
species (Type D conflict events), which became more frequent over the
past decade. Quarrels over territories with general fish biomass is the
third most frequently occurring conflict event between Asian countries
(Type H events). Those disputes include competing claims for fishery
rights around the islands off eastern Hokkaido (the Kuril Islands,
claimed by both Russia and Japan), the Senkaku Islands (disputed by
Japan, China, and Taiwan) and the Scarborough Shoal (claimed by both
China and the Philippines). These conflicts events have been most
common from 2007-2016.
4. Discussion
4.1. Examining changing patterns of international fisheries conflict
Our analysis suggests that the nature of, and countries engaged in,
fisheries conflict have changed substantially over the past 40 years.
Many of the countries most frequently involved in conflict are large
industrial fishing powers known to dominate global fishing efforts, but
they have engaged in conflict at different points in time (Teh and
Sumaila, 2015; Tickler et al., 2018). Spain and the UK, for instance,
dominate European fishing effort along with Russia (Anticamara et al.,
2011), and are among the ten countries with the largest number of
fisheries conflict events. In Asia, Japan was long the dominant fishing
power in terms of fishing effort, but has more recently been surpassed
by China and South Korea (Tickler et al., 2018). All three are also
among the ten countries most frequently involved in conflict. The USA
and Canada are responsible for the majority of North/Central American
fishing effort, again often engaged in conflict in the past. Some coun-
tries have large Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleets that have con-
tinually expanded their geographical presence and have been cited for
engaging in illegal or unreported fishing (such as the DFW fleets of
certain European countries and China, see (Belhabib et al., 2015;
Carolin, 2015)); which could be a reason for their frequent engagement
in conflict with other nations.
Type A, C and F conflict events involving North American and
European actors (related to single species, mostly characterized by low
conflict intensity and sometimes territorial disputes), were relatively
common particularly before the turn of the century. This echoes find-
ings by Daniels and Mitchell (2017) that advanced democracies reg-
ularly have conflict over maritime issues (with the Americas in parti-
cular exhibiting high rates of maritime conflict). They suggest that this
is likely the consequence of being more able and thus active to pursue
claims, and having relatively high levels of economic activity in their
maritime domains (Daniels and Mitchell, 2017). After the turn of the
century, conflict involving North America and European states became
less common, as many conflicts were resolved through negotiated
agreements. Important changes to the system’s institutional archi-
tecture were made through agreements over boundaries, such as the
decision by the International Court of Justice in 1984 on the Georges
Bank delineation; and agreements over fisheries management, such as
the Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty in 1985 for the Pacific North-
west, revised in 1999 (Rogers and Stewart, 1997), and the Trans-
boundary Resource Assessment Committee for the Gulf of Maine in
1998 (Pudden and Vanderzwaag, 2007). Those institutional changes
contributed to de-escalating fisheries conflict and preventing them from
cascading throughout the system. In addition, it is also conceivable that
conflict among and between North American and European actors has
subsided in part due to a relatively high rate of species collapse in the
higher latitudes (Watson and Pauly, 2013), potentially leaving less to
argue over after the year 2000.
Fig. 2. Eight conflict event types and their narrative descriptions.
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The frequency of Type B, D and H conflict events between countries
in East and Southeast Asia (focused around non-specified fish species)
can be explained by the multispecies fisheries common to tropical and
highly diverse marine ecosystems. The increase in fisheries conflict
between Asian actors might be a consequence of overfishing of major
fisheries in temperate northern waters, and subsequent displacement of
conflict risk to other regions by relocating the locus of fishing effort
(Watson and Pauly, 2013; Worm and Branch, 2012), combined with
subsequent overfishing within the Asian region. The conflict events are
often characterized by illegal fishing and higher intensity actions,
which likely reflects the rapid expansion of fishing effort by East and
Southeast Asian fleets, such as those from China (Rogers and Stewart,
1997; Blasiak et al., 2015) and South Korea (Anticamera et al., 2011).
Competition for control of resources with other states, as well as illegal
activities and (violent) conflicts, ramped up since 2007 (Carolin, 2015).
Low intensity disputes over specific species also occur between Asian
countries, such as the ongoing conflict over Pacific saury (Cololabis
saira) where Japan has proposed setting catch limits for the stock but
has seen its proposal blocked by China (Kyodo, 2018). Our analyses
show that disputed territories in Asia currently present grave security
concerns for fisheries. As fleets venture farther out, crew risk entering
off-limits or disputed waters and engaging in fishing potentially un-
authorized due to ongoing territorial rivalry (Mallory, 2013).
4.2. Response strategies
There are historical precedents for strategies that have been effec-
tively put in place by countries to respond to certain conflict types we
have considered, and we outline those below. We distinguish between
foundational and specialized risk mitigation strategies for the different
conflict types (Table 2). Foundational strategies are those that have
proven generally helpful in resolving conflict of any kind, whereas
specific strategies are those that can help prevent particular types of
conflict from escalating. We note that these strategies are mostly
technical and legal in nature, and might not efficiently address issues
that have deeper social, political or economic roots requiring much
Fig. 3. Distribution of intra-continental (A) and inter-continental conflict events (B).1974–2016.
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broader solutions.
For all conflict types, creating a shared scientific understanding
of stocks and aquatic ecosystems more generally has historically proven
valuable as a first step to conflict mitigation.
Scientific collaboration, through shared monitoring and coordinated
data collection, often provides a basis for negotiation. The establish-
ment of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission -
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), for example, was crucial as it served
as a platform for a non-threatening political exchange between the
Soviet Union and the other Baltic states. The literature on trans-
boundary cooperation over fresh water resources underscores the im-
portance of joint fact-finding among nations as an important catalytic
tool to move from conflict to cooperation, where information disclosure
through data-sharing and monitoring is regarded as a first and key step
in conflict management (Xie and Jia, 2017; Mitchell and Zawahri, 2015;
Uitto and Duda, 2002). However, scientific collaboration on fishery
issues is not implemented in certain areas with high conflict risk, with
substantial constraints existing in the volatile South China Sea (Zhang,
2018), although it could be initiated by an existing regional governing
body (such as the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
(SEAFDEC)).
The establishment of shared enforcement activities, especially in
areas where conflict relates to IUU, is another important foundational
strategy to reduce conflict risk. The Joint Fisheries Commission be-
tween Russia and Norway, for example, is an arena where countries
exchange observers on each other's control vessels or coordinate sa-
tellite tracking systems, which has aided in creating a coordinated re-
sponse to rampant IUU (Stokke, 2009). The lack of joint enforcement
actions not only leads to an uneven marine space where areas of high
enforcement and monitoring create spaces with high fishing pressure
but no enforcement; it can also result in violent, militarized conflict
responses to IUU between countries. However, in fisheries conflicts
where not only IUU is an issue but also overlapping territorial claims,
addressing territorial boundary tensions is a pre-requisite, and one not
easily fulfilled. For example, being a party to UNCLOS encourages the
use of third-party dispute settlement techniques, but it does not reduce
militarized tensions over contested maritime spaces between states
(Nemeth et al., 2014).
Side payments, or compensating transfers in the form of monetary
or in-kind compensation from one party of a conflict to another, provide
incentives to stay in a coalition where otherwise payoffs between
countries would differ (Cole et al., 2014). This kind of conflict mitiga-
tion tool requires some form of an established institution for the pur-
pose of collaborative management (such as a Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Organization (RFMO)). Side payments in the form of
contributions to a conservation fund helped resolve a number of con-
flicts surrounding specific species, such as the Pacific salmon conflict
between the USA and Canada (Pinsky et al., 2018; Miller and Munro,
2004). More recently, side payments have been put forth as a tool to
resolve the northeast Atlantic mackerel dispute, where access to or
quota for other species such as Atlanto-Scandian herring could be used
to increase the scope for bargaining and forego conflict.
Long-term management plans that allow for changes in stock
distributions have proven to be essential in creating successful fisheries
management plans for specific stocks, if territorial issues and IUU
fishing are largely absent (Bundy et al., 2017). The revised Pacific
Salmon Treaty (1999), for example, replaced short-term management
regimes with a longer-term plan where harvest shares were defined on
stock abundance indices (Rogers and Stewart, 1997), avoiding frequent
renegotiation of catch allocation. Coupled with side payments, the re-
vised long-term management plan significantly enhanced collaboration
between the parties.
Provisional fishery agreements that explicitly recognize terri-
torial disputes will be essential in avoiding fisheries conflict in areas
with overlapping territorial claims. Taiwan and Japan, for example,
recognized this issue and forged in 2013 a fisheries agreement desig-
nating the waters around the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands a ‘non-specific
area’, thereby treating territorial sovereignty as a separate issue (Yeh
et al., 2015). This agreement reduced tensions and helped to promote
stability in the East China Sea, as fishermen have been able to avoid
detention or penalties from the opposing claimant country (Yeh et al.,
2015).
Stringent IUU policies are necessary to avoid conflicts events
characterized by IUU. There are a few effective, non-belligerent IUU
policies that can be implemented by coastal states, such as banning
transshipment (or the transfer of fish between boats) at sea or requiring
a vessel monitoring system (VMS) tracking the vessel’s location. Both
policies were implemented recently by Indonesia, with great success
(Cabral et al., 2018). Market states that are major consumers of fish can
demand stricter traceability standards to combat IUU in foreign waters.
The EU, for example, requires catch documentation for imported sea-
food. Modifying the policies and procedures of financial services in the
insurance sector in such a manner that it denies benefits to those that
engage in IUU fishing, could greatly reduce conflicts related to this il-
legal practice (Miller et al., 2016). Other measures should include
preventing the reflagging of fishing vessels to tax havens, removing
subsidies from fishing fleet owners and investors tied to IUU activities,
and more comprehensively listing vessels, companies, and beneficial
owners involved in illegal fishing activities (Belhabib and Le Billon,
2018).
4.3. Response gaps
There are historical examples of successful strategies for fishery
conflict de-escalation. However, there is no standardized, swift proce-
dure for dealing with conflict situations in a non-escalatory manner yet,
and it often takes years for governments to agree on an effective
strategy to end conflicts that have already damaged international re-
lations and fish stocks. Moreover, the two foundational strategies are
not applied in certain conflict-prone areas: to our knowledge, scientific
collaboration between South-East Asian countries, for example, has
only been initiated in a few areas (such as the Coral Triangle Initiative
for Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security between six Asian countries
in the Coral Triangle (Weeks et al., 2014)) despite an increase in Type D
events. This is problematic as, depending on the extent of warming,
certain EEZs in East Asia are projected to receive up to 10 new stocks by
Table 2
Selection of foundational and specific response strategies for the different conflict types.
A B C D E F G H
Foundational strategies Scientific collaboration
Shared enforcement









IUU policies IUU policies
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the end of the century (Pinsky et al., 2018), and new entrants into al-
ready saturated territories are more likely to spark disagreement
(Blasiak et al., 2015). These response gaps increase the possibility for
conflicts to become systemic risks. To promote wider and swifter im-
plementation of the strategies discussed, deep changes to the current
international governance framework for fisheries will be necessary
(through, for example, revisions of RFMO competences and operations
(Pinsky et al., 2018)).
Besides responding swiftly to conflict once it has erupted, countries
also need to manage the incremental stressors that either drive conflict
to erupt in the first place, or that push fisheries conflicts to become
systemic risks. For this, more region-specific research is needed into
underlying and proximate drivers of conflict, and how they interact to
produce wider systemic risks. We suggest three specific topics for at-
tention: the impacts of climate change as a driver (so as to better
identify conflicts likely to result from unprecedented rates and magni-
tudes of change) the key drivers of conflict in Asia (so as to better
prevent even more widespread and severe conflicts that could result in
systemic risks) and the importance of fish abundance as a driver of
conflict (so as to better understand the role of responsible fisheries
management for conflict prevention). Research on conflict drivers
within fisheries can also further facilitate a discussion on indicators of
potential imminent fishery conflict and how policymakers might use
those to develop responses. For instance, it might be possible to simplify
the eight conflict types according to appropriate policy prescriptions.
Finally, we advise continued monitoring of the occurrence and types of
fisheries conflict that occur globally to follow-up trends and gain
greater accuracy.
5. Conclusion
The world has become highly interconnected, and as a result, a
crisis in one part of the global system can trigger cascading shocks in
other sectors. In certain instances, international fisheries conflict has
already negatively affected international relations and fishery sustain-
ability. Conflicts need to be swiftly and peacefully addressed to avoid
escalation into globally extensive, systemic risks with unforeseeable
consequences. To design effective response strategies and prioritize
them geographically, the regional frequency and nature of fisheries
conflict has to become clearer. For that purpose, we developed and
analysed the International Fishery Conflict Database and show that
international fisheries conflict increased between 1974 and 2016,
shifted largely from occurring between and among countries within
North America and Europe to countries within Asia, and included eight
distinct types of fisheries conflict events. More recent conflict types
involve greater severity, nonspecific species, IUU, and territorial dis-
putes. We discussed foundational and specialized risk mitigation stra-
tegies for the different conflict types, and highlighted existing response
gaps.
Many international fisheries conflicts have been successfully re-
solved in the past, but often only after much damage to both interna-
tional relations and fish stocks. In some parts of the world where con-
flict has been increasing, even the most foundational procedures for
dealing with conflict situations in a non-escalatory manner do not exist,
increasing the possibility for localized fisheries conflicts to escalate into
systemic risks. In the face of climate change impacts, resource scarcity,
illegal activity and territorial disputes, conflict management across
political borders becomes essential for environmental sustainability,
human health and maritime security. Fisheries conflicts, their impacts
and their drivers need to be considered more rigorously by scientists
and government.
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Supplementary Information (Figures) 
 
 
Figure S1: Diagram representing countries involved in more than 4 international fisheries conflict events with each other, 1974-
2016. The width of the link represents the number of conflict events between the connected countries. Colors hold no meaning but 
to distinguish between the different connections. Abbreviations clockwise, followed by the top 5 ranking of countries in conflict 
overall: CAN (2)= Canada, MEX= Mexico, USA (1)= United States of America, AUS= Australia, FSM= Federated States of 
Micronesia, ERI= Eritrea, YEM= Yemen, CHN (4)= China, IDN= Indonesia, IND= India, JPN (3)= Japan, KOR= South Korea, 
LKA= Sri Lanka, PAK= Pakistan, PHL= Philippines, RUS= Russia, TWN= Taiwan, ESP= Spain, EU (5)= European Union, 
FRA= France, FRO= Faroe Islands, GBR= United Kingdom, GRL= Greenland, ISL= Iceland, NOR= Norway, PRT= Portugal. 












































Figure S3: Correlations between number of conflict events and media output. First plot shows the media count analysis, second 











Figure S4: Crosscorrelation between conflict events in the IFCD and media coverage per year from LNA. The horizontal dotted 
lines above and below 0 indicate significant correlations. 
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Figure S5: Correlation between the number of conflict events for countries with English as the de facto primary spoken language 
and English as a de jure language, and media output. 
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Figure S6: Crosscorrelation between conflict events in the IFCD involving the USA and media coverage per year for the USA 




Figure S7: Relationship between conflict events in the IFCD involving the USA per year and media coverage per year lagged one 
year for the USA from LNA.  
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Figure S8: Relationship between conflict events in the IFCD involving the USA per year and media coverage per year lagged two 






Figure S9: The three dimensions of the three-dimensional NMDS plot showing eight clusters of conflict events within the IFCD. 
Stress for NMDS plot: 0.08471569, indicating reasonably good fit. The clusters were later renamed with letters (Cluster 1 

















Figure S10: The occurance of the eight conflict clusters overtime, plotted using 3-year rolling averages (Cluster 1 = Cluster A and so on). The colors 
within this time series represent (combinations of) continents. That visualizes the proportion of conflict between countries located in the same or 
different continent(s) within the eigth clusters.  
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Table S1: Fish species search terms included in the IFCD 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Africa 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 5 
Africa Asia 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Africa Asia Europe N America 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 
Africa Asia Europe S America 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Africa Europe 1 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 
Asia 6 65 11 24 10 8 4 15 
Asia Europe 5 2 2 6 0 0 0 0 
Asia Europe N America 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asia Europe N America Oceania 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Asia N America 6 2 10 2 2 0 1 0 
Asia Oceania 19 5 8 2 0 0 0 0 
Asia S America 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Europe 53 6 6 10 10 2 4 0 
Europe N America 19 6 9 5 5 15 2 0 
Europe Oceania 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 
Europe S America 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
N America 68 1 16 3 6 2 6 0 
 16 
N America Oceania 5 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
N America Oceania S America 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N America S America 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
S America 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Table S2: Frequency of continent configurations per conflict cluster (1-8) 
 
z test of coefficients: 
   
      
 
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
 
(Intercept) 4.4675248 0.5317751 8.4012 < 2.2e-16  
media coverage 0.0374248 0.0054086 6.9194 4.534e-12  
Table S3: Robust Regression of total media score vs media derived conflict count (including USA) 
 
z test of coefficients: 
   
      
 
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
 
(Intercept) 3.872938 0.732384 5.2881 1.236e-07  
media coverage 0.061362 0.041921 1.4637 0.1433 
Table S4: Robust Regression of total media score (excluding USA) vs media derived conflict count 
 
 
z test of coefficients: 
   
      
 
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
 
(Intercept) 8.166357 2.098671 3.8912 9.975e-05  
media coverage -0.025059 0.045077 -0.5559 0.5783 
Table S5: . Robust Regression of press freedom index vs media derived conflict count 
 
  
z test of coefficients: 
   
      
 
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
 
(Intercept) 2.6044029 0.4310791 6.0416 1.526e-09  
media coverage 0.0156847   0.0019572 8.0140 1.110e-15 
Table S6: Robust Regression of media score for English countries vs media derived conflict count (including the USA) 
 
z test of coefficients: 
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Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
 
(Intercept) 1.877706 4.435362 0.4233 0.6720 
media coverage 0.042532  0.509604 0.0835 0.9335 
Table S7: Robust Regression of media score for English countries (exclusing the USA) vs media derived conflict count 
Coefficients 
 
    
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)   1.190765    0.819271    1.453   0.15410    
media coverage -0.026010    0.008173   -3.183   0.00286  
 
Residual standard error: 4.667 on 39 degrees of freedom 
  (1 observation deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.2062 Adjusted R-squared:  0.1858  
 F-statistic: 10.13 on 1 and 39 DF 
Table S8: OLS regression of conflict events in USA vs lagged media score (+1 year), including 1999 data point 
Coefficients 
 
    
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)   0.602951 0.844996 0.714 0.480 
media coverage -0.005162    0.013197 -0.391 0.698 
 
Residual standard error: 4.503 on 38 degrees of freedom 
  (1 observation deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared:  0.00401 Adjusted R-squared:  0.0222  
 
 
F-statistic: 0.153 on 1 and 38 DF 




    
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)   -1.047728    0.863804   -1.213    0.2326   
media coverage 0.023069    0.008514    2.709    0.0101  
Residual standard error: 4.856 on 38 degrees of freedom 
  (2 observations deleted due to missingness) 




F-statistic: 7.341 on 1 and 38 DF 
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 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)   0.602951    0.844996    0.714     0.480 
media coverage -0.005162    0.013197   -0.391     0.698 
Residual standard error: 4.503 on 38 degrees of freedom 
  (1 observation deleted due to missingness) 




F-statistic: 0.153 on 1 and 38 DF 
Table S11: OLS regression of conflict events in USA vs lagged media score (+2 years), excluding 1999 data point 
 
z test of coefficients: 
   
      
 
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
 
(Intercept) 0.844557 0.615527 1.3721 0.17004 
media coverage -0.029181    0.015428 -1.8915   0.05856  
Table S12: Robust Regression of media score per year for the USA vs media derived conflict count per year for the USA 
Supplementary Information (Text) 
SI Methods: IFCD 
The source we used to obtain data on international fisheries conflicts is the LNA database. The 
content type we opted for is ‘newspapers’, which means we excluded law reviews, company 
profiles and state and federal cases as those would not provide the data needed. Within the 
LNA database, we searched for a combination of fish- related search terms (e.g. ‘ fish’ or 
selected fish stocks such as ‘tuna’ or ‘pollock’) and conflict-related terminology such as ‘conflict’ 
or ‘disagreement’. The combination of species search terms and conflict terms result in 
searches such as salmon AND (no w/5 agreement), shrimp AND sanction, capelin AND tribunal 
AND conflict and so on. This resulted in 184 different search queries, which were performed 
over the time period 12/12/2016 – 27/07/2017. Also, within LNA, using the singular word form 
will retrieve the singular, plural, and possessive forms of most words. For example, fish would 
find fish, fishes, fish’, and fishes’.  
 
Using LNA, we searched for specific fish species which were selected based on the 12 
commercial groups within the SeaAroundUs database (Pauly & Zeller 2015). SeaAroundUs 
defines ‘commercial’ as all marine fish or invertebrate species that are either reported in the 
catch statistics of at least one of the member countries of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), or are listed as part of commercial and non-
commercial catches (retained as well as discarded) in country-specific catch reconstructions. 
We selected the top 2 species that were targeted most in terms of tonnage for each 
commercial group (see Table S1), and used (part of) their taxa common name as search terms. 
 
We scrutinized all the results LNA returned for a given search query, and entered into the 
database those results that were relevant based on our definition of a conflict event. From the 
event, we recorded: 
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- The year and month of the event; 
- The fish species the event centred on. If it was not ONE specific species, but multiple 
species, then we recorded it as ‘multiple’ and recorded the multiple species of interest 
in a different column. If it was not one nor multiple specific species, but rather non-
specific fish in general, we recorded it as Unspecified; 
- The countries involved in the event; 
- The count of countries involved in the event (which is not the total amount of countries 
mentioned in an article or generally active in the dispute, but those in actuality involved 
in the event); 
- Which of the actors was the one to take action, and which one was the one afflicted by 
the action; 
- Because of an interest to know if and how often conflicts are linked to instances of  
illegal fishing, we tracked which events were directly the result of illegal fishing and 
which of the actors committed the illegal fishing act; 
- Because of an interest to understand the connection between fish and territorial 
disputes, we tracked whether the event mentioned a specific territory under dispute 
linked to the fish conflict in question. If there was a disputed territory mentioned, we 
recorded which territory that is; 
- The action type based on the ‘severity of observed behavior’ categorical scale, see Table 
1; 
- The source of the event description. 
 
Based on the above, it is important to note that we excluded events that might have been 
triggered by or linked to fisheries, but were detached from issues of fisheries ownership or 
management. For example, if country A entered into a dispute with country B over fish, but 
centered around other policy areas such as food safety measures (which, due to the complex 
nature of domestic and international politics, is not uncommon), those events will no longer be 
registered in the database. It is also important to note that some events (such as the boarding 
of a vessel and detaining it) are not always comparable: sometimes the event would involve 
several boats, sometimes just one. We did not take note of any quantities involved in conflict 
events.  
 
After entering all the data into the excel file, we went through all the individual events to 
remove those that are duplicates (an event is sometimes reported multiple times by different 
institutions), though these instances were relatively rare. In case two institutions reported on 
the same event but gave different information, the event reported in most detail was retained. 
We also grouped different conflict events together that were continuations of the same conflict 
over time. This means we grouped events together if events happened between the same 
countries (the EU can represent countries part of the EU in the database because fishery policy 
is a competence of the EU), the same species (or part of the same nested species grouping, e.g. 
albacore tuna and tuna were clustered together, but not yellowfin tuna and albacore tuna).  
  
There are a number of limitations to the method used to set up the IFCD. First, the data on 
conflict events was extracted from news reports (not official reports), which are more prone to 
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misreporting. Secondly, as we used English as the only language to search for news, there may 
be some bias in the coverage of conflict events (due to potential underreporting of conflicts in 
the IFCD in regions with non-English speaking news media and lower journalistic capacity). LNA 
includes a number of international press agencies (e.g. International Reports by BBC Monitoring 
and Al Jazeera) which should ensure global coverage even when limited to the English language 
(see SI Figure S2 for further details on coverage). However, overall there is less reporting in the 
early period of the database (e.g. entries from BBC Monitoring start in 1979), and international 
news agencies will be most focused on events judged of interest to an international audience. 
That might also be dependent on the strategic interests of the reporting country, such as 
whether the conflict event involves an English-speaking country, whether it involves a region 
that is of interest to the English-speaking world, or whether the event has serious implications 
for food supply for English-speaking markets. Overall, we warn for the likely underreporting of 
(minor) conflicts in regions with non-English speaking news media within the IFCD, and even 
more so in the early part of the period covered (1970s in particular). For example, we have 
limited data for South American and African countries, though the low amount of data for those 
regions can also reflect the lower enforcement capacity (e.g. negligible or non-existent 
enforcement capacity, weak institutional capacity and capabilities and even corruption). 
Nonetheless, we intend for this database to become more inclusive of conflicts occurring in for 
example South America by conducting searches in Spanish. Lastly, it is plausible that in certain 
countries especially ridden with co-optation and corrupt arrangements conflicts might not be 
reported by the coast guard or news agencies (Galaz et al. 2017).  
 
SI Results: Media Bias 
We ran three analyses to understand if the IFCD was biased by the media sources we extracted 
it from. Firstly, to analyse if the conflict data within the IFCD was correlated to the level of 
English media output in different countries (see SI Figure S2 for further details on coverage by 
LNA), we extracted the content list from the LNA website (from the European region) for 
analysis. Second, we also extracted the Press Freedom Index scores for the countries in the 
IFCD (Reporters Without Border 2018). We took an average press freedom index over the 
maximum time frame that the data was available (from 2002-2018). The resulting data did not 
fit the assumptions of standard linear models (both datasets had probably influential outliers 
according to leverage plots with Cook’s distance and heteroscedastic variance), so to explore if 
there was a relationship between 1) media output and reported conflict events and 2) press 
freedom and reported conflict events, we used robust regression (downweighing outliers) with 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors (Mackinnon & White 1985, Rousseeuw & Leroy 
2005) (see SI Figure S3).  
 
Initially, we found a significant positive relationship between total media count from LNA and 
conflict count (see SI Table S3), but further investigation into the leverage of each country 
showed that the USA still had an outsized influence on the analysis (with a Cook’s distance 
measure an order of magnitude above the second most important country, Canada). Removing 
the USA from the analysis resulted in the finding of no significant relationship between total 
media score and conflict count (see SI Table S4). The combination of high influence and a 
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relationship being dependent on a single data point led us to conclude that there is no reliable 
relationship between media output and database’s count of conflict events.  
Secondly, we determined no significant relationship between the Press Freedom Index and the 
count of conflict events (see SI Table S5). Though press freedom is less directly related to our 
concern of media bias, and data only exists on this metric for a small period of time, it does 
corroborate our previous analysis which fails to find evidence of media bias in reported 
conflicts.  
 
As we used English media as our source, we performed additional analysis investigating media 
bias for countries in the database where the primary de facto spoken language or de jure 
language is English. Because the assumptions of standard linear models were violated 
(according to leverage plots with Cook’s distance and heteroscedastic variance), we used robust 
regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors (Mackinnon & White 1985, 
Rousseeuw & Leroy 2005). We found a significant relationship between conflict and media 
output for these English-speaking countries (see SI Table S6). Further investigation into the 
influence (leverage) of each country showed that the USA, again, had an outsized influence on 
the analysis (leverage over an order of magnitude more than the second most influential 
country, Canada) (see SI Figure S5). Removing the USA from the analysis resulted in the finding 
of no significant relationship between total media score and conflict count (see SI Table S7). 
Because the relationship we found initially was dependent on the inclusion of a single data 
point, we conclude that the relationship is spurious. 
 
Because the USA was an outlier that influenced both previous analyses, we performed 
additional analyses to determine whether there is a strong relationship between media output 
covering the USA in LNA and the frequency conflict events involving the USA in the IFCD in a 
given year. To do so, we ran a cross-correlation over the entire time period for the USA (see SI 
Figure S6). Media output covering the USA correlated significantly with conflict count for the 
USA at two time points (though the correlations indicated that media output lagged behind 
conflict: one time point had a relationship with a media time lag of two year, and one time 
point had a relationship with a media time lag of one year). However, the correlations for those 
two time points ran in opposing directions, suggesting that the correlations may not have been 
meaningful (see SI Figure S6). We relied on regression analysis to explore these potential 
relationships. However, after running an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (which tests if a time 
series has a unit root) we learned that because the data was not stationary (time series data is 
not independent as each data point is related to the previous time step), and needed to 
‘stationarize’ the time series to remove the autocorrelation. Then, running Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions, we found both lagged correlations were dependent on the inclusion 
of data for the year 1999 (see SI Figure S7 and SI Figure S8). The year 1999 was a very influential 
outlier in both cases, with leverage values 2 orders of magnitude higher than the next most 
influential year (for lag of one year, see SI Table S8 and S9, for lag of two years see SI Table S10 
and S11). Conducting OLS regression without the year 1999 led to the conclusion of no 
significant relationship in either case. Because this case also involved influential outliers and 
some heteroskedasticity, we also performed robust regression (downweighing the influence of 
outliers) with heteroskedastic corrected errors. This analysis showed no significant relationship 
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(see SI Table S12). This led us to conclude there is no consistent relationship between media 
output and conflict count for the USA. 
Lastly, to analyze if the conflict data per year is correlated to the amount of media coverage per 
year, we extracted the list of publishers from the LNA website (the European region) every 
year. We cleaned that data (filling in empty end dates and deleting irrelevant dates) and ran a 
cross-correlation with the count of conflict per year. However, after running an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (which tests if a time series has a unit root, meaning it is not stationary) we 
learned that because the data was not stationary (time series data is not independent as each 
data point is related to the previous time step), and needed to ‘stationarize’ the time series to 
remove the autocorrelation. Once the data was stationary, we found no significant correlation 
between conflict and media coverage, even when taking into account lag (see SI Figure S4). 
Though these analyses do not determine that our database is free from bias, they do provide 
early indication that our database is reflective of actual historical and geographical trends and 
not simply media bias of reporting location, country as reporting subject, the national freedom 
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Abstract 
Marine capture fishery resources are declining, and demand for them is rising. These 
trends are suspected to incite conflict, but their effects have not been quantitatively 
examined. We applied a multi-model ensemble approach to a global database of 
international fishery conflicts between 1974 and 2016 to test the supply-induced 
scarcity hypothesis (diminishing supplies of fishery resources increase fisheries 
conflict), the demand-induced scarcity hypothesis (rising demand for fishery 
resources increases fisheries conflict), and three alternative political and economic 
hypotheses. While no single indicator was able to fully explain international conflict 
over fishery resources, we found a positive relationship between increased conflict 
over fishery resources and higher levels of per capita GDP for the period 1975-1996. 
For the period 1997 to 2016, we found evidence supporting the demand-induced 
scarcity hypothesis, and the notion that an increase in supply of fishery resources is 
linked to an increase in conflict occurrence. By identifying significant predictors of 
international fisheries conflict, our analysis provides useful information for policy 
approaches for conflict anticipation and prevention. 
 
Introduction 
Natural resources have long been studied for their role in sparking conflict. Historical 
narratives recognizing the interdependence between natural resources and the 
security of the individual as well as societies date back to antiquity, yet more formal 
analysis of the role of resources in conflict emerged out of the environmental 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s (see works by Hardin (1968) and Ehrlich (1968)) 
(Floyd & Matthew 2013).The early environmental security literature (developed 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s) proposed an analytical framework that 
identified resource scarcity as the primary reason for conflict over land or fresh water 
(Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994). The ‘scarcity hypothesis’ holds that a decreased 
availability of resources, either through increased demand or diminished supply, 
heightens the likelihood of conflict – henceforth referred to respectively as the 
demand and supply-induced scarcity hypotheses (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994). Conflict 
triggered by scarcity was often linked to a Malthusian perspective, where resource 
scarcity is seen as the result of population growth and rigid limits on supply are 
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assumed (Finkbeiner et al. 2017, Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1996, Renner 1996). Later studies 
linked resource abundance and environmental change, driven by natural variability or 
climate change, to conflict (Brunnschweiler & Bulte 2009, Welsch 2008). Many 
scholars, often from the field of political ecology, disputed these environmentally 
deterministic accounts of conflict, and instead documented the complex relationship 
between resources and conflicts, and in particular contextual factors such as 
vulnerable livelihoods, institutional failures or weak states (Le Billon & Duffy 2018, 
Dalby 2014, Le Billon 2001, Peluso & Watts 2001). Some scholars even propose that 
environmental changes (such as increased scarcity or availability of resource) can at 
most be aggravators of pre-existent social conditions (Mehta et al. 2019, Salehyan 
2008). Results from studies of linkages between the environment and conflict have 
varied widely, in part because researchers define conflict in many different ways: 
some studies consider conflict to solely be expressed in violence, while others 
consider conflict broadly, including diplomatic reprimands. Moreover, analyses cover 
different time periods and geographic scales, complicating the analysis of general 
links between resources and conflict (Bernauer & Böhmelt 2020). Despite this 
inconsistent evidence base, the narrative of resource conflicts associated with rapidly 
increasing demand for raw materials and growing resource shortages is common in 
policy and is included in many briefs for decision makers (for example, UNFT 2012) 
(Dalby 2014).  
 
The scarcity hypothesis is also common within the literature on fisheries conflict 
(although some studies flag the indirect role of scarcity and importance of other 
variables; Mendenhall et al. 2020, Jiminez et al. 2019, Glaser et al. 2018, Dupont & 
Baker 2014, Bavinck 2005). The emphasis on the scarcity hypothesis must be 
interpreted in the context of global fisheries dynamics, where global catches 
increased from the 1960s to the 1990s and then levelled off and declined (Pauly and 
Zeller 2016, Garibaldi 2012). In addition to declining catches, climate change has 
been suggested as a potential instigator of fishery conflict (Mendenhall et al. 2020, 
Pinsky et al. 2018). Climate change is leading to increases in sea temperature as well 
as changes in salinity, ocean currents, pH and oxygen, impacting stock dynamics and 
altering depth and geographical distributions (Free et al. 2019, Cheung 2018, 
Poloczanska et al. 2013). Recent projections of the shifting distribution patterns of 
commercially important marine species under climate change have led researchers to 
suggest that conflict might be more likely in the future as species enter into new 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) (Oremus et al. 2020, Pinsky et al. 2018, Spijkers & 
Boonstra 2017). In this sense, climate change can be conceptualized as a rendition of 
the scarcity hypothesis, where a change in the relative access of different groups to a 
resource causes conflict. The concern is that an absolute decline in fish, due to 
overfishing or mismanagement, or redistribution in catch brought on by climate 
change, are intensifying the risk of future conflict. The scarcity hypothesis has, 
however, not yet been rigorously tested on marine fishery conflict data (contrary to 
fresh water conflict datasets; see Dinar et al. 2015, Bernauer & Böhmelt 2014, Yoffe 
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et al. 2004). Moreover, no studies have employed such data sets to test other 
hypotheses, such as whether social or economic factors regulate fisheries conflict.  
 
Here, we provide the first such analysis by testing five different hypotheses from the 
environmental security literature that link natural resources to conflict. In addition to 
the demand and supply scarcity hypotheses, we include three alternative hypotheses 
that consider economic and political conditions: 
 
H1. Demand-induced-scarcity. As national demand for fishery products (both wild 
catch and aquaculture) increases, the number of conflicts over fishery 
resources a country engages in with another country increases. 
 
H2. Supply-induced-scarcity. As the domestic supply of fishery products (both 
wild catch and aquaculture) decreases, the number of conflicts over fishery 
resources a country engages in with another country increases. 
 
H3. Democracy level. As the level of democracy of a country increases, political 
stability is enhanced, creating a pacifying effect on international relations, 
and the number of conflicts over fishery resources a country engages in with 
another country decreases.  
 
H4. Macroeconomic performance. As the economic development and macro-
economic performance of a state increase, the number of conflicts over 
fishery resources a country engages in with another country decreases.  
 
H5. Military expenditure. As the military expenditure of a country increases, it is 
able to engage in more policing, and the number of conflicts over fishery 
resources a country engages in with another country increases. 
 
Because conflicts can extend over multiple years, we use conflict at a previous time 
point as a predictor of conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). Although not connected to a 
specific hypothesis, we therefore also account for lagged conflict.  
 
By testing these five hypotheses and identifying which variables are significant 
predictors of historical international fisheries conflict, we seek to parse out what 
might be driving fisheries conflict – a necessary step to develop knowledge that can 
support adequate approaches for conflict anticipation and prevention. 
 
Materials and methods 
We evaluated how a set of seven predictors was related to the number of fisheries 
conflicts a country engaged in with another country in a given year. The seven 
variables were proxies for the five hypotheses laid out previously (Table 1). These five 
specific hypotheses were chosen as they have often been tested for in previous 
academic work on conflict over other natural resources, and because these are the 
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hypotheses we could test given available predictor datasets. We used the 
International Fishery Conflict Database (IFCD) (Spijkers et al. 2019) as our response 
dataset. We first discuss the response dataset and structure, then lay out the 
rationale behind the 5 hypotheses and the chosen predictors, and finally discuss how 
we used a multi-model approach to establish which variables are significant 
predictors of fisheries conflict despite uncertainty in model structure and the 
complexity of international conflict. 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses and linked predictors and their data sources. For a more elaborate description of all the predictor 
variables, see SI: Data sources. 







The apparent consumption is 
calculated as production minus 
non-food uses and fish exports. 
Fish imports are added, and 
changes in stocks taken into 
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This variable includes all 
commercial, industrial and 
subsistence fishers, operating in 
freshwater, brackish water, and 
marine waters to catch and land 
any aquatic animals and plants. 
Because the dataset was only 
available from 1995, we only 
tested this predictor for the second 
time period. Measured in numbers 





















The quantity of fishery products for 
domestic utilization is calculated by 
adding the production of fisheries 
products to imports of fisheries 





exports and taking into account the 
changes in stocks. Fisheries 
products encompass both wild 
caught fish as well as cultured fish. 
Measured in tons.  
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democracy 
 
Scale ranging from 0-10 where 0 is 
least democratic and 10 most 
democratic, covering both 
procedural (e.g. electoral process) 
and structural (e.g. rule of law) 


























Response variable data source: International Fishery Conflict Database 
Our response variable was the number of international fishery conflict events a 
country engages in per year. We use the IFCD as our data source, which was set up to 
explore international conflicts over marine fishery resources by using detailed 
records of interactions between countries (Spijkers et al. 2019). The IFCD currently 
contains 542 reported international fishery conflict events that occurred between 
1974 and 2016 of five differing intensities (see SI: Table 1). We removed the EU from 
our analysis as it did not fit the country-level predictor datasets. We also removed 
Palestine, Western Sahara and the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) from out dataset 
as there were no data available for these regions for any of the predictor variables. 
 
In freshwater conflict studies, country dyad data is commonly used (Dinar et al. 2015, 
Bernauer & Böhmelt 2014), where a conflict dyad consists of two conflicting parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state. However, close to 11% of the 
fishery conflicts in IFCD occur between more than two countries, where dyad-level 
analysis would not be informative. For that reason, exploring how national 
characteristics might predict conflict is a more valid and interesting avenue to 
explore. Finally, we are interested in exploring if national characteristics (related to 
supply and demand of fish, and additional economic and social conditions) influence 
the amount of conflict that a country experiences, and thus use country-level conflict 
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data as the level of observation, precluding the use of dyad analysis to explore causes 
of conflict. 
 
Details on hypotheses and predictor data sources 
We first tested the demand-induced-scarcity hypothesis (H1) by looking at the 
relationship between demand and conflict (see Pomeroy et al. 2016, Seter et al. 
2016, Brashares et al. 2014, Yoffe et al. 2003). Specifically, we tested whether 
increased demand for fish was linked to fisheries conflict through three different 
aspects of demand for fishery products. The first aspect is demand for fish as a source 
of food, measured through the ‘protein supply quantity’ variable. The protein supply 
quantity reflects ‘apparent consumption’, which is the per capita food fish supplies 
available for human consumption, and it includes both cultured and wild fish in the 
data. The second aspect is demand for fish as a source of income, measured through 
the ‘employment in the fishing sector’ variable, which includes all commercial, 
industrial and subsistence fishers. The third aspect is increased demand for fish due 
to domestic population size increase (the Malthusian hypothesis) (Table 1). 
 
Second, we tested the supply-induced-scarcity hypothesis (H2) by looking at the 
relationship between supply and conflict (see Pomeroy et al. 2016, Seter et al. 2016, 
Brashares et al. 2014, Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994) through the variable ‘domestic 
supply quantity’ (Table 1). If H2 is supported, we would expect to see that as the 
domestic supply of fishery products decreases, the number of conflicts over fishery 
resources a country engages in with another country increases.  
Third, we tested the democracy level hypothesis (H3) by looking at the relationship 
between the level of democracy in a country and conflict (see Bernauer & Böhmelt 
2020, Bodea et al. 2016, Van Holt et al. 2016, Mcclanahan et al. 2015, Brochmann & 
Hensel 2009, Salehyan 2008, Wolf et al. 2003, Brochmann & Gleditsch 2012, Hauge & 
Ellingsen 1998). We tested this using the ‘democracy level’ variable (Table 1). The link 
between democracy levels and conflict has been analyzed from a variety of analytical 
angles (often from a dyadic perspective, testing for example if pairs of democracies 
experience less violent conflict), with studies on their link reaching differing 
conclusions (Hegre 2014, Quackenbush & Rudy 2009, Boehmer 2008). Nonetheless, a 
significant body of research indicates some pacific benefits from democracy on the 
monadic level (i.e. on the level of the individual country) (Boehmer 2008, Oneal & 
Russett 1997, Fukuyama 1992). The hypothesized relationship is that domestic 
institutions influence foreign policies, making democracies less likely to initiate 
conflicts, thus more democratization has a pacifying effect on international 
interactions (Daniels & Mitchell 2017, Quackenbush & Rudy 2009). Note, however, 
that previous studies specifically on maritime conflict have shown that democracies 
are significantly more likely to experience conflict than dictatorships (Daniels & 
Mitchell 2017, Mitchell & Prins 1999). 
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Fourth, we tested the macroeconomic performance hypothesis (H4) by looking at the 
relationship between the country’s macroeconomic performance and conflict (see 
Bernauer & Böhmelt 2020, Bodea et al. 2016, Brochmann 2012, Yoffe et al. 2003, 
Hauge & Ellingsen 1998) (Table 1). Lower GDP per capita is reportedly one of the 
most robust predictors of social conflict, where higher income levels lead to less 
conflict (Bernauer & Böhmelt 2020). The working assumption here is thus that as the 
development and macro-economic performance of a state increases, the number of 
conflicts over fishery resources a country engages in decreases. However, a previous 
study specifically on maritime conflict have shown that states with higher levels of 
economic development are more prone to conflict (Daniels & Mitchell 2017). 
 
Last, we tested the military expenditure hypothesis (H5) by looking for a relationship 
between military expenditure and conflict (see Bodea et al. 2016, Hauge & Ellingsen 
1998) (Table 1). Particularly for fisheries conflict, military expenditure can be linked 
to a country's strengthened naval presence to protect strategically important waters 
by conducting military exercises or building military outposts on disputed islands 
(Wirth 2016, Song 2015). This could therefore suggest that greater capacity and 
amount of policing would lead to a greater number of international conflicts. 
 
We also acknowledge that conflict in the previous year may be an important 
predictor for experiencing it in the next year, a variable we call lagged conflict. 
Indeed, in studies parsing out drivers of conflict, conflict occurring in the previous 
year is often a strong predictor for experiencing conflict in the next year (Ciccone 
2011, Theisen 2008, Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). To test this, we use the conflict dataset 
lagged by one year, and dropped the first time point (year 1974) from our conflict 
dataset (Salehyan 2009, Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). We also used conflict of the 
previous time point as a predictor to account for temporal autocorrelation. We used 
Auto Correlation Function (ACF) plots to assess whether temporal autocorrelation 
had been removed from our dataset with the inclusion of this variable. We ran 
separate ACF plots for each country per model, and found the residuals from time T-1 
were not correlated with the residuals from time T. 
 
To assess the potential effects of multicollinearity in our models, we used pairwise 
relationship correlation coefficients (Pearson correlations, no coefficient greater 
than|0.7|, see SI: Figures 3-4) and variance inflation factor (VIF) estimates (scores 
lower than 2.5). Based on previous literature, we also considered population size and 
more precise measures of governance quality (the World Governance Indicators) as 
predictors. However, population size (source: World Bank) violated the Pearson 
correlation criterion (high correlation with the employment dataset), so it was 
excluded as a predictor. Additionally, the World Governance Indicators (source: 
World Bank) were excluded as predictors as they violated the Pearson correlation 






Establishing time periods for analysis 
Based on previous research, we suspected that over time there might be two 
different periods within the data with different underlying dynamics. There are two 
qualitative reasons to analyze the history of fisheries conflict in two periods. First, the 
conflict trends in Spijkers et al. 2019 suggest that conflict has not had a continuous 
trend over time, showing a more rapid increase in conflict from around the year 
2000. Moreover, Spijkers et al. (2019) concluded that, before the turn of the century, 
fisheries conflict involved mostly North American and European countries fighting 
over specific species, with conflicts being characterized largely by low-intensity 
events of a diplomatic nature (see SI: Table 1) (Spijkers et al. 2019). The nature of the 
conflict events altered markedly, as fisheries conflict then primarily involved Asian 
countries (encompassing nearly half of all conflict events after the year 2000) clashing 
over multiple and non-specified species, with conflict often triggered by illegal fishing 
and more often exhibiting violent interactions (Spijkers et al. 2019).  
 
Second, because we have a primary interest in exploring how the available supply of 
fishery resources might influence the likelihood of international fisheries conflict 
(scarcity hypothesis), it is important to take into consideration the global trends in 
available fishery resources. Global fisheries catch patterns show a clear peak in the 
mid-1990s (Pauly & Zeller 2016 specifically report year 1996) and visible declines 
since. This break in the trend (with increasing global supplies of wild-caught fish up to 
around 1996, and declining supplies thereafter) suggests that breaking the dataset up 
into two periods allows us to explore how such a change in the global resource-base 
may have influenced incidences of conflict. The changed nature of international 
fisheries conflict, the faster rate of increase in conflict over fishery resources in recent 
years, and the altered availability in global supply of fish catch signal the importance 
of examining different time periods of fisheries conflict. 
 
To determine whether there are statistical breakpoints in the IFCD to confirm our 
qualitative intuitions, we run a piecewise regression model (r package: segmented 
(Muggeo 2008)) on the number of conflicts between 1974-2016. Using the raw 
conflict data over time, 1997 and 2000 emerge as breakpoints (see SI: Figure 1 and SI: 
Table 2). After applying a rolling mean of three years over the data, 1997 and 2002 
emerge as breakpoints in the dataset (see SI: Figure 2 and SI: Table 3). As both 
models suggest 1997 as a clear break, and because 1997 coincides with a change in 
trend in available supply of fishery resources (a predictor of interest), we split the 
dataset that year and explored whether the different time periods (before and after 
1997) might be driven by different predictors. To visualize both time periods and the 
countries experiencing most conflict, we built two world maps showing the count of 






Identifying important predictors: a multi-model approach 
Exploring complex systems, where there are multiple potential predictors, often 
precludes the search for a single ‘best’ model because of the high uncertainty 
regarding what combination of variables are important (Gregr & Chan 2015). 
Determining a single best model can bias resulting inference or generate misleading 
results (for example, variables not included in the selected model are deemed 
unimportant where they may be influential in reality) (Lukacs et al. 2010, Raftery et 
al. 1993). Beyond the parametric uncertainty about which variables to include in a 
model, there is considerable uncertainty in choosing model design (sometimes 
referred to as ‘structural uncertainty’ (Gregr & Chan 2015, Tebaldi & Knutti 2007)). To 
address parametric and structural uncertainty, we used a multi-model approach 
which allowed us to benefit from individual model strengths and guard against their 
limitations, while explicitly acknowledging different model structures and 
determining results robust to high uncertainty. In short, we used a multi-model 
ensemble to determine signals that cut through deep uncertainty in complex systems 
and model assumptions. We used three different approaches to identify significant 
predictors of conflict.  
 
1. Boosted regression trees 
Our first model, boosted regression trees (BRT), is a nonparametric tree-based model 
which recursively fits multiple trees (i.e. it combines multiple models or ‘trees’ where 
a single tree relates a response to their predictors by recursive binary splits) with the 
samples randomly drawn from the original data set. It predicts the averaged outcome 
based on the predictions from these multiple trees (r packages: dismo (Elith et al. 
2008), gbm (Ridgeway 2013), and ggBRT (Jouffray et al. 2019)) (Elith et al. 2008). 
Because our response variable (conflict count per country per year) is a discrete 
count, we used a Poisson distribution. Within the BRT models, one can control the 
tree complexity (i.e. how many levels of interactions are fitted), learning rate (which 
determines the contribution of each new tree to the model) and bag fraction (which 
specifies the proportion of data to be randomly selected while fitting each single 
decision tree) (Jouffray et al. 2019, Elith et al. 2008). The optimal parameter settings 
were elected based on explained deviance.  
 
For BRT, we assessed the cross-validated percent deviance explained. The cross-
validated percent deviance explained is calculated as 1 – (cross-validated 
deviance/mean total deviance) (Jouffray 2019), and is a measure of goodness of fit - 
where 100% would indicate a perfect model. We also used BRT to explore the relative 
importance of each predictor. The relative importance of each predictor is a ranking 
metric based on how often it was used in the tree for splitting, weighted by the 
improvement to the model as the result of each split and then scaled so the values 
sum to 100 (Colin et al. 2017). We considered only the predictors with a relative 
influence above that expected by chance (100/number of variables) as significant 
(Jouffray 2019). For significant predictors, we provide partial dependence plots (PDP) 
showing the marginal effect on the predicted outcome for a given value of the 
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predictor (i.e., the instantaneous effect that a change in the predictor variable has on 
conflict when the other variables are kept constant). The x-axis shows the distribution 
of the data points, and the PDP flattens in regions where there is no change, or 
where there is no data available. The y-axis is on the log scale. PDP’s show whether 
the relationship between conflict and a predictor is linear or more complex. 
 
The BRT approach offers some important advantages over other statistical models. 
First, it can capture nonlinear relationships, something different conflict scholars 
have advocated for to incorporate in models (Selby & Hoffman 2016), and which 
parametric models (i.e. models where the shape of the functional relationships 
between the response and the explanatory variables are predetermined) cannot. 
Second, BRT accommodates missing data by using surrogates, meaning that, if a 
variable is missing in a data point, the decision defers to another variable that is 
highly correlated with it. Third, it is robust against outliers. Last, it automatically 
incorporates interaction effects between predictors (Elith et al. 2008). BRT also has 
some important drawbacks: it depends heavily on the sample of data, and even small 
changes in training data can result in very different series of splits, introducing 
uncertainty into their interpretation; and it can be prone to overfitting (Elith et al. 
2008). 
 
2. Generalized linear model  
Second, we used a zero-inflated negative binomial generalized linear model (GLM), or 
ZINB GLM. The ZINB GLM (r package: pscl (Jackman 2012, Zeileis et al. 2008)) is a two-
component model. The first component is a count model that predicts some zero 
counts, with zeros representing instances where countries could have experienced 
conflict but did not. The second component is a zero-inflation binary model, where 
the zeros represent countries which could not have experienced fisheries conflict in 
that year. Because the ZINB GLM has two components, we deemed a predictor 
significant for the overall model if it is significant for at least one of the two 
components. We chose to run a ZINB GLM instead of aggregating conflicts across 
time to reduce the zeros in the conflict dataset, because we wanted to explicitly 
incorporate instances where conflict does not occur in our models; a limitation of 
many causal studies on natural resources and conflict (Adams et al. 2018, Hendrix 
2018). The GLM approach offers a number of advantages. Its output is relatively easy 
to interpret, and offers clear understanding of how predictors influence the outcome. 
It is also not prone to overfitting. It can, however, show sensitivity to outliers. The 
ZINB GLM model in particular can account for excess zeros, which encompasses 
situations in which countries in our dataset at a given point in time: (a) did not have 
the means to protect their fishing interests (Daniels & Mitchell 2017) and therefore 
could not engage in conflict; or (b) could experience conflict, but there was no 
reporting on occurring conflicts. We use the model to assess significance of the 
predictors, using a p-value of < 0.05 as cut-off. We provide the pseudo r-squared as a 
goodness-of-fit measure, as the usual r-squared is not provided for GLM (r-squared is 
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calculated by ordinary least-squares regression, while GLM uses the maximum 
likelihood estimator). The pseudo r-squared is obtained using McFadden’s method. 
 
3. Generalized linear mixed model  
Third, we used a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), which is an extension to 
the GLM in that it can contain random effects (i.e. effects that vary among 
individuals) in addition to fixed effects (i.e. effects that are constant across 
individuals). In our GLMM (r package: lme4 (Bates et al. 2015)), we used the negative 
binomial distribution and the country ID as a random effect to account for any non-
independence within a country (i.e., within-country correlation). This model includes 
the possibility that important country-specific characteristics may influence the 
number of conflicts a given state engages in, but which we do not have predictors for. 
We used the model to assess significance of the predictors, with a p-value of < 0.05 
as cut-off. We provide the pseudo r-squared as a goodness-of-fit measure, as the 
usual r-squared is not provided for GLMM (r-squared is calculated by ordinary least-
squares regression, while GLMM uses the maximum likelihood estimator). The 
pseudo r-squared is obtained using the delta method and considers the variance by 
both the fixed and random effects. 
 
Cross model evaluation 
For time period 1 (1975-1996), we used the three models (BRT, ZINB GLM and 
GLMM) to evaluate which predictors are most robust. We included all predictors 
listed above except for employment in the fishing sector, as data was not available 
for time period 1. For time period 2 (1997-2016), we ran the same three models for 
all predictors, with and without employment, as data were limited to only OECD 
countries as well as Argentina, China, Indonesia, Thailand and Chinese Taipei. We 
assessed robust predictors across those six models for time period 2.  
 
To evaluate which of the predictors carried the most weight across models, we used 
the following scale: 
- Strong support: significance of the predictor across all models (i.e. 3/3 for time 
period 1 or 6/6 models for time period 2). 
- Moderate support: significance of the predictor across the majority of models 
(i.e. minimum of 2/3 models or 4/6 models). 
- Low support: significance of the predictor across less than half of models (i.e. 
less than 2/3 of 3/6 models). 
- No support: no significance of the predictor in any of the models. 
 
When assessing multicollinearity through the VIF scores, we found that the GLM 
model showed VIF scores estimates much greater than 2.5 (see SI: Table 4), but all 
VIF scores were no greater than 2.2 within the GLMM (see SI: Table 5) and no greater 
than 2.2 within the BRT (see SI: Table 6). Despite multicollinearity in the GLM, 
focusing on results that are consistent among all the models suggests that our results 
are sound. We analyzed the standardized residual plots of all models (for time 
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periods 1 and 2) to confirm that they did not show evidence of heteroscedasticity or 
trends that would violate model assumptions. We also analyzed the performance of 
our models by comparing model predictions with our actual conflict data, to confirm 
a monotonic relationship between actual and predicted in our models.  
 
Results 
Time period 1 (1975-1996) 
During this time period, the USA was involved in the greatest number of conflict 
events (n=98), followed by Canada (n=97) and Spain (n=35) (Spijkers et al. 2019) 
(Figure 1). The cross-validated percent deviance explained from the BRT model for 
this time period was 40.2%. The pseudo r-squared for the ZINB GLM is 0.36 and the 
pseudo r-squared for the GLMM model was 0.30. Across the three models, lagged 
conflict and GDP per capita emerged as influential predictors (Table 2). However, in 
the GLM model, decreased GDP per capita was significantly associated with lower 
levels of conflicts (zero-inflation model), while in the other two models, increased 
GDP per capita was associated with more conflicts. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of countries experiencing conflict over fishery resources for time period 1 (1975-1996).  
Predictor BRT ZINB GLM GLMM 
Count model Zero-inflation 
 Relative 
influence 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
Lagged conflict 48.430055 1.53617     -4.13908     1.5205      
GDP per capita 21.850888 -0.20168 -6.22271     3.0714      
Domestic supply 9.167361 1.20459     -3.22221     2.4764      





Table 2: Model comparison for time 1 (1975-1996). Bold variables are significant for the model and highlighted variables are 
those that have moderate to strong support across all models (as per our evaluation scale). Significant for the ZINB GLM and 
the GLMM mean the predictor has a p-value of < 0.05. For the BRT model, significance indicates that the predictor crossed 
the relative influence cut-off in order to not be expected by mere chance (14.3%). Note: the relative influence does not 
indicate if the relationship is positive or negative. See SI: Tables 7- 9 for raw output from all three models. 
 
From the PDP, we can see that a country has an increasingly higher probability of 
experiencing conflict as the amount of conflicts it engaged in during the previous year 
increases (Figure 2). The same relationship holds for GDP per capita (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: PDP for time period 1 showing the marginal effect on the predicted outcome for a given value of the predictor. 
Relative influence of each predictor in is reported between parentheses. Grey tick marks along the x-axis indicate observed 
data points. Values along the y-axis indicate count of conflict on a log scale. 
Time period 2 (1997-2016) 
Spijkers et al. 2019 found a greater number of conflicts in Asia during time period 2, 
mainly involving China (n=70), followed by Japan (n=53), and South Korea (n=44) 
(Figure 3). The cross-validated percent deviance explained from the BRT model for 
time period 2, including fisheries employment as a predictor, was 31.8%. The pseudo 
r-squared for the ZINB GLM with fisheries employment as predictor was 0.68, and for 
the GLMM model the pseudo r-squared was 0.23. Protein supply emerges as an 
influential predictor across the three models (see Table 3). Lagged conflict emerged 
as significant in the BRT and ZINB GLM, while population growth was significant in 
both ZINB GLM and GLMM.  
 
Due to limited data availability for ‘fisheries employment’, we also ran the three 
models without that variable as a predictor (see Table 4). The cross-validated percent 
deviance explained from the BRT model was 33.2%. The pseudo r-squared for the 
ZINB GLM became 0.33, and the pseudo r-squared for the GLMM model remained 
Protein from fish 5.454625 -1.86071     2.83389     -2.4212      
Democracy level 3.960203 1.18338     1.40043     0.2996      
Military 
expenditure 
3.443970 -1.19697     1.71233     -2.6367      
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unchanged. The three models without fisheries employment as predictor found 
convergence on the importance of three predictors: lagged conflict, domestic supply 
quantity and amount of protein consumed from fish (see Table 4). 
 
 
Figure 3: Map of countries experiencing conflict over fishery resources for time period 2 (1997-2016). 
 
Table 3: Model comparison for time 2 (1975-1996), the three models with fisheries employment as predictor. Bold variables 
are significant for the model and highlighted variables are those that have moderate to strong support across all models (as 
per our evaluation scale), including the models without fisheries employment as a predictor (see Table 4). Significant for the 
ZINB GLM and the GLMM mean the predictor has a p-value of < 0.05. For the BRT model, significance indicates that the 
predictor crossed the relative influence cut-off in order to not be expected by mere chance (12.5%). Note: the relative 
Predictor BRT ZINB GLM GLMM 
Count model Zero-inflation 
 Relative 
influence 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
Lagged conflict 31.122203 4.9257      42.969      1.8789      
Domestic supply  28.485425 3.5428      2.402      1.2808      
Protein from fish  14.416985 2.6083      20.893      3.2177      
Population growth 4.631676 7.4385      -455.880     8.4098 
GDP per capita 8.245806 0.4451      3.259      0.8056       
Democracy level 3.149263 -0.8000      54.044      -1.4527      
Military 
expenditure 
3.877867 12.9729      824.609     4.1042      
Fisheries 
employment 
6.070774 0.8768      78.641      0.9417      
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influence does not indicate if the relationship is positive or negative. See SI: Tables 10-12  for raw output from all three 
models. 
 
Table 4: Model comparison for time 2 (1975-1996), the three models without fisheries employment as predictor. Bold 
variables are significant for the model and highlighted variables are those that have moderate to strong support across all 
models (as per our evaluation scale), including the models with fisheries employment as a predictor (see Table 3). Significant 
for the ZINB GLM and the GLMM mean the predictor has a p-value of < 0.05. For the BRT model, significance indicates that 
the predictor crossed the relative influence cut-off in order to not be expected by mere chance (14.3%). Note: the relative 
influence does not indicate if the relationship is positive or negative. See SI: Tables 13-15  for raw output from all three 
models. 
 
From the PDP, we can see that a country has an increasingly higher probability of 
experiencing conflict as the amount of conflicts it engaged in during the previous year 
increases, yet that probability remains the same from about four past conflict events 
onwards (Figure 4). The same relationship holds for domestic supply. We also found 
that as the quantity of protein derived from fish consumption in a country increases, 
so does the occurrence of conflict over fishery resources. The PDP shows that this 
relationship mainly holds true for higher levels of protein consumption from fish. The 
findings for both time periods are summarized in Table 5.  
 
 
Figure 4: PDP for time period 2 showing the marginal effect on the predicted outcome for a given value of the predictor. 
Relative influence of each predictor in is reported between parentheses. Grey tick marks across the top of each plot indicate 
observed data points (along the x-axis). Values along the y-axis indicate count of conflict on a log scale. 
 
 
Predictor BRT ZINB GLM GLMM 
Count model Zero-inflation 
 Relative 
influence 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
Lagged conflict 30.766761 5.08320     -45.3797     4.98655     
Domestic supply  28.598450 3.95801     -71.5552     3.79510     
Protein from fish  16.238776 1.19910     1.4120      2.17422     
Population growth 7.393651 -0.34175     -1.9172      -0.9966   
GDP per capita 9.217082  0.16370     -1.7705      0.71646     
Democracy level 3.780293 0.02571     0.6737      -0.27826     
Military 
expenditure 




Table 5: Summary of the findings for time period 1 and time period 2. The findings for time period a are based on 3 models, 
and the findings of time period 2 are based on 6 models (3 with and 3 without the employment variable). High and 
moderate support findings are highlighted. 
 
Discussion 
We did not find a single hypothesis that could fully explain increases in international 
fishery conflict. The results show that the nature of international fisheries conflict has 
changed over time (supporting previous findings by Spijkers et al. 2019) and that the 
predictors of the phenomenon are not generalizable from any of the tested 
hypotheses. Only one predictor, lagged conflict, remained significant across both 
time periods. Particularly during time period 1, lagged conflict was a strong predictor. 
During this time, many of the fisheries conflicts were prolonged, low intensity events 
between the same set of countries (Spijkers et al. 2019). For time period 2, 
experiencing conflict in the previous year remained an important predictor for 
conflict in a given year, but the predictor had less predictive power than for time 
period 1 in the BRT model. This is likely due to international fisheries conflicts not 
lasting as long during time period 2, but being more intense (Spijkers et al. 2019).  
 
Aside from lagged conflict, the time periods exhibited different significant predictors 
for conflict. From 1975 to 1996, a time in which marine fisheries catch as well as 
fishing effort steadily increased, lagged conflict and high levels of GDP per capita had 
a significant relationship with conflict. From 1997 to 2016, when more conflict 
occurred in Asia and global yields from fishing had started to stabilize and decrease, 
we found evidence that increased demand and an increase in supply of fishery 
resources is linked to an increase in conflict occurrence. For a discussion on the 
predictors with no to low evidence for either time period, see SI: Low evidence 
predictors. 
 
Findings for time period 1 (1975-1996) 
During time period 1, marine fisheries catch as well as fishing effort steadily 
increased, and global catches peaked in 1996 at 86 million tonnes (Pauly & Zeller 
Predictor Time period 1 Time period 2 
Level of 
support 
Relationship Level of 
support 
Relationship 
Domestic supply Low Positive Moderate Positive 
Protein quantity None None Strong Positive 
Fishery employment NA NA None None 
Population growth None None Low Positive 
GDP per capita High Positive None None 
Democracy level None None None None 
Military expenditure None None Low Positive 
Lagged conflict High Positive Moderate Positive 
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2016, Worm & Branch 2012, Anticamera et al. 2011). Conflicts mainly involved North 
American and European countries, often occurred around a single species and were 
mostly characterized by low conflict intensity (such as hostile verbal expressions or 
hostile diplomatic acts) (Spijkers et al. 2019). Examples include the Pacific salmon 
dispute between Canada and the USA or the Cod wars between France and Canada 
(Spijkers et al. 2019).  
 
We found that GDP per capita was a significant predictor for fisheries conflict 
conflicts in time period 1 (see Table 5). Studies linking natural resources such as fresh 
water to conflict find that decreasing levels of GDP per capita (a general indicator of 
the development and macro-economic performance of a country) are significant 
predictors of conflict (Bernauer & Böhmelt 2020, Yoffe et al. 2003, Hauge & Ellingsen 
1998). However, focusing on maritime conflict, Daniels and Mitchell (2017) report 
that that more economically developed states have greater opportunities to make 
maritime claims, and thus engage in more conflict. Economically developed states 
started to delimit their maritime spaces in the late 1970s to early 1980s, triggering 
conflict over access to fishing areas (such as the Turbot Wars between Canada and 
Spain, or the fish wars between the USA and Canada over the maritime boundary at 
the Dixon Entrance) (Daniels & Mitchell). Our findings support this hypothesis for 
time period 1, although with some nuance. From our GLM model, we find that lower 
GDP per capita is a predictor for not being able to engage in conflicts. This could 
indicate that countries with a lower GDP per capita in this time period did not have 
the economic capacity necessary to actively participate in activities related to 
fisheries to the same degree as more developed states. Fisheries in developing 
countries have only gradually been integrated into international markets, yet now 
contribute a significant proportion of fish traded on such markets (Crona et al. 2015, 
FAO 2018). Being initially isolated from regional and global dynamics may have 
shielded them from the low intensity international conflicts common to this time 
period. 
 
Findings for time period 2 (1997-2016) 
We found strong support for the demand hypothesis, more specifically for demand 
for fish as food (see Table 5). We found moderate support for the significance of 
domestic supply (significant across 4 out of 6 models), however because the 
relationship between fish supply and conflict is a positive rather than negative (i.e. as 
supply of fish increases, so does conflict), this does not confirm the supply-induced 
scarcity hypothesis. During time period 2, more conflict arose in Asia (Spijkers et al. 
2019) (Figure 3). The three countries that experienced most conflict during this 
period, China, Japan and South Korea, operate some of the largest Distant Water 
Fishing (DWF) fleets globally (Pauly et al. 2014, Mallory 2013). During this period that 
the number of areas open to new fisheries exploitation declined (McClanahan et al. 
2015, Swartz et al. 2010) and yields from fishing started to stabilize or potentially 
even decrease (Pauly & Zeller 2016 report a peak in catches in 1996). However, 
fishing effort continued to rise, leading to a global decline in catch-per-unit-effort 
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(Pauly & Zeller 2016, Mcclanahan et al. 2015, Watson et al. 2013, Worm & Branch 
2012). Between 1997 and 2016, a shortfall in supply from collapsing stocks within the 
EEZ of developed countries was increasingly replaced by fish harvested from tropical 
waters, where fisheries are often minimally managed (Mcclanahan et al. 2015). China 
became the largest producer and exporter of fishery products worldwide, while the 
USA became the largest importer (FAO 2018).  
 
In time period 2, the quantity of fish available for domestic consumption had a 
positive relationship with conflict. The finding that an increase in supply of fishery 
resources to a given country is linked to increased conflict for that country goes 
against the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis, which postulates that conflict 
increases when resources decline. It is, however, possible that despite a decline in 
the wild capture of marine fish, total supply of fishery resources has increased, 
potentially masking the effect of degrading ecosystems on the incidence of conflict. 
We illustrate this with the example of China, the country most in conflict for time 2. 
As discussed previously, global yields from wild fish capture had started to stabilize or 
potentially even decrease during time period 2 (Pauly & Zeller 2016). For that same 
time period, reports indicate that some regions have been able to rebuild certain fish 
stocks, while others have experienced stock depletion and overfishing (Béné 2015). 
China is a good example of the latter, as 30 percent of its domestic fisheries are 
reported to have collapsed, and a further 20 percent to be overexploited (Blomeyer 
et al. 2012). Thus, China has increasingly turned to distant water fishing and 
aquaculture to satisfy its domestic demand (Pauly & Zeller 2016, Pauly et al. 2014, 
Watson et al. 2012, Anticamara et al. 2011). While both of these strategies have 
allowed China to maintain its domestic supply quantity (which is made up of both 
catch of wild fish and production of cultured fish) growing despite local stock 
collapses, it has potentially also led to a greater number of conflicts over fish. In the 
2000s, China’s growing DWF fleet operated in the EEZs of over 90 countries 
worldwide (Pauly et al. 2014). As of 2014, China’s estimated DWF fleet encompassed 
nearly 4000 vessels and is supported by a number of governmental tax relief policies 
and subsidies (for comparison, the USA’s DWF fleet consists of roughly 200 ships 
(Mallory 2013, 2016). It is possible that China has increasingly experienced conflicts 
because of the geographic expansion of their DWF vessels, even operating in foreign 
EEZs such as those of Japan and South Korea, to maintain their catches (Pauly et al. 
2014). Declines in fish caught in its own EEZ push China to source its domestic supply 
of fish through distant water fishing and aquaculture (which also still relies in part on 
wild caught fish for feed (FAO 2018)). Consequently, a greater number of conflict 
incidences could be the end result of local scarcities that are masked in the domestic 
supply variable. 
 
For time period 2, we also found that as the quantity of protein derived from fish 
consumption in a country increased, so did the occurrence of conflict over fishery 
resources. The PDP shows that this relationship mainly holds true for higher levels of 
protein consumption from fish (over 20g/capita/day) (Figure 4), suggesting that 
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countries whose populations rely heavily on fish for food experience more conflict to 
ensure demand for fish is met. Fish, derived from both wild capture fisheries and 
aquaculture, are an important source of protein: In 2015, they accounted for about 
17 percent of the global population’s intake of animal protein (note that this 
percentage also includes consumption of inland catches, though they only represent 
about 12.8 percent of total catches) (FAO 2018). Moreover, per capita fish 
consumption is growing. It averaged 9.9 kg in the 1960s, grew to 20.2 kg in 2015, and 
preliminary estimates indicate further growth (FAO 2016). This growth in demand is 
reportedly due to urbanization and increasing living standards in developing 
countries (Béné 2015). The rising demand for fish is an important driver for the 
expansion of the Chinese DWF industry (Mallory 2013), and is reported to make IUU 
fishing profitable (Sumaila et al. 2006).  
 
Evaluating the evidence for scarcity-induced conflict 
For the first time period, we found no evidence that any type of scarcity, neither 
demand-nor supply-induced scarcity, is a significant predictor for increased conflicts 
over fishery resources. For the second time period, we did find evidence for the 
demand-induced scarcity hypothesis and evidence that goes against the logic of the 
supply-induced scarcity hypothesis. Support for the demand-induced scarcity 
hypothesis suggests that countries whose populations rely heavily on fish for food 
experience more conflict to ensure demand for fish is met. However, the demand-
induced scarcity hypothesis only holds if this rise in demand is combined with an 
insufficient rise in supply. As discussed previously, despite an escalation in global 
fishing effort, global wild catch volumes are shrinking, suggesting there is not enough 
supply for the demand. For example, it is reported that China (the country in most 
conflict during this time period) has experienced declining returns of wild catch from 
its own EEZ while simultaneously demand for fishery resources is increasing (FAO 
2018, Li & Amer 2015, Blomeyer et al. 2012, Agnew et al. 2009). Nonetheless, largely 
due to the increased availability of cultured fish, global supply of fish continues to 
increase. Would this increase in supply of cultured fish fulfill demand and buffer 
against conflicts over wild-caught, marine fish? This is a complex issue to be 
considered more rigorously by fisheries conflict scholars. We offer two reasons why 
an increase in supply from aquaculture might not (yet) act as a buffer.  
 
First, perhaps fish supplied by aquaculture does not fully substitute certain popular 
and highly valuable or culturally sought-after marine species obtained through wild 
capture, so aquaculture might not prevent conflicts over such stocks. For example, 
squid (families Gonatidae, Loliginidae, Ommastrephidae, Onychoteuthidae) are in 
high demand in countries such as Japan and China. Because cephalopod aquaculture 
production is not significant enough to meet demand (Cai & Leung 2017), pressure on 
major squid species remains high (about 14 percent of global squid production is 
deemed sustainable or improving, see Sustainable Fisheries Partnership 2019). The 
IFCD has tracked conflict events related to squid, triggered by illegal fishing. Second, 
aquaculture itself still in part relies on supply from wild catch. Fish oil and fishmeal, 
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produced from marine fish, are regular inputs into aquaculture systems. All in all, it is 
still possible that, though the total supply of fish is increasing, the decline in 
availability of marine, wild-caught fish in combination with growing demand is 
spurring conflict. These findings indicate that the relationship between availability of 
fishery resources and conflict might not be as straightforward as represented in some 
fishery conflict studies. Rather, it is possible that variables such as the value of, or 
cultural preferences for, particular species play a more important role in the 
occurrence of conflict than overall resource availability. 
 
Limitations and recommendations 
There are a few important limitations to our study. First, the IFCD does not include 
cooperative events over fishery resources. To better understand how often states 
collaborate on fishery issues rather than experience conflict over them, we need 
comprehensive longitudinal data on existing transboundary fishery treaties (Mitchell 
& Zawahri 2014, Brochmann 2012, Yoffe et al. 2004). This could also clarify whether 
there are shared predictors between conflict and cooperation. Second, there is a 
need to better understand if certain predictors would have a stronger relationship 
with conflict if they were lagged over a certain amount of time, indicating delayed 
effects of certain predictors. Finding the correct time lags for conflict research is a 
persistent issue (Selby & Hoffman 2014, 2016). Third, the domestic supply data set, 
which includes wild capture and cultured products as well as fish imports, could be 
masking actual declines in local resources. Efforts are therefore needed to look 
further into the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis, and particularly how supply and 
demand for specific species might interact with monetary value or cultural demand 
to produce conflict. Fourth, predictors such as the democracy and military 
expenditure here might not have shown a significant relationship with conflict 
occurrence, but they might be better predictors of conflict intensity (Daniels & 
Mitchell 2017, Hegre 2014, Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). Last, we find unexplained 
variance in the data across all models, which could indicate that we are missing 
(important) predictors. Possible other predictors are discussed below. 
 
First, more precise indicators of state capacity other than the traditional democracy 
level indicator could have strong relationships with conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999). The 
World Governance Indicators could be a good starting point, but they have limited 
temporal coverage (from 1995 onwards) and, when we incorporate them into our 
analysis for time 2, the dataset exhibits a high level of collinearity with the democracy 
level variable. Similarly, more granular variables of economic development (and 
dependence) might also be a promising avenue. Second, the number of shared rivers 
has been used as an important predictor for dyad-conflict in the fresh water conflict 
literature (Brochmann 2012). Preliminary findings of analyses looking into shared fish 
stocks indicate that this variable could be an important indicator (Palacios-Abrantes 
et al., submitted), but as of yet no long time series dataset is available. Third, fleet 
size and fishing effort are likely to be important determinants for conflict occurrence, 
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but only limited data on fleet size is available (source: the OECD), precluding their 
inclusion in our analyses. 
 
We recommend four avenues of inquiry to guide future work on fisheries and 
conflict. First, greater disaggregation (higher analytical resolution) of explanatory 
variables and better recognition of local circumstances, including explicit 
consideration of geographic location and context, may make patterns clearer and 
easier to understand. Exploring spatial aspects associated with international fisheries 
conflict is an important next step (e.g., to test the ‘distance and contiguity’ argument, 
which specifies that countries in closer proximity will experience more conflict), and 
for which the literature on water conflict provides important insights (Bernauer & 
Böhmelt 2020, Wolf et al. 2003). Second, gathering more data on fisheries conflict 
from local to international scales, and establishing international teams that can align 
data-gathering methods and compile large datasets, will greatly improve our 
understanding of conflict drivers across time, scales and geography. Third, looking at 
characteristics of fishery resources themselves and how they influence conflict is an 
unexplored avenue. Characteristics such as the fish’s value, or its spatial variability, 
could be informative for their relationship to conflict. Last, we suggest further 
research is conducted not only on the predictors found to be significant, but also 
those predictors that had less support for their relationship with conflict in our 
analyses, such as measures of democracy, employment or militarization, particularily 
as potential mediators of conflict intensity.  
 
Conclusion 
The role of natural resources in sparking conflict is contested. Particularly for fishery 
resources, declines in abundance are often assumed to incite increased competition 
over valuable, dwindling stocks. In this paper, we aimed to identify which variables 
are significant predictors of historical international fishery conflict to parse out what 
might be driving fisheries conflicts to help inform approaches that might anticipate 
and prevent them. Though we did not find a relationship between decreased 
availability of fish and increased conflict, we cannot entirely discount this hypothesis. 
Instead, we argue that reality is more nuanced and complex. Conflict might still result 
from local declines in wild catch, and an increase in global fish supplies (largely 
attributable to gains from aquaculture and increased DFW activities) might mask this 
reality. However, this does leave the literature to grapple with the role that cultured 
fish might play in mediating the relationship between declining wild fish supplies and 
conflict. As discussed, increased fish supplies from aquaculture could in theory act as 
a buffer for conflicts over wild-caught fish, yet some wild-caught species might not be 
substitutable by cultured species (such as, perhaps, certain wild fish of high monetary 
value or of cultural importance). Indeed, paying attention to the effects of cultural 
preferences and traditions in mediating the fishery resource-conflict pathway is an 
important next step in understanding what drives conflicts over fish. Overall, parsing 
out more nuanced pathways between changes in available fish supplies and conflict 
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Supplementary Information Paper III 
 
SI: Data sources  
GDP per capita (value, USD).  
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Domestic supply quantity (tonnes) 
Source: FAO (commodity balances) 
Domestic supply quantity is calculated as the production of fisheries products (in 
terms of live-weight; covering catch and culture of all fish, crustaceans, molluscs and 
aquatic organisms, excluding mammals and aquatic plants) + imports - exports + 
changes in stocks (decrease or increase) (FAO 2018). 
 
For territories that are part of another country (Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland 
(Denmark) and Gibraltar (Great Britain)), we did not use the values of the governing 
country as fish production differs greatly between the areas. We did not find specific 
values for any of them, and noted them as missing values. 
 
Protein supply quantity (g/capita/day) 
Source: FAO (food balances) 
The apparent consumption of protein from fish is based on estimates of the per 
capita amount of food available for human consumption. The apparent consumption 
is calculated as production (capture fisheries and aquaculture) minus non- food uses 
(including amount used for reduction into fishmeal and fish oil), minus fish exports, 
plus fish imports, plus or minus stocks (FAO 2018). This variable represents apparent 
consumption, not actual consumption, as the numbers could be higher than actual 
average food intake due to for example waste and losses. Moreover, records of 
production from subsistence and recreational fisheries, as well as cross- border trade 
between some developing countries, may be incomplete, which could lead to 
underestimation of consumption (FAO 2018). This variable is used by the FAO to 
report on consumption patterns. 
 
For territories that are part of another country (Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland 
(Denmark) and Gibraltar (Great Britain)), we did not use the values of the governing 
country as fish consumption differs greatly between the areas. For the Greenland, we 
used values reported specifically for the territory for the years 2000 and 2010-2013 
and noted other values as missing values (FAO n.d.). For the Faroe Islands, the value 
reported for fish consumption per capita per year approximated that of the values for 
Greenland (FAO 2005). Because the territories are close in geography and both part 
of Denmark, we used the same four reported values for the Faroe Islands as we did 
for Greenland and kept the years as missing values. We did not find specific values for 
Gibraltar, and noted them as missing values. 
 
Employment in fishing sector (number of persons) 
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Source: OECD 
The 'fishing population' includes all commercial, industrial and subsistence fishers, 
operating in freshwater, brackish water, and marine waters in economically inspired 
efforts to catch and land any of the great variety of aquatic animals and plants, 
should be included. People working on fish farms, hatcheries, and employed in shell 
fish culture operations, should also be included. The term 'fisher' should include not 
only those operating from fishing vessels of all types, but also those operating land-
based fishing gears and installations from the banks of rivers, lakes, canals, dams etc., 
and from beaches and shores which do not require the use of auxiliary boats. Where 
possible a breakdown by the type of activity should be included. The crews on fish 
factory ships, mother ships to fishing fleets, and on auxilliary craft such as, fish 
carriers, and fish transport craft should be included. Foreign fishers working on 
foreign vessels landing in national ports should be excluded from the data. However 
the data should show, preferably separately, the national fishers working on foreign 
vessels chartered to national companies. 
The crews of state-operated fishery patrol vessels, fishery protection vessels, hospital 
ships, etc. should be excluded from the fishers’ statistics. 
 
Data were available from 1995 onwards, but for OECD countries only as well as 
Argentina, China, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei and Thailand. For territories 
that are part of another country (Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland (Denmark) and 
Gibraltar (Great Britain)), we did not use the values of the governing country as 
employment within the fisheries sector differs greatly between the areas. For the 
Greenland, we used values reported specifically for the territory for the years 2010, 
2012 and 2013 and noted other values as missing values (FAO n.d.). For the Faroe 
Islands, we took values reported specifically for the territory for the year 2002 and 
kept the other years as missing values (FAO 2005). We did not find specific values for 
Gibraltar, and noted them as missing values. 
 
Population growth (annual %): 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Level of democracy: 
Source: Quality of Governance database. variable fh_ipolity2 (Freedom 
House/Imputed Polity) 
The scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. The 
value was created by taking the average of the Freedom House political rights (i.e. 
electoral process, political pluralism, participation categories and functioning of 
government categories) and civil liberties (i.e. freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights categories) scores transformed to a scale of 0-10; and Polity scores 
(transformed to a scale 0-10). The imputed version has imputed values for countries 




For territories that are part of another country Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland 
(Denmark) and Gibraltar (Great Britain)), we used the values of the governing 
country. 
 
Military expenditure (% of GDP) 
Source: Quality of Governance database. Military expenditures data from SIPRI are 
derived from the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures 
on the armed forced, including peacekeeping forces, defense ministries and other 
government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are 
judges to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space 
activities (SIPRI n.d.). For territories that are part of another country (Faroe Islands 
(Denmark), Greenland (Denmark) and Gibraltar (Great Britain)), we used the values of 
the governing country. 
 
Lagged conflict 
Temporal dataset, have to consider temporal autocorrelation. It is common to use 
conflict of previous time point as a predictor (Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). To do this, we 
had to drop the first time point (year 1974) from our conflict dataset as a response 
variable. 
 
SI: Low evidence predictors 
 
1. Population growth 
For time period 2, population growth shows a significant relationship with conflict 
across 2 out of 6 models. The relatively low evidence for the significance of 
population growth as a predictor of conflict could be because, overall, the global 
supply of wild captured (as above, this also includes inland catches) and cultured fish 
for human consumption has outpaced population growth in the past five decades 
(FAO 2018). Global supply of fish has increased at an average annual rate of 3.2 
percent over the period 1961 to 2013, double that of population growth over the 
same time period (FAO 2018). As mentioned above, increased demand for fish has 
been attributed to urbanization and increasing living standards in developing 
countries than increases in total population size (Béné 2015). 
 
2. Military expenditure 
For time period 2, military expenditure shows a significant relationship with conflict 
for one of the models. The relatively low evidence for the significance of military 
expenditure as a predictor for conflict occurrence is likely due to the fact that few 
conflicts in the IFCD are military conflicts involving navy vessels. Moreover, military 
expenditure might be a more meaningful predictor for particular intensities of 
conflict rather than conflict occurrence (Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). The importance of 
this predictor may change in the future as seas become increasingly militarized 
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(Wirth 2016, Wirth 2012), particularly in regions with territorial disputes (Spijkers et 
al. 2019). 
 
3. Democracy level 
In contrast to previous studies, we did not find significantly greater conflict 
occurrence for more democratic countries for any of the two time periods (Spijkers et 
al. 2019, Daniels & Mitchell 2017). However, similar to the military expenditure 
variable, it could be that democracy level is a better predictor of conflict intensity 
than occurrence, as Daniels & Mitchell (2017) report that democracies do experience 
more diplomatic conflicts than non-democratic countries over fish. 
 
4. Employment in the fisheries sector 
We only test this variable for time period 2 due to the datasets limited time coverage. 
None of the three models showed a significant relationship between employment 
and conflict. This could be explained by the decrease in proportion of those 
employed in capture fisheries, declining from 83 percent in 1990 to 68 percent in 
2016 (FAO 2018), potentially decreasing the opportunity for at-sea confrontations. 
Nonetheless, 85 percent of the global population employed in the fisheries and 
aquaculture sectors is in Asia (FAO 2018), which is where most conflicts occurred 
during this time period. 
 










Figure 2: Piecewise regression model (smoothed conflict data, rolling mean of 3 years) with estimated breakpoints year 




Figure 3: Collinearity matrix of all predictors used in time 1. Scatterplots of each pair of variables are drawn on the left part 





Figure 4: Collinearity matrix of all predictors used time 2. Scatterplots of each pair of variables are drawn on the left part of 
the figure. Pearson correlation is displayed on the right. Variable distribution is available on the diagonal. 
 
Supplementary Information (Tables) 
 
 
Table 1: Categorization of fishery conflict intensities, linked to their observable 
actions and behaviors. From Spijkers et al. (2018). 
 
Intensity of observed behavior/action 
Intensity Description 
5 Military acts causing death 
- Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast Guards, with 
resulting deaths 
4 Military acts  
- Attack of foreign vessels, crew members or Coast Guards, no death 
toll 
3 Political-military hostile acts  
- Sending out police vessels/ warships 
- Seize vessel and/or crew 
- Gear destruction 
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- Reinforcing borders 
2 Diplomatic-economic hostile acts 
- Breaking or not adhering to existing agreement 
- Lawsuit 
- Trial in court 
- Seeking international arbitration 
- Trade ban 
- Fishing ban 
- Landing ban 
- Monetary penalties 
- Close ports 
1 Verbal expressions displaying discord or hostility in interaction  
- Failing to reach an agreement 
- Making threatening demands and accusations 
- Threatening sanctions 
- Condemning specific actions, behaviors or policies 
- Requesting change in policy 
- Civilian protests 








   
 Estimate Standard error  
psi1.Year 1997 .001   0.665  
psi2.Year 2000 .592 0.640  
    
Meaningful coefficients 
of the linear terms: 
   
 Estimate Standard error Pr(>|z|)     
Year    0.08235     0.00729   <2e-16 *** 
 
 




   
 Estimate Standard error  
psi1.Year 1997 .600   0.492  
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psi2.Year 2000 .372 0.595  
    
Meaningful coefficients 
of the linear terms: 
   
 Estimate Standard error Pr(>|z|)     
Year    8.781e-02   8.688e-03   <2e-16 *** 
 
Table 4: VIF GLM time 1 and time 2 
 
VIF GLM time 1 
GDP.per.
capita     
Domestic.supp
ly          
Protein.fis
h 
Military.expenditure       Democracy.level 
11.98544
0             
10.570221             14.645303             12.439507             54.733523 
Lagged.c
onflict     
Population.gro
wth 
   
 2.712484              61.190335    
 
VIF GLM time 2 
GDP.per.
capita     
Domestic.supp
ly          
Protein.fis
h 
Military.expenditure       Democracy.level 
4.786557 2.442451 7.336159              7.536486 34.796513 
Lagged.c








440.609532 2.910195   
 
Table 5: VIF GLMM time 1 and time 2 
              
VIF GLMM time 1 
GDP.per.
capita     
Domestic.supp
ly          
Protein.fis
h 
Military.expenditure       Democracy.level 
1.583126              1.932557 2.189199              1.039492 1.387835              
Lagged.c
onflict     
Population.gro
wth 
   
  
1.145170              
1.371484    
 
VIF GLMM time 2 
GDP.per.
capita          
Domestic.supp
ly          
Protein.fis
h 
Military.expenditure       Democracy.level 
1.412520              1.159574              1.211319 1.149163              1.788539              
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Lagged.c




yment          
  
 1.133511              1.188923 1.880709   
 
Table 6: VIF BRT time 1 and time 2 
VIF BRT time 1 
GDP.per.
capita     
Domestic.supp
ly          
Protein.fis
h 










onflict     
Population.gro
wth 





   
 
 
VIF BRT time 2 
GDP.per.
capita     
Domestic.supp
ly          
Protein.fis
h 
























Table 7: BRT results time 1 
Model parameters: a tree complexity of 3, a learning rate of 0.001, number of trees 
set at 800 and a bag fraction of 0.75.  
 
Total.Deviance      2.0601176 
Residual.Deviance   0.8616932 
Correlation  0.8280932 
AUC     0.0000000 
Per.Expl           58.1726208 
cvDeviance   1.2323207 
cvCorrelation 0.5996819 
cvAUC   0.0000000 
cvPer.Expl 40.1820195 
             
 
Table 8: ZINB GLM results time 1 
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Count model coefficients (negbin with log link): 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)           -0.01828     1.30310   -0.014   0.98881    
GDP.per.capita -0.20168 0.79031   -0.255   0.79858    
Domestic.supply 1.20459     0.92643    1.300   0.19351    
Protein.fish -1.86071     1.35763   -1.371   0.17051    
Democracy.level 1.18338     0.77723    1.523   0.12787    
Military.expenditure -1.19697     3.42074   -0.350   0.72640    
Lagged.conflict 1.53617     0.47588    3.228   0.00125 ** 
Growth.population -0.42474     1.82226   -0.233   0.81570    
Log(theta) 0.37867     0.31946    1.185   0.23589    
Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link): 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)            0.07414     1.41816    0.052 0.958307     
GDP -6.22271     1.69162   -3.679 0.000235 
*** 
Domestic.supply -3.22221     1.46331   -2.202 0.027666 *   
Protein.fish 2.83389     1.93507    1.464 0.143061     
Democracy.level 1.40043     0.94796    1.477 0.139593     
Military.expenditure 1.71233     3.06762    0.558 0.576711     
Lagged.conflict -4.13908     1.66194   -2.491 0.012756 *   
Growth.population 2.22541     2.00704    1.109 0.267515     
  
Theta = 1.4603  
Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 28   
Log-likelihood: -409.7 on 17 Df  
 
Table 9: Results of GLMM time 1 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
AIC BIC logLik deviance df.resid 
878.3     921.5    -429.2   858.3       542 
Scaled residuals:      
    Min       1Q       Median   3Q Max 
-0.6446 -0.3899 -0.3090 -0.2306 0.2292 
Random effects:     
Groups       Name   Variance Std.Dev.  
X (Intercept) 0.5963    0.7722    
Number of obs: 552 groups:  X, 
28 
   
Fixed effects:     
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 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)            -1.5244      0.7474   -2.040 0.041394 *   
GDP   3.0714      0.8773    3.501 0.000463 *** 
Domestic.supply         2.4764      1.3486    1.836 0.066331 .   
Democracy.level         0.2996      0.7024    0.426 0.669765     
Protein.fish           -2.4212      1.7904   -1.352 0.176257     
Military.expenditure   -2.6367      2.3191   -1.137 0.255572     
Lagged.conflict         1.5205      0.6758    2.250 0.024450 *   
Population.growth      -2.6453 1.7593 -1.504 0.132683 
Correlation of Fixed Effects: 
 
 (Intr) GDP Dmstc. Dmcrc Prtn.f Mltry. Lggd.c 
GDP 0.025       
Dmstc.spply   0.066 -
0.156                                    
     
Demcrcy.lvl -0.749 -
0.264   
0.030                               
Protein.fsh -0.290 -
0.162 
-0.612 -0.062                       
Mltry.xpndt -0.227 -
0.010 
-0.001 -0.029   0.065                
Lggd.cnflct   0.094 -
0.286   
0.043 -0.066 -
0.014   
0.104         






Table 10: BRT results time 2 
Model parameters: a tree complexity of 5, a learning rate of 0.001, number of trees 
set at 900 and a bag fraction of 0.75.  
 
Total.Deviance      1.8253158 
Residual.Deviance   0.7885975 
Correlation  0.8440961 
AUC     0.0000000 
Per.Expl           56.7966527 
cvDeviance   1.2442513 
cvCorrelation 0.4356522 




Table 11: ZINB GLM results time 2 
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Count model coefficients (negbin with log link): 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)           -5.6450      1.9748   -2.858 0.004257 ** 
GDP.per.capita 0.4451      0.5517    0.807 0.419854     
Domestic.supply 3.5428      1.9415    1.825 0.068034 .   
Protein.fish 2.6083      0.6561    3.975 7.03e-05 *** 
Democracy.level 0.8000      0.5763   -1.388 0.165075     
Military.expenditure 12.9729      5.5463    2.339 0.019335 *   
Lagged.conflict 4.9257      1.3211    3.729 0.000193 
*** 
Growth.population 7.4385      3.5087    2.120 0.034008 *   
Fish.Employment         0.8768      0.6174    1.420 0.155551     
Log(theta) -0.1757      0.2254   -0.780 0.435557     
Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link): 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)            114.820      78.766     1.458     0.145 
GDP.per.capita 3.259      16.268    0.200     0.841 
Domestic.supply 2.402      10.464    0.230     0.818 
Protein.fish 20.893      14.936    1.399     0.162 
Democracy.level 54.044      35.815    1.509     0.131 
Military.expenditure 824.609     522.340    1.579     0.114 
Lagged.conflict 42.969      31.626    1.359     0.174 
Growth.population -455.880     -455.880     -1.543     0.123 
Fish.Employment        78.641      50.861    1.546     0.122 
  
Theta = 0.8388  
Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 2887  
Log-likelihood: -395.3 on 19 Df  
 
Table 12: GLMM results time 2 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
AIC BIC logLik deviance df.resid 
839.4     884.4 -408.7 817.4 429 
Scaled 
residuals:  
    
    Min       1Q       Median   3Q Max 
-0.8278 -0.4920 -0.3672   0.0173   8.6270 
Random effects:     




0.2665    0.5162    




   
Fixed effects:     
 Estimat
e 
Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)            -1.3755      0.9317   -1.476 0.139872     
GDP   0.8056      0.7576    1.063 0.287632     
Domestic.suppl
y         
1.2808      1.1220    1.141 0.253664     
Democracy.leve
l         
-1.4527       0.8401 -1.730 0.08358 . 
Fish.Employmen
t         
0.9417      0.8313    1.133 0.257324     
Protein.fish           3.2177      0.9302    3.459 0.000542 *** 
Military.expendi
ture   
4.1042      8.3194    0.493 0.621778     
Lagged.conflict         1.8789      1.2283    1.530 0.126108     
Population.gro
wth      
8.4098 4.1423 2.030 0.04233 *   
Correlation of Fixed Effects: 
 









GDP -0.023                                                        
Dmstc.spply   -0.073 -0.050                                              
Demcrcy.lvl -0.821 -0.218 0.117                                                                
Fsh.Emplymn -0.546 0.263 -
0.159   
0.490     






   
Mltry.xpndt -0.541   0.139   0.032   0.163   0.245 -
0.068 
  
Lggd.cnflct   -0.116 -0.102   0.204   0.179 -
0.100 
-
0.173   
0.014  
Ppltn.grwth -0.177 -0.209   0.037 -
0.053 
-
0.207   
0.244   0.154   0.007 
 
 
Table 13: Results of BRT without employment  
Total.Deviance      1.8253158 
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Residual.Deviance   0.8457307 
Correlation 0.8039740 
AUC     0.0000000 
Per.Expl           53.6666105 
cvDeviance 1.2184492 
cvCorrelation 0.4469995 
cvAUC    0.0000000 
cvPer.Expl         33.2472135 
 
Table 14: Results of ZINB GLM without employment 
 
Count model coefficients (negbin with log link): 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)           -1.05653     1.12824   -0.936    0.3490     
GDP.per.capita 0.16370      0.51997     0.315    0.7529     
Domestic.supply 3.95801     1.01323    3.906 9.37e-05 *** 
Protein.fish 1.19910     0.53838    2.227    0.0259 *   
Democracy.level 0.02571     0.36412    0.071    0.9437     
Military.expenditure 4.38959     2.97046    1.478    0.1395     
Lagged.conflict 5.08320     0.98114    5.181 2.21e-07 *** 
Growth.population -0.34175     1.82244   -0.188    0.8513     
Log(theta) -0.37807     0.16168   -2.338    0.0194 *   
Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link): 
 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)            1.0755      2.1692    0.496   0.62002    
GDP -1.7705      1.6184   -1.094   0.27395    
Domestic.supply -71.5552     25.4029   -2.817   0.00485 ** 
Protein.fish 1.4120      1.6591    0.851   0.39471    
Democracy.level 0.6737      1.0032    0.672   0.50186    
Military.expenditure 8.6029      5.2797    1.629   0.10322    
Lagged.conflict -45.3797     21.7630   -2.085   0.03705 * 
Growth.population -1.9172      3.2316   -0.593   0.55300    
  
Theta = 0.6852  
Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 105    
Log-likelihood: -832.8 on 17 Df  
 
Table 15: Results of GLMM without employment 
 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
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AIC BIC logLik deviance df.resid 
1702.8    1752.6    -841.4    1682.8      1069 
Scaled residuals:      
    Min       1Q       Median   3Q Max 
-0.7734 -0.4349 -0.3192 -0.2710   7.7907 
Random effects:     
Groups       Name   Variance Std.Dev.  
X (Intercept) 0.6242    0.7901    
Number of obs: 
1079 
groups:  X, 
58 
   
Fixed effects:     
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)            -1.73487     0.51524   -3.367   0.00076 *** 
GDP   0.71646     0.67789    1.057   0.29056     
Domestic.supply         3.79510     1.32148    2.872   0.00408 **  
Democracy.level         -0.27826     0.50339   -0.553   0.58041     
Protein.fish           2.17422     0.85789    2.534   0.01127 *   
Military.expenditure   -2.89693     3.46971   -0.835   0.40376     
Lagged.conflict         4.98655     1.06101    4.700   2.6e-06 *** 
Population.growth      -0.9966   1.9691 -0.506   0.61277 
Correlation of Fixed Effects: 
 
 (Intr) GDP Dmstc. Dmcrc Prtn.f Mltry. Lggd.c 
GDP 0.185                                                 
Dmstc.spply   -0.006   0.001                                      
Demcrcy.lvl -0.382 -
0.220 
-0.210                               
Protein.fsh -0.753 -
0.415   
0.010 -0.010                       
Mltry.xpndt -0.547 -
0.036   
0.039   0.119   0.221                
Lggd.cnflct   -0.022   0.029   0.115 -0.131 -
0.023   
0.099         
Ppltn.grwth -0.355   0.003   0.063   0.121   0.147 -
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Recent studies suggest that global climate change and subsequent shifts in fish 
species distribution could dramatically increase the likelihood of fisheries conflict. 
However, existing ecological projections often neglect wider economic, social and 
political trends when assessing the likelihood of, and influences on, future conflict 
trajectories. In this paper, we build four future fisheries conflict scenarios by 
integrating longitudinal scientific evidence on international fisheries conflict with 
expert data on fishery conflict trends and drivers. The scenarios take place in the 
years 2030 to 2060 in the North-East Atlantic (“Scramble for the Atlantic”), the East 
China Sea (“The Remodeled Empire”), the coast of West Africa (“Oceanic 
Decolonization”), and the Arctic (“Polar Renaissance”). The scenarios illuminate how 
the different decisions made today can lead to dramatically different future paths. 
Moreover, they aim to inspire policy makers to work with exploratory scenario 
processes to build anticipatory capacity in the pursuit of future ocean security. 
 
Introduction 
Global changes in our climate, and as a consequence, in our oceans and related food 
systems, are projected to spark or exacerbate fisheries conflict. Fisheries conflicts are 
here defined as disagreements between two or more actors that center on the 
ownership or management of marine fishery resources (Nyman 2013, Pinsky et al. 
2018, Spijkers et al. 2019). Climate change is leading to changes in the ocean’s water 
temperature, ocean currents and coastal upwelling patterns, which in turn alters the 
distribution and potential yields of marine species (Cheung et al. 2010, Sumaila et al. 
2011, Costello et al. 2016, Wabnitz et al. 2018). Shifts in species’ abundance and 
distribution, and consequently their catch potential, can spur conflict and 
compromise security, for example through disrupting the management of fish stocks 
(Pinsky et al. 2018, Spijkers & Boonstra 2017). Other stressors such as habitat 
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destruction, pollution and overfishing exacerbate the negative impacts on marine 
species and their catch potentials (Wabnitz et al. 2018). Overfishing has resulted in 
declining catches, species collapse and even extinction (Pauly & Zeller 2016, Cabral et 
al. 2018, McCauley et al. 2015). In 2015, the percentage of stocks fished at 
biologically unsustainable levels was 33.1 percent, up from 10 percent in 1974 (FAO 
2018). Aside from reducing fish catches and inciting further competition, overfishing 
can also directly increase instances of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) 
fishing (Österblom et al. 2011), which has led to an increasing array of conflicts, 
ranging from diplomatic spats to violent clashes (Kim 2012, Spijkers et al. 2019).   
 
Scholars and policy makers are warning of a possible increase in fisheries conflicts 
due to such pervasive changes in our global ocean and fisheries (Nyman 2013, IPCC 
2014, Glaser et al. 2018, Pinsky et al. 2019, Spijkers et al. 2019), yet climate conflict 
scholarship reminds us that there is no consistent, direct connection between climate 
change, natural resources management and conflict (Hendrix 2018, Buhaug et al. 
2014, Gemenne et al. 2014). Instead, climate change can increase the risk for conflict 
through multiple pathways. To what degree these risks manifest as conflict within 
marine social-ecological systems (SES) is dependent on a diverse set of inter-related 
socio-political factors (Mach et al. 2019, van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018, Hegre et al. 
2016), such as vulnerable livelihoods (see Theisen 2008, Barnett & Adger 2007), weak 
states (see Barnett & Adger 2007) or institutional design failures (see Penney et al. 
2017, Dinar et al. 2015, Theisen 2008). Our understanding of the impacts of these 
contextual factors is important to integrate with knowledge on pervasive ecological 
changes in marine ecosystems if we are to gain more detailed insights into possible 
future trajectories for fisheries conflict.  
 
Due to the inherent uncertainty and complexity associated with human-climate 
connections, integrating such contextual factors with patterns of environmental 
change so as to forecast when and where conflicts can arise within marine SES is 
challenging. Achieving accurate forecasts is a notorious problem for complex SES 
particularly due to difficulties in predicting human behavior and social systems (Lade 
& Niiranen 2017, Müller-Hansen et al. 2017). Long-term security planning, for 
example, has been repeatedly criticized for employing conventional quantitative 
analyses that downplay the subjectivity and interpretative elements of assessing risk 
(Bostrom and Cirkovic 2008, van Asselt and Renn 2011). Such conventional analyses 
have also been critiqued for their linear approach to cause and effect (Buhaug et al. 
2014, Frank et al. 2014, Jore et al. 2018). Qualitative scenarios can assist in 
overcoming these challenges by allowing for the examination of a broader range of 
intervening variables. They are therefore an important tool to help policy makers 
think through uncertainties about the future, and decide on strategic directions that 
are robust to a variety of outcomes (Vervoort & Gupta 2018). Moreover, they can be 
used not only to identify emerging trends, but also to actively magnify or subvert 
different trends and to consider implications of the multiple futures generated 
(Boenink 2013, van Baalen & Mobjörk 2018). This feature caters to the fact that many 
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trends that appear inevitable end up having negligible impacts (‘non-events’), while 
minor trends or nearly invisible ‘slow variables’ that operate outside of established 
governance structures can have a much bigger influence in shaping the future (e.g. 
‘femtorisks’) (Frank et al. 2014). 
 
Exploratory scenarios are one of a range of tools that have been widely used to 
consider different futures related to complex socio-environmental problems (Riddell 
et al. 2018). Exploratory scenarios can help escape deterministic forecasts of the 
future and provide more creative and complex narratives about future 
developments, which are essential if we are to explore the robustness of decision-
making strategies (Riddell et al. 2018, Lord et al. 2016). However, exploratory 
scenarios have also been critiqued for their lack of creativity and underdeveloped 
communicative qualities, prompting more researchers to incorporate story-telling, 
creative narration and imagination into scenario building (Goulden & Dingwall 2012, 
Burnam-Fink 2015, Merrie et al. 2018). Marrying scientific fact and a systematic 
methodological approach with story-telling techniques is also imperative for the 
expansion of the scientific process and the engagement of a wider audience (Goulden 
& Dingwall 2012, Burnam-Fink 2015, Merrie et al. 2018, “Learn to tell science stories” 
2018).  
 
Here, we explore different future scenarios for fisheries conflict by combining 
scientific evidence with creative story-telling techniques. The scientific evidence base 
for the scenarios consists of: 
i. An expert workshop on fisheries conflict (identifying key drivers and conditions 
which contribute to conflict and potential case studies); 
ii. Conflict trend data from the International Fishery Conflict Database (Spijkers 
et al. 2019) (validating final case study selection); 
iii. Scientific literature on fisheries conflict cases; and scientific, technical and 
policy literature related to conflict drivers (validating conflict drivers and 
conditions, and identifying driver trends for each case study). 
Using this evidence base, we built four fisheries conflict narrative scenarios for the 
years 2030 to 2060 in the North-East Atlantic (“Scramble for the Atlantic”), the East 
China Sea (“The Remodeled Empire”), the coast of West Africa (“Oceanic 
Decolonization”), and the Arctic (“Polar Renaissance”). In addition to the expert 
workshop, external regional experts reviewed each narrative to enhance its validity 
and robustness. To enhance scenario diversity and account for different leverage 
points in the trajectories described, experts identified alternative discrete events or 
longer trends where the scenario would, or could have, taken a different path. 
 
Results 
We found that 23 economic, social, political and environmental drivers and 
conditions have been linked to the onset of fisheries conflict (Table 1). Climate 
change is not the only driver of future fisheries conflict. Rather, it is a specific 
configuration of underlying drivers and immediate conditions that causes systemic 
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instability in marine SES from which conflict episodes emerge (Boxes 1-4). Underlying 
drivers are forces operating at local, national or global levels that may shape 
situational factors in such a way that conflict becomes more likely, while conditions 
are explicitly linked, both spatially and temporally, to the conflict (Geist & Lambin 
2002, Helbing 2013). 
 
Table 1: Political, social, economic and environmental drivers and conditions that have triggered fisheries 
conflict. The relationship between the variables listed here and fisheries conflict are positively correlated. Case 
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Scenario development revealed that the underlying drivers and immediate conditions 
for conflict vary across time and space. Different drivers and immediate conditions 
can become amplified in different regions at different times. For example, the East 
China Sea and West Africa scenarios feature eight magnified drivers and conditions, 
while the Arctic scenario features six. The North East Atlantic scenario features four 
distinct drivers and conditions. The variable ‘unequal distribution of benefits’ is the 
main point of commonality across the four scenarios (Boxes 1-4). 
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Box 1. The North-East Atlantic: “Scramble for the Atlantic”  
 
It is 2030. Climate change has been left unchecked, and fish stocks have migrated 
north. Great Britain, now no longer part of the EU, is attempting to negotiate with 
the New Nordic Alliance (Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands) to regain access 
to fish it traditionally has rights to, but no longer has direct access to. The fish have 
migrated north, and Great Britain has not managed to negotiate any access 
agreements with other states. Current stock extent and stock abundance are both 
subject to intense debate and misinformation. Scientific and political cooperation 
and neutrality between states has broken down, obstructing any deal from being 
realized. Regional Fisheries Management Organizations are powerless, and with no 
functioning sanctions or dispute mediation tools in place, international law has 
become ineffective. The Ministers responsible for Great Britain's fisheries have 
called a diplomatic meeting with fisheries Ministers in the ‘New Nordic Alliance’ in 
an attempt to resolve escalating tension (read the full scenario in SI: Narratives). 
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Box 2. The East China Sea: “The Remodeled Empire” 
 
It is 2045. After countless confrontations at sea, full-blown military conflict has now 
broken out in the East China Sea. The triggering incident was a seemingly 
accidental confrontation between a Chinese nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarine and a Japanese fishing vessel. Numerous vessels have been seized and 
sunk, citizens are being illegally detained in both countries, and more than 200 
people have already lost their lives. Many ASEAN members have lost their trust and 
patience after decades of illegal fishing, undermining of peaceful conflict resolution 
processes, territorial disputes, and at-sea aggression from China. Japan and 
different ASEAN countries are beginning to signal that they no longer support the 
diplomatic approach of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union. The 
conflict is set to escalate further as new countries enter into open conflict. The 
United States of America has sent navy vessels to its ally, Japan, and the conflict is 
on the brink of spilling over into the South China Sea. A UN Security Council 
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meeting has been set up in New York to call for concrete action and prevent further 




Box 3. The coast of West Africa: “Oceanic Decolonization” 
  
It is 2045. After a deadly confrontation between small-scale fishers and massive 
international trawlers, fishers across West Africa have banded together to take 
back control of their fisheries and infrastructure in a movement called ‘Ocean 
Decolonization’. Using the judicial system, they are overturning decades of foreign 
overexploitation and control of marine resources and local infrastructure, which for 
decades had been enabled by debt traps and systemic corruption. Growing regional 
unity and international and local political support has empowered them to fight for 
the renegotiation of access agreements and the reclaiming of infrastructure and 
resources. West African fishers are looking forward to a future free from foreign 
ocean exploitation with an abundance of opportunities to grow and harvest 
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seafood. Beyan Boakai, the representative of Liberia for the West African Fishing 
Fleet, has become a local hero, celebrated for his fight in the Ocean Decolonization 




Box 4. The Arctic: “Polar Renaissance”  
 
It is 2060. A decade ago, climate change and hunger for resources in the Arctic had 
pushed the region to the brink of military conflict. Retreating sea ice had allowed 
untapped expansion into remote Indigenous lands in pursuit of fossil fuels and 
boreal fish. At first, a new economic opportunity beckoned for young Yakuts, the 
Russian people, industrial fishers and energy companies. However, Russian military 
presence and competition over fish increased political tensions and led to 
numerous at-sea confrontations between Russia and other Arctic states. Then, on 
the brink of full-blown armed conflict, the carbon bubble finally burst. Oil and gas 
prices collapsed and Russia, a long-time petrostate, became saddled with 
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skyrocketing debt. Indigenous communities suffered rapid socio-economic decline. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) used this opportunity to force Russia to 
stop its military build-up in the Arctic. The initial conflict and economic downturn 
also catalyzed a region-wide process of Arctic reconciliation and Indigenous 
empowerment. International climate reparations enabled the development of a 
joint Arctic trust fund to support Indigenous-led transformation. Sardana Nikolaev, 
an indigenous Yakut and CEO of Sakha Fishing, emphasizes the importance of Arctic 
unity at the fifth anniversary celebration of the historic Arctic reconciliatory 
meeting (read the full scenario in SI: Narratives). 
 
 
We also found, through the alternative pathways provided by the expert reviewers 
(SI: Alternative pathways), that key drivers could drastically change the trajectory of 
the scenarios, thus illuminating possible policy interventions that could be part of a 
plan for conflict mitigation or de-escalation. For example, alternative pathways for 
the North-East Atlantic and Arctic scenarios elucidated the importance of building 
fishery management agreements and partnership networks that are robust to volatile 
geopolitics and changes in the environment brought on and/or exacerbated by 
climate change. The East China Sea scenario revealed the importance of more 
effective Chinese domestic policy regarding fisheries management. Similarly, for the 
West Africa focal area, it is the future direction of West African fisheries 
management, and how the region as a whole decides to tackle the tension between 




Fisheries conflict is characterized by multiple drivers that interact and intervene 
between cause and effect, and different regions exhibit varying levels of vulnerability 
to fisheries conflict. However, low-intensity, non-escalatory conflict can also unlock 
stronger modes of cooperation, and climate change in particular increases the 
likelihood of both conflict and transformation. We examined potential pathways for 
future fisheries conflict through the generation of four distinct science-based 
narrative scenarios that explore the implications of ongoing trends in conflict-prone 
regions of the world. Exploratory scenarios are a promising tool to investigate how 
different decisions made today can lead to dramatically different future paths, and 
how one can build anticipatory governance capacity in the pursuit of future ocean 
security. We highlight four key lessons. 
 
‘Priming the pump’ for conflict 
The sheer volume and complexity of conflict drivers reflects the reality that fisheries 
conflict is embedded as part of a complex, social-ecological system (Spijkers et al. 
2018, Levin et al. 2013). The unequal distribution of benefits, real or perceived, is 
generally the social condition that ultimately triggers conflict (see Coulthard et al. 
2011 - ‘disparate cost/benefit outcomes’), unless an intervention mitigates it. As 
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shown, the unequal allocation of resources, or access to them, is not always the 
outcome of biophysical triggers (such as absolute resource scarcity), but also of 
certain configurations of political economies that govern modes of appropriation and 
distribution (Le Billon 2015). However, the intersection of biophysical changes (such 
as shifting species distributions prompted by climate change) and existing political 
economic realities can supercharge inequalities and ‘prime the pump’ for conflict.  
 
Conflict vulnerability awareness 
Different regions exhibit varying levels of vulnerability to fisheries conflict, as some 
systems are exposed to a wider range of socio-economic, environmental and political 
pressures (Jiminez et al. 2019). However, the message of the scenarios is not that 
West Africa is more vulnerable to conflict than the Arctic for example, and thus 
requires more immediate attention, as by using different input variables the picture 
could look different. Rather, the scenarios create awareness around the differential 
vulnerability across regions when there are more pressure points that can collectively 
act as a catalyst for sparking or entrenching fisheries conflict. Low quality 
governance, pre-existing ethnic tensions or increasing (local) demand for seafood are 
just some of the pressures that can shape a region’s socio-political and economic 
profile so as to increase the propensity for fisheries conflict (see Scholtens & Bavinck 
2018, Pomeroy et al. 2016).  
 
The transformative role of climate change 
Pervasive and often unpredictable impacts from climate change could increase the 
likelihood of conflict in least-likely cases. There is increasing evidence of climate 
change impacts on marine systems (Cheung et al. 2010, Sumaila et al. 2011, Costello 
et al. 2016, Wabnitz et al. 2018), however the degree of exposure to these impacts 
varies greatly across countries and regions, especially when one takes into account 
differences in both sensitivities and adaptive capacities (Blasiak et al. 2017). 
Nevertheless, climate change is projected to disrupt fisheries management even in 
well-organized, good governance areas (Pinsky et al. 2019), making fisheries conflict 
more likely in areas that otherwise exhibit fewer social, economic and political 
stressors, as has been the case in the northeast Atlantic mackerel conflict (Spijkers & 
Boonstra 2017). Climate change is increasingly framed as a growing security threat 
due to its overwhelming capacity in driving vulnerabilities through multiple pathways. 
It is worth noting, however, that a higher number of drivers and conditions may also 
offer more potential pathways for taking advantage of windows of opportunity 
(Chapin et al. 2009). We should therefore consider if the most volatile regions could 
in fact be arenas for transformation. 
 
Productive conflict 
Fisheries conflict does not always lead to undesirable societal outcomes. Low-
intensity, non-escalatory conflict can even be productive by pushing forward public 
debate, incubating  social justice movements, breaking down path dependencies, 
generating new norms and institutional structures, and thus contributing to stronger 
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cooperation (Scholtens & Bavinck 2018, Larsen & Nilsson 2017, Scheidel et al. 2017). 
For instance, fisheries conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s led to the establishment of 
EEZs, proving that conflict can be transformative and lead to stronger institutions for 
fisheries management. Likewise, conflict between fisherpeople of Sri Lanka and India 
has been a catalyst for bottom-up policy development (Scholtens & Bavinck 2018). 
Our scenarios explore the transformative capacity of conflict, and we specifically 
articulate this potential in the Arctic and West Africa scenarios. In both narratives, 
initial conflict and breakdown led to a renewal process, better regional cooperation, 
stronger institutions, and more accountability to the regions’ inhabitants. In the West 
Africa scenario, local resource-users banded together to collectively face the 
perceived shared threat of foreign overfishing (see social identity theory on how this 
‘banding together’ could unfold, Tajfel & Turner 1979). In the Arctic scenario, the IMF 
used its leverage as a global regulatory institution to coerce non-cooperative states 
into adopting structural adjustment policies with great political implications for 
regional peace. Both scenarios exemplify how conflict can be short-circuited by either 
social or institutional mechanisms, especially when precipitated by disruptive 
environmental change, to unlock stronger modes of cooperation.  
 
Building anticipatory governance capacity through narrative scenarios 
The conflict narrative scenarios are not only scientifically valid articulations of four 
conflict futures in which conflict drivers are magnified to consider the implications in 
the futures being created, they also function as accessible, science-based 
communication tools for articulation of complex sets of interactions leading to 
emergent outcomes.  
 
Exploratory scenarios in general allow us to build an understanding of potential 
futures of context-specific issues, and provide insights into future vulnerability of 
complex systems in a way that is not possible with current modelling approaches. 
Combining participatory elements with imaginative approaches also boosts the utility 
of the scenarios in multiple ways (Selin 2015, Bell et al. 2013). First, the participatory 
approach, which here took the form of an expert-led process to generate a set of 
conflict drivers, allows the creation of more robust future scenarios. Engaging more 
deeply with regional experts also helps to further illuminate the inherent radical 
uncertainty of social-ecological change and legitimizes possible policy interventions 
for conflict mitigation. Second, the storytelling approach can increase engagement 
with a more diverse audiences, and can help inspire readers to work towards 
desirable change (Pereira et al. 2019, Merrie et al. 2018, Milkoreit 2016, Burnam-Fink 
2015). Indeed, because of the transformative role that imagination can play, 
imaginative approaches are now finding their way into the international policy arena 
(such as the ‘Nature Futures’ work within the context of the Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Pereira et al. 2019)). 
We hope that continued creative and participation-led scenario development can 
enable the dialogical and imaginative policy experimentation space that is necessary 
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to pre-empt and short-circuit conflict, and build anticipatory capacity in service of 
fostering future ocean security.  
 
Materials 
The materials that make up the scientific evidence base for the four fishery conflict 
scenarios stem from: 
a) The results derived from an expert workshop comprised of 11 participants 
hosted at the facilities of the National Center for Ecological Analysis and 
Synthesis (NCEAS) in Santa Barbara, USA (October 2018). Participants included 
11 researchers with expertise in environmental governance, peace and conflict 
studies, ecology, fisheries, socio-ecological systems, human geography, law 
and political science. During the workshop, participants discussed what 
constitutes fisheries conflict; what the drivers of current and potential future 
conflicts are; and which governance mechanisms could ensure conflict 
prevention or mediation. The data resulting from this workshop is used in this 
paper as a scientific foundation to support the selection of case studies and 
conflict drivers (SI Methods: Workshop). 
b) The International Fishery Conflict Database (IFCD) (Spijkers et al. 2019). The 
IFCD contains 531 reported international fishery conflict events between 1974 
and 2016 (Spijkers et al. 2019). The last ten years of conflict events in the IFCD 
were used as an additional axis for case study selection. 
c) Secondary literature. Academic papers in Scopus were used to validate the 
drivers of fisheries conflict with case studies. To understand the expected 
future trends for those drivers, we relied on academic literature where 
possible, and also extracted information from technical literature (e.g. reports 
from NGOs considered authorities in the subject matter, as well as media 
reports from established sources) retrieved through Google searches.  
 
Methods: Building the scientific evidence base 
First, we defined fisheries conflict based on the most recent literature. Fisheries 
conflicts are disagreements between two or more actors that center on the 
ownership or management of marine fishery resources (adapted from Spijkers et al. 
2019). They can occur between different stakeholders, over varying geographical 
scales, and be of different intensities, ranging from an exchange of statements to 
severe military involvement and casualties (Spijkers et al. 2018). We use an inclusive 
concept of fishery conflict that encompasses, for instance, not only disputes over fish 
among fisherpeople but also disputes over access to ocean space between the fishery 
sector and other maritime industries.  
 
Second, we selected four regions in which to set the narratives, based on the latest 
trends in the prevalence of fisheries conflict and maritime security issues more 
generally. Such geographical conflict trends (areas where fisheries conflict and 
maritime security more generally is a current and future concern) were drawn from 
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the expert workshop and the IFCD (Spijkers et al. 2019) (Table 2). The following case 
study regions were selected: 
1. North-East Atlantic. This scenario features actors from the European Union 
and some of its member states, as well as surrounding nation states. The 
nations involved in the scenario are the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Great Britain, 
Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). 
2. East China Sea. This scenario features actors from China, Japan, and the United 
States of America, as well as surrounding South-East Asian states such as 
South Korea and Malaysia.  
3. Coast of West Africa. This scenario features actors from a number of Western 
African countries spanning Mauritania to Nigeria. 
4. Arctic. This scenario involves actors from the Arctic Council members, which 
are Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the 
Russian Federation and the United States of America. 
 
 
Table 2: Selected case studies of fisheries conflict 





Multiple fisheries conflicts 
have already erupted and 
are ongoing; diplomatic 
conflict (no at-sea violence). 
Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway & 
EU conflicts (Mackerel, Scomber 
scombrus). Event timing 2009-







Multiple fisheries conflicts 
have already erupted and 
are ongoing; high likelihood 
of further escalation due to 
territorial tensions and 
economic development. 
Japan versus Taiwan and China. 
Disputes over territory and 
fishing rights such as Senkaku 
Islands, and fish (Pacific Saury, 
Cololabis saira). Event timing 








Some fisheries conflicts have 
already erupted and are 
ongoing; fisheries important 
for local livelihoods; 
important incidences of 
illegal fishing and 
unequitable fisheries access. 
 
A few events such as Guinea 
versus China on IUU (e.g. shark). 
Event timing 2017. Flagged at 
workshop. 
 
Arctic  Polar 
Renaissance 
No fisheries conflicts have 
erupted yet; severe climate 
change impacts expected to 
trigger conflict. 
Few specific Arctic events 
(2016). Also tensions over 
Northern Shrimp quotas 
between Canada, Denmark and 
Faroe Islands (2010). Flagged at 
workshop. 
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The third step consisted of identifying variables that have already, and could continue 
to, accelerate the occurrences and/or intensity of conflict. The drivers were drawn 
from the expert workshop, and identified as political, social, economic and 
environmental. Later in the workshop the variables were separated into underlying 
drivers and immediate conditions. This distinction is key for the appropriate design of 
mitigation policies and measures. As conflict can occur between a multitude of 
stakeholders on different scales, the drivers are a mix of those relevant for sub-
national as well as international/regional contexts. To ensure the validity of the 
underlying and immediate driving variables, we only retained those variables linked 
to a peer reviewed fisheries conflict case in which the variable in question was 
described as having importance in causing conflict (SI Tables 1-4). We did not compile 
an exhaustive list of all available fisheries conflict cases, but provide a multitude of 
examples for each considered driver or condition (SI Tables 1-4).  
 
Fourth, we extracted the likely future trends for each of the drivers and conditions in 
each selected case study region from the latest scientific, technical and policy 
literature (SI Tables 5- 8), capturing more recent and emerging trends. We selected 
current (not before 2014) reports from NGOs considered authorities in the subject 
matter, as well as media reports from established sources, to find trends for the 
different drivers. For some of the drivers, no trend data could be found. For those 
drivers where multiple, conflicting trends were reported, we selected the most 
established authority. The drivers, conditions and their trends were used to build the 
core of the scenarios, where some were given a dominant role in the narrative by 
amplifying them. The amplified drivers, conditions and their trends differ among 
scenarios as specific variables will be more important in certain cases, based in part 
on the initial conditions within the region (including cultural considerations, history 
and environmental conditions). Selected variables for amplification were chosen 
based on a combination of the significance of the trend for the region (to ensure the 
scenario is plausible), narrative cohesion and scenario diversity. The amplified trends 
are indicated in schematic representations alongside each scenario. 
 
Finally, we selected an expert reviewer for each region to ensure scientific, socio-
economic and cultural validity (increasing the robustness and validity of the scenario), 
as well as to obtain alternative scenario storylines based on regional in-depth 
knowledge (SI: Alternative pathways). The alternative storylines not only enhance the 
diversity of our scenarios, but also ensure that they spanned a wider scope of 
relevant uncertainty while gaining insight into key potential leverage points in the 
trajectories. Reviewers were selected based on academic experience in the domain 
and were asked to identify 1-3 inflection points (discrete events or longer trends) in 
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Supplemental Information Paper IV 
 
Supplemental Information (Text) 
SI: Narratives 
 
For an overview of the additional sources used to build the narratives aside from the 
scientific evidence base, see SI: Additional sources for narratives.  
 
1. Scramble for the Atlantic - North-East Atlantic 
 
Our story begins sometime during the latter half of Earth's so-called twenty-first 
century.  Most of humankind has been working diligently to ignore actually doing 
anything about the impacts of climactic change except when they can 
opportunistically take advantage of it. That worked for a while, until it didn’t. We deal 
with a period chiefly labeled as the post-truth era, a time marked by the use of non-
knowledge and ignorance as important political forces, where facts are irrelevant and 
emotion and prejudice rule. With science, and unity out the door, the full 
consequences of this global experiment escaped nearly all governments and their 
people. Here is a recording of one such event that occurred at the onset of the period 
known as The Disintegration. 
 
Great Britain: Good evening  
 
The New Nordic Alliance (NNA): Good evening, we are all here. Can you hear us? 
 
GB: Who is us?  
 
NNA: All of us. The fisheries ministers of Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroese. We 
have business representatives of the New Nordic Alliance in the room, as well as two 
of our top scientists. Now. You wanted to once again discuss our fishing in the north-
east Atlantic? 
 
GB: Well, as we have previously made clear, Great Britain demands the right to exert 
the sovereign authority bequeathed to us under international law and to claim the 
marine resources that are rightfully ours. 
 
NNA: You say Great Britain, but Scotland is eager to leave the UK, your biggest fishing 
industry, not least because they are fearful for the implications on their shellfish 
sales. Even Northern Ireland and Wales are ready to jump ship. Hardly ‘Great Britain.’ 
 
GB: Please do not resort to disparagement and ill-formed suppositions. It is our right 




NNA: Listen. You don’t have any fish, they moved North, they are ours now and we 
have processed most of them already. Our negotiators have been over this countless 
times, perhaps you should have invested time and money in building vessels and 
processing facilities for anchovies, our scientists say they’re coming in to your waters 
next.   
 
GB: Forgive us, but that is simply not true. Our scientists, respectable people that do 
excellent research, tell us they are not all gone from our territory. Our Navy vessels 
even saw you entering our waters, targeting our fish! 
 
NNA: It is impossible for us to confirm or deny that accusation. Navigation 
malfunctions of course happen, and that cannot be helped. Why did you not take the 
opportunity to apprehend the vessel, if you felt it was violating your sovereignty? 
Why did you not take the opportunity to apprehend the vessel, if you felt it was 
violating your sovereignty?  
 
GB: Well… We petitioned the European Union for assistance, but they refused to 
intervene to assist us in enforcing our fishing regulations. This was clearly a 
retaliatory tactic for the British people deciding to re-establish their sovereign 
authority. This was most especially the case as we were, regrettably, forced to ban 
them from our waters after we expelled their fleet… This seemed to have particularly 
provoked Holland and Belgium who then petitioned the European Commission, 
supported by France and Denmark to refrain from supporting us in our hour of need.  
  
NNA: Don’t be disingenuous. Great Britain left the union without having a fishing 
agreement in place, and of course Norway is too politically aligned with the EU to 
discuss any agreement without the EU. You must remember our altercation with 
regards to EU accession? At the very least,  you could have taken a hard look at the 
numbers – your people don’t even want to eat the fish you worked so hard to 
reclaim. Horse mackerel and chips? Please. You just forced yourself into a situation 
where buying the fish your people actually want to eat has become much more 
expensive. Forgive me for my flippancy but In Iceland we have a saying; ‘If you can’t 
take the heat, don’t swim in a volcanic lake.’ 
 
GB: This is a blatant violation of our rights as a fishing nation! 
 
NNA: These fish are in our waters and have been for many years now. Even the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Committee admitted it was utterly powerless once fish began 
swimming all over the North. Essentially, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement is 
no longer applicable. It is archaic, not suited to such a volatile ocean. Besides, we 
ourselves are struggling to exploit the fisheries resources in our waters. We are 
sparring with the Russians and the Norwegians. We had to spend a good chunk of our 
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annual GDP to weaponize our fishing fleet, to act as a deterrent and now with our 
surveillance drones and EMP torpedoes, we can finally secure our stock.  
 
GB: (Outraged) This is not a matter of our honor and some misguided quest to 
reclaim ancient lost glory, it is a matter of rights. We do not need the European Union 
or anyone else for that matter to protect what is rightfully ours. Historical catches are 
a key factor in determining fishing quotas, and we have always caught mackerel and 
herring. The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement clearly states that historical rights 
matter and that even if the fish shifts its distribution, our right to harvest our fairly 
allocated and agreed quotas remains in effect. This is a blatant violation of our rights 
under international law.  
 
NNA: We just explained, the fish stocks agreement is functionally void now. You think 
historical catches, zonal attachment or any other one of those ridiculous metrics we 
used to adhere to still make sense in this changed environment? The world has 
changed.  
There are no Coastal State agreements anymore, we have even halted our scientific 
collaborations. Maybe you would have a leg to stand on if you were part of the 
European fishing fleet still. Perhaps you should have considered a suite of alternative 
options for supporting your economy before you decided to abruptly exit. Perhaps, a 
more effective strategy would be to wait until anchovy moves even further north. 
Besides, if there was mackerel or herring left in your waters, you would not be 
pleading us to give you access to take a share of ours. 
 
GB: There is most assuredly a significant stock of mackerel remaining, despite your 
rampant overfishing, despite your unwillingness to negotiate a fair and just total 
catch! Our scientists recently revised their stock assessment after some early errors 
and estimated a substantial abundance, for many years to come. Please admit that 
you are unwilling to negotiate a fair and equitable sharing and access agreement 
because you are focused on taking advantage of the ecological windfall resulting from 
climatic shifts. We know that a large part of the stock might have moved north, but 
our scientists tell us the stock is healthy. There should be enough for us to craft a 
sharing agreement for the benefit of all parties. This will require, of course, 
sustainable management from the NNA group, and not this reckless jeapordization of 
the stocks! 
 
NNA: Egg surveys, trawl surveys, none of the established scientific stock assessment 
methodologies turned out to be very reliable anymore, which is exactly why we 
exited the scientific collaborations. You are quite correct that years ago, we thought 
the stock was very abundant and breeding fast, so we fished hard. The Norwegians, 
the Europeans, even the Russians. We together learned something to our detriment, 
it turns out that a chaotic free-for-all is not the best way to manage unpredictable 
fish stocks… And you need to acknowledge your own wrongdoings in this. We, 
Iceland and Greenland, we did everything we could to support responsible, 
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precautionary management. We tried for years to get a fair management plan! You 
were unwilling to cooperate at the time so, yes, we were catching hundreds of 
thousands of tons. Now… now a few tons at best. And I am sorry to say, those tons 
are all in our Exclusive Economic Zone, the stock shift is real.  
 
GB: Are you calling our scientists liars, our research invalid? New Nordic Alliance, this 
is absolutely a despicable way of negotiating! If we do not come to a reasonable 
agreement here, we will be left with not option but to take this to the courts. 
 
NNA: We ask you again to please acknowledge your own role in this dispute. You 
should not have promised your fishing industry a return to the glory days. Projections 
many years ago showed stocks leaving your waters and moving north. Maybe you 
should have taken climate change a bit more seriously when you had the chance. 
Look, it’s tough, even on us. We are lucky we have our geothermal energy surplus 
and our digital services, otherwise we could be worse off than you.  
 
GB: We will not leave it at this! We will take you to court!  
 
NNA: Under which jurisdiction precisely do you propose to take this case?  
 
GB: We are a legitimate Coastal State now. You must consider- 
 
NNA: We will hear from you (disconnect tone)  
 
2. Remodeled Empire - East China Sea  
 
We are reading excerpts from a transcript of the meeting held at the UN 
headquarters in New York to address the East China Sea crisis. The objective of this 
meeting is to discuss ways forward and mobilize action in the international 
community through the United Nations in response to the escalating crisis spreading 
across the Pacific region. This crisis is the result of a series of flashpoints that have 
ratcheted up in the region, year by year, little by little. The excerpts provide a 
snapshot of the debate held between Security Council members, chaired by the Prime 
Minister of France. They feature the Prime Minister of Japan (via Videolink), the 
Foreign Minister of South Korea, the United States Secretary of State, the acting Chair 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the President of the European 
Council, the President of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 




Wednesday, 11:21 AM 
 
President of GPPAC: Sehr geehrte Vorsitzende, vielen Dank für Ihre Einladung … 
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Interpreter: Madam chair, thank you for convening this Arria meeting on the China 
Sea crisis. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for joining us here today 
to participate in this crisis meeting. As President, I am speaking on behalf of the 
GPPAC Foundation, an international organization dedicated to advancing peace in the 
world and preventing conflict. Today, I have failed in that duty following China’s 
decision to veto the Security council resolution to de-escalate the crisis in the 
region… We must rally together and by means of diplomacy prevent further 
escalation. Ensuring we can resolve the disputes will require Council members to take 
concrete action and display considerable political will in the face of a complex and 
rapidly evolving situation. 
 
We can confirm that the start of this crisis, almost a month ago, was likely accidental. 
Video footage from U.S. low-flying surveillance drones show a Chinese nuclear-
powered missile submarine, Jin Class, becoming entangled in the fishing nets of a 
Japanese trawler southwest of Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Island chain. All crew 
lost their lives as the boat was dragged under. While no one was aware then of what 
had happened exactly, it is important to indicate that this collision was likely 
accidental.  
 
Permanent representative from the PRC:  Nǚshìmen xiānshēngmen… 
Interpreter: Ladies and gentlemen, we appreciate the attention that is being paid to 
the unfortunate accident. To clarify, what is of course an unintentional omission from 
the visitor to the Security Council President of GPPAC, we vetoed a resolution seeking 
further multilateral talks for de-escalation – we remain open to bilateral negotiations. 
Further, we express our concerns that certain rogue actors appear to consider the 
event something more than an unfortunate accident… 
 
Prime Minister of Japan (via Videolink): Kore wa guuzen dewanai… 
Interpreter: (struggling to catch up) With all due respect, we do not believe this was 
accidental. China has crafted a way to push forward their coordinated, long-planned 
operation to mobilize hundreds of fishing boats and a large naval force to advance on 
the Senkaku islands and East China Sea. Likely the Paracel and Spratly islands in the 
South are next. They wanted us to retaliate, to give them an excuse to execute their 
strategy. Chinese fishing boats have had their fishing gear in the water, but for years 
now their nets and lines have been empty of fish in their own Exclusive Economic 
Zone. We have amassed enough evidence to show that their coastal and inland 
fisheries resources have been severely overfished and are in decline. Their fishing 
effort simply was, and is not, sustainable, nor is their rapidly growing domestic 
seafood consumption which now accounts for almost half of global consumption. So 
they come into our rich fishing grounds, into many other neighboring zones in fact, 
with an increasing number of boats, and illegally target our fish. It only has gotten 
worse throughout the last month.  
 
Permanent representative from the PRC:  Yǐ wǒmen de qiànyì… 
 6 
Interpreter: With our apologies, but prior to being interrupted, we were expressing 
our regrets. We agree with the Japanese representative that the fisheries around 
China are depleted, owing in no small part to the voracious appetites of our 
neighbors Japan and Korea, as well as foreign interlopers. To ignore the history of 
aggression from foreign powers near and far would of course be quite foolish. 
However, many of these concerns are moot. We fish in our territory – the Diaoyu, 
Nansha, and Xisha islands – all of which China has actively developed for many 
decades. Do we question whether Japan can fish near Honshu or Okinawa? Of course 
not. Would we expect Indonesia to defend Java and Sumatra? Absolutely. China’s 
actions must be viewed in the same light as this regarding its territorial sovereignty. 
 
Prime Minister of Japan (via Videolink): Genzai no jōkyō ni dōi shinai…  
Interpreter: This duplicity is no surprise to us. We have felt for years how Chinese 
vessels aggressively pressed into our territories for our seafood, barely held 
accountable by their government. Their government welcomed it. Fishing vessels 
entering disputed zones only strengthened China’s maritime presence. China sees 
these fishing disputes through their nationalist lens, to pursue their own agenda for 
more resources, more territory! If they truly had not wanted this conflict at sea, they 
would have steered their fisheries policy away from boosting fisheries production 
long ago, avoiding what have now been years of fishing clashes at sea to escalate like 
this. Their attempts at dis-incentivizing their fishermen from expanding operations 
have been fruitless. A vessel buy-back program to reduce fishing pressure, but at the 
same time still not really lowering fuel subsidies? They never even monitored the 
actual performance of their policies and programs: vessel tonnage kept increasing, 
Chinese fishing effort is now at an all-time high. Besides, they also have their eye on 
prominent shipping routes and natural gas and oil reserves that surround our islands. 
To try and lay official claim to our marine resources they began extensive territorial 
remodeling, bringing into being dozens of square kilometres of new land. They do not 
seem to care about working within the bounds of international law as much now, 
ignoring the UNCLOS prohibition on the use of force.  
 
Permanent representative from the PRC:  Nǚshìmen xiānshēngmen… 
Interpreter: Strange that you speak as though we are not here. And stranger yet to 
speak of ignoring international law when Japan has flouted the International Whaling 
Commission decisions for nearly a century. And let us not forget the devastation 
Japan visited upon the most valuable commercial fishery in the Pacific, relegating the 
Pacific Bluefin Tuna to a functionally extinct status. It seems that the cat weeps for 
the dead mouse – but we are not fooled by this false pretense of concern. 
 
Prime Minister of Japan (via Videolink): (In an authoritative tone) This academic 
reflection of historic perceptions is devoid of meaning in light of present events. This 
incident was deliberate – China delivered a targeted threat. So yes, we sent in our 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft Kawasaki P-1 to track the Chinese submarine after it sunk 
our trawler. Our data clearly shows that the submarine was headed further into our 
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territory. It was only once this data was available to us that we sent in our Shikishima 
vessel and its two helicopters. They were quickly met by two Chinese naval 
destroyers, sent from their nearby military station. We were left with no choice but 
to engage. Our vessel fired a warning shot over the bow of the Chinese destroyer, but 
the destroyer did not stop. It fired back, holing the coastguard cutter below the 
waterline and sinking our vessel and our men… Ladies and gentlemen, with all due 
respect, these are clear intimidation tactics threatening Japanese sovereignty. 
 
Excerpt 2 
Wednesday, 19:48 PM 
 
US Secretary of State: Thank you, Chair. Well. I think this is a good time to clearly 
state our involvement: we do not take a position on ultimate sovereignty of the 
islands. But they are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. With South Korea’s 
decision to not come to Japan’s aid and defense, we - 
 
Foreign Minister of South Korea: Ulineun tongbodoeji anh-assda... 
Interpreter: No intelligence has been shared with us. May I remind you of Japan’s 
actions undertaken against our country, starting decades ago? How can they expect 
us to come to their aid when they forced us to break the General Security of Military 
Information Agreement already in 2016? Not only that, this was followed by 
aggressive and unsafe behavior at sea, provoking and threatening us near the Yellow 
Sea. Not to mention their inability to apologize for their dogmatic behavior and 
occupation decades ago during - 
 
Chair: Please, Foreign Minister! Let us remain focused on the current situation here. 
United States Secretary of State, you have the floor. 
 
US Secretary of State: Thank you, Chair. This is not a critique of South Korea. We are 
well aware of the long-standing tensions in the region, which structure foreign 
security policy. However, the last two weeks were chaos. The aggressive seizure of 
numerous Japanese fishing vessels; last week the sinking of a Japanese Defence 
forces vessel and three Chinese coastal patrol boats; the sinking of multiple fishing 
vessels on both sides; the illegal detention of Japanese, Vietnamese and Chinese 
citizens; the destruction of an offshore oil installation that was a U.S.-Japanese joint 
venture and which is now spilling oil into the Pacific Ocean… Our U.S. Pacific Fleet 
Carrier Battle Group is still in a stand-off with a large Chinese naval contingent as we 
speak. Fortunately, as of yet, no shots have been fired (pauses).  
 
We are looking at more than 200 deaths in the region, primarily Japanese Coast 
Guard and Self Defense forces. China was clear in its message to us all this morning: it 
vetoed a Security Council Resolution calling for rapid de-escalation, refusing to 
engage in multilateral talks. China seems to view this situation as an infringement of 
their sovereignty and will stand down only once they feel the issue has been 
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adequately addressed through bilateral talks with individual countries in the region. 
With this in mind, the United States is reassessing its will and responsibility to engage 
in this conflict. 
 
Permanent representative from the PRC:  Wǒmen gǎnxiè měiguó… 
Interpreter: We thank the US representative for their recognition of Chinese 
sovereignty in these matters. Further, we appreciate the US re-emphasis on bilateral 
talks. Multi-lateral negotiations are so often derailed by tedious posturing – by 
tiresome bickering. Indeed we need look no further than the peacocks parading 
before us today. 
 
(Angry mumbling coming from the Japanese VideoLink) 
 
Excerpt 3 
Thursday, 03:19 AM 
 
President of the European Council: A short statement only, thank you Chair. We, as 
the EC, do not take any position on the sovereignty of the territories. However, we 
wish to stress the importance of multilateralism and of the rule of law. We urge the 
parties involved to cease any use of force and to not threaten Beijing any further. We 
must de-escalate this crisis using all non-violent policy means at our disposal. Moving 
out of the region temporarily will facilitate the reverting to a status-quo, and then the 
parties can seek external assistance in the form of mediation or arbitration, in a 
transparent manner. 
 
Acting Chair of ASEAN: Kami menolak cadangan yang disyorkan oleh kesatuan Eropah 
… 
Interpreter: ASEAN rejects the path laid out by the EU. Let me first thank the United 
States for being the first responder and attempting to contain the aggression as 
quickly as they did. We failed to get intra-bloc consensus within ASEAN, so we are 
only now ready to move forward with a few… proactive ASEAN states. So, ASEAN has 
invoked ‘ASEAN minus X’ from Article 21 of our Charter in this crisis. Taiwan, 
Singapore and Thailand have decided to remain neutral in this political crisis (nervous 
shuffling of papers). In any case… For many years now we have tried to peacefully 
deal with our own fishing clashes, watching as Chinese vessels moved in, looking to 
fill their boats with giant clams, sea turtles, fish that is ours, simply because their 
waters are polluted and nearly empty. Close to 80 percent of their fish stocks are 
overexploited or collapsed, they barely have feed-grade fish left to catch. We 
acknowledge some of the efforts China has made in reducing exploitative and illegal 
behavior, but agree with Japan that the measures undertaken so far are weak and 
only occasionally enforced. A closer look at the satellite imagery around, say, Subi 
and Mischief Reef shows how Chinese navy-trained fishing militia vessels have simply 
invaded the South China Sea. This persistent militia presence and their aggressive 
tactics are clear threats to our sovereignty. 
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Permanent representative from the PRC:  Zhōngguó chéngrèn ASEAN de kànfǎ… 
Interpreter: We acknowledge ASEAN’s perception of this issue, yet we do not 
recognize this criticism as legitimate. Too often in this group, the collective memory 
of past actions is conveniently brief, especially on the part of Western nations and 
their rapacious ambition. China represents the largest population in East Asia, and as 
such we will do whatever we deem necessary to feed our people. Moreover, we are 
the world’s most powerful economy, producing and consuming more than any other 
nation. We welcome other nations to our table, and we welcome friendships that 
acknowledge the benefits of harmonious cooperation with Chinese interests. 
However, we categorically reject the demand to compromise our sovereignty in any 
of these matters. Calls to do so will be ignored. 
 
Acting Chair of ASEAN: Kami menolak cadangan yang disyorkan oleh kesatuan Eropah 
… 
Interpreter: Regretfully this reaction is entirely predictable. History has shown that 
the tools we use - soft power and international law - are simply not successful in 
these sorts of disputes. ASEAN has tried too many times. You may recall that we 
came close to ratifying a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with China, but 
Beijing always challenged its binding status and continued to initiate attempts at 
bilateral talks, undermining the progress we had made as a unified group of nations. 
With this rapid escalation in the East, the Code will be neglected completely. 
Moreover, from investigations of a whale carcass stranded at Ha Tinh beach, we have 
intelligence that the Chinese Type 815 spy ship is possibly connected to a network of 
chipped marine mammals used by the Chinese government as undetectable 
underwater surveillance of the South China Sea. This is a blatant violation of our 
maritime security cooperation agreement. So, with all due respect, with China now 
having vetoed a peaceful resolution, we have exhausted all diplomatic means to 
address the crisis and military force is the only way to address the current situation. 
ASEAN minus X have decided to proactively protect our resources, our territories. 
Malaysia and Indonesia are preparing a concerted, collective approach to combat 
Chinese aggression. Their Navies are preparing to assist Japanese and US forces by all 
means necessary as we speak.  
 
Silence falls over the meeting 
 
 
3. Oceanic Decolonization - West Africa  
 
We are listening to an episode of Ubuntu Talks, a pan-African political affairs podcast 
hosted by Coura Bangura. Today, Coura will be speaking with Beyan Boakai, a 
previous master fisherman for Liberia and now representative for the West African 




Welcome to Ubuntu Talks, this is Coura Bangura. Today I am speaking with Beyan 
Boakai, the representative of Liberia for the West African Fishing Fleet, a coordinated 
fleet operating in our common EEZ, now celebrated across West Africa for his 
leadership in the fight and struggle to reclaim our fisheries and oceans. Welcome, Mr. 
Boakai. 
 
Beyan: Please, please call me Beyan.  
 
Coura: Beyan! Terrific to have you in the studio today. What a journey the past few 
years have been for you, and now here back in the studio with your battle seemingly 
won. How are you? How does it feel? 
 
Beyan: Honestly… It still feels unfinished. I am happy, ecstatic, about our ability, 
together with our friends in Mauritania, to reclaim Nouakchott last week, but I know 
the war is not won. There is still a lot of infrastructure that needs to be reviewed, also 
within the offshore oil and gas fields many of which are at least partially foreign-
owned due to loans the government could not pay off. 
 
Coura: I see, I see. It seems a much longer process than many of us would have 
fathomed when this conflict first became apparent… I remember during your last visit 
to our studio a few years ago now how relieved I was after there was finally a halt to 
the warfare at sea and a return to some sense of normalcy, but you were quick to tell 
me the battle was not over then either. Did I get that correct? 
 
Beyan: That’s right. Once we had reclaimed our oceans, pushing foreign trawlers out 
of our inshore exlusion zones and expanding those, it dawned on us that the 
revenues from our resources will continue to go to others, far away, if we do not 
reclaim our infrastructure. Our ports, processing factories. This realization, then, 
started off the process of what my wife called fisheries lawfare, and this is definitely 
an ongoing battle. But we are feeling very positive after our friends in Mauritania 
won back Nouakchott. 
 
Coura: If you will, let’s start from the beginning, before the conflict erupted. Back 
then, of course, foreign vessels fishing in our waters was described by many as a win-
win situation. A situation where both West African countries and distant foreign 
water fishing nations would benefit. What did we not understand at that time? 
 
Beyan: Well of course this was described as a win-win situation by our government, 
and governments in many neighboring West African countries at that, including 
Mauritania. Generating desperately needed public revenue, delivering skills and 
technology for access to our rich waters. All of this back then, seemed like a dream to 
many of us who were struggling to keep our heads afloat, quite literally. 
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Coura: But, even at the time many people, including the international community, 
could sense problems ahead. 
 
Beyan: Yes. But our own governments were too busy enriching themselves off the 
deal. There was significant money in the licensing fees, export fees, which basically all 
went straight into our government’s personal pet projects and rumor has it, offshore 
accounts. I mean, the China Africa Fisheries Union was an entirely Chinese-run 
organization even back then, chaired by local chapters of transnational, state-owned 
fishing companies. There was no real engagement with our local fisherpeople, the 
deal was done above our heads really. Many nations profited unfairly from our 
marine resources. Spain, Russia, China, South Korea… All were able to loot our oceans 
and feed their farmed fish off of our backs for many years. We lost billions of dollars 
each year. They did not only exploit our fisheries, but also our people… The 
horrendous conditions in which our people had to work aboard these foreign vessels, 
all for cheap fish… And the number of foreign boats just kept increasing. Until, of 
course, our movement to decolonize our oceans started. 
 
Coura: Right. Why do you think it took so long for West Africa to band together 
against this almost hostile, neo-colonial take-over of our oceans? 
 
Beyan: Well at the time there were other, bigger issues, right? Renewed political 
conflict, economic instability, the Ebola riots. The African Union was instrumental in 
ending such violence, brokering the necessary peace throughout ECOWAS - which 
was truly a turning point. If the Union had not expanded and confederated, as well as 
granting greater power to ECOWAS, we would never have been able to band 
together through unions, an important connector from the onset being CAOPA. It 
really helped that a new generation took over the leadership of the AU and had a 
genuine, grounded vision for regional unity. It laid the foundation necessary for small 
unions, CAOPA and other partners to rise up. Remember, this has not only been a 
fight to reclaim our fish and infrastructure; but also to develop beyond our national 
capacities to create a modernized fleet across the region and expand into deep-sea 
aquaculture.  
 
Coura: Right. But first, let’s go over your recollection of this revolutionary conflict 
once again for our new listeners. What do you remember most of that turning point, 
the period when this volatile conflict erupted with the Chinese, South Korean and 
Spanish boats in particular? 
 
Beyan: Well. I was leading the fisherpeople on my Yongoro 6 at the time. We all had 
had enough for a long time already. For years we could not gain access to our own 
fishing grounds, occupied by enormous, hulking mothership trawlers and their fleets 
of buzzing smaller boats posing as small-scale fishers. We were forced to buy back 
fish landed by  
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international vessels at 5 times the price. Out of frustration the rebel movement 
grew, with some fisherpeople setting up headquarters on a rusty, decommissioned 
oil rig. We had already teamed up with the vigilante Sea Wolves to make a stand and 
push away these vessels from our coasts, but many of us were losing patience. It was 
honestly feeling like a losing battle because we knew our rebellion would never make 
a difference as long as these access agreements existed, as long as foreign 
investments dominated our infrastructure and our resources. Ports, processing 
factories, fish markets… So many of it was foreign owned, often because our 
governments were not able to pay of the loans they had signed. Foreign investors 
knew this, they lied to us, they took advantage. At sea and on shore, we were treated 
as the outlaws by our own governments! We were forced to confront our own Coast 
Guard as they turned against us, paid off by our politicians and foreign investors. 
 
Coura: And then the first shots were fired… 
 
Beyan: Yes. Despite the months’ long tensions in the area, and on-and-off clashes 
between vessels, I had honestly not felt it coming. It is still difficult to talk about, also 
because what actually happened remains controversial and we are still dealing with 
the repercussions in court. But it had started earlier that week with a stabbing 
leading to the death of a local woman, Mariama Sesay, a much-loved fishtrader, over 
the prices charged by the colonizers for our own fish. Those had skyrocketed not 
least because of overexploitation, but also because of greed. There was such a 
desperate hunger for high-quality protein globally, everything good was exported and 
the scraps offered to us at exorbitant prices. It was the stabbing of Mariama that led 
a group of fisherpeople to retaliate at sea. This is when shots were fired late at night. 
No one knows exactly how it all started… There is evidence that it was the Coast 
Guard that shot first, at our own vessels, protecting foreign interests at the direction 
of the fisheries ministry… I was immediately informed through radio, and set course 
to the area right away. I was stopped by the Coast Guard, detained. Beaten. Tortured. 
(a deep note of sadness in his voice) In just 24 hours we had lost 21 fisherpeople. One 
confirmed Spanish death. Those numbers tell the real story, I think. 
 
Coura: More lives were lost over the course of those three weeks, while you were 
detained. 
 
Beyan: It was excruciating. I was not kept informed, was not allowed to attend the 
funerals of those in our community. They had no grounds to keep me detained, it was 
chaos. 
 
Coura: Things quieted down after those three weeks of on-and-off violence. What 
happened? 
 
Beyan: I was released, eventually. I came back to thousands of messages, phone calls, 
of disgruntled, angry, scared fishermen from all across West Africa. I felt it: this was 
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our time. But we had to avoid violence, we had to be smart. Use the tools of the 
colonizers against them. Not in the least because we knew we did not have the 
means to win this war on the water. We quietly, but powerfully, revolted, engaging 
with partners mainly through CAOPA as a platform . Many CAOPA members stopped 
engaging with international vessels, traders, processing facilities. Foreign products 
were boycotted. It had a ripple effect across the world: The ICIJ, ProPublica, and 
CENOZO investigative media alliance had campaigned across the west to raise 
awareness, raise the alarm. The news spread like wildfire and became known as our 
ocean decolonization fight. 
 
Coura: Under this mounting pressure, things started to change for the better. 
 
Beyan: It took a long time. After months, we finally had some politicians fighting for 
us, partially thanks to help from an increasingly stronger African Union which put 
pressure on individual governments, but mainly thanks to our strong fisherpeople. 
The Coast Guard was called back and told to show restraint, and more naval vessels 
were made available to enforce our West African Exclusive Economic Zones, in part 
supported by the U.S. Africa Command’s Security Cooperation program. Slowly but 
surely, most of the foreign vessels retreated under the mounting pressure. But, they 
still basically owned our facilities and, when criticized, said they were acting under 
the law. 
 
Coura: That’s right! After the infamous violent clashes at sea, you came to our studio 
the first time together with your Sea Wolves partner, explaining the physical fight 
might be over, but that indeed we were far from claiming back our ocean resources. 
 
Beyan: My wife was the first to make me aware. She is the brains behind that second 
phase of our ocean decolonization strategy. We had to kill the unfair access 
agreements, reclaim ownership over our fishing ports and fish processing factories. 
And we also want to stress that we are not against all foreign investments or 
partnerships! But it needed to be to the benefit of West Africa as well. The 
community, the fisherpeople, needed to be consulted and benefited. Fighting for 
transparency within fisheries access agreements between governments as well as big 
foreign companies and our governments was the first step. Many of them had only 
been established due to the shortsightedness, or sometimes outright corruption 
amongst our politicians. We advocated for the renegotiation of those access 
agreements and only establish new ones if both parties were on equal footing. My 
wife led this with success: Liberia is now in the process of establishing an 
international investment treaty with foreign interests, informed by local communities 
through consultation rounds. Transparency obligations and mandatory reporting will 
be included. We are even striving to make the reporting of beneficial ownership 
obligatory so no foreign-owned companies can front as a West-African enterprise. 
(pauses)  
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My wife… She was fearless despite all the threats we were getting. You know, we had 
to work underground, off the grid, for months because of the possibility of retaliation 
against our family. 
 
Coura: But now, months after this lawfare process as you call it had started, you have 
won some battles and with the recent reclaiming of Nouakchott, you feel optimistic? 
 
Beyan: Yes. Now our politicians are finally treating the fisheries industry as what it 
should have been all along: the lifeblood of West Africa, an engine for our future 
prosperity. It is this political support that makes me optimistic. We can finally invest 
in our future. Within the African Union we have created a shared quota system, 
allowing for greater flexibility and efficiency, and we increasingly reinvest profits 
from our fishing industry in aquaponics and community deep-sea aquaculture, 
creating more jobs. These facilities in the open ocean are really our future. Gaining 
our fishing grounds and ports back was an important step to free ourselves from 
exploitation, but we now know that aquaculture is an important part in securing 
nutritious food for generations to come. 
 
Coura: Amazing. Thank you Beyan, for your inspirational work, and continued fight in 
reclaiming our ocean resources and beyond. An honor to have you back on Ubunte 
Talks. 
 
4. Polar Renaissance – Arctic  
 
This is a speech by Sardana Nikolaev, CEO of Sakha Fishing and chair of the 
indigenous-business partner organization ‘Polar Renaissance’, held during the fifth 
anniversary of the Arctic reconciliatory meeting. All Arctic Heads of State are present 
for this meeting at the Arctic Council – from the United States of America, the Russian 
Federation, the Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, Iceland, the Republic of Finland, The 
Kingdom of Sweden, and the Kingdom of Norway - to further strengthen Arctic 
cooperation. 
 
Sardana: Today I am here to celebrate with you all. A celebration of our renewed 
international Arctic cooperation. No so long ago, we were on the brink of conflict, so 
standing here in front of the Arctic Council, with all Heads of State present, feels like 
a true victory. I am speaking today not only on behalf of my fishing company, Sakha 
Fishing, but also on behalf of ‘Polar Renaissance’, a pan-Arctic initiative by indigenous 
business leaders that is passionate about the Arctic, its people and its future. I want 
to start by reminding us all why our, though still fragile, Arctic unity is such an 
achievement. 
 
When I was young and not yet the business owner I am today, Russia was still ruled 
by Putin, and had long ignored (pauses)… Well, with apologies to my Russian 
colleagues in the room, basically welcomed some of the consequences of climate 
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change and ocean warming. The disappearance of the sea ice in the Arctic in 
particular was embraced by our politicians. It was much more rapid than any of us 
expected, of course. My Yakut ancestors, humble fisherpeople surviving mainly on 
whitefish catches, were initially wary of the changes that came so rapidly. We started 
experiencing near ice-free summers much more quickly than any models had 
suggested... (sighs). Despite this, few Russian politicians took seriously the disastrous 
consequences of these changes. The Yakut people were some of the few, together 
with some lone scientists, that witnessed first-hand some of the pervasive changes 
Siberia at large was undergoing: thinning sea ice, flooding, thawing permafrost, 
changing migration patterns of land and sea animals. Their concerns were dismissed. 
Our government and many Russian businesses, from fishing to mining to energy 
companies, instead saw a new gold rush. They thought that, at worst, some of the 
adverse effects of climate change such as the wildfires we already saw intensifying, 
could surely be managed. The promise of the Northern Sea Route, the trans-Arctic 
shipping routes, all the resources that would become available… The chance to build 
a “new palace”… it was all too good to pass up. Our government took advantage, 
started subsidizing new technologies and ocean businesses with the help of other 
interested nations from the East, and pushed into the Arctic, both economically and 
militarily. Planning for new seaport facilities, reconditioning abandoned Soviet 
military bases, mining operations, oil and gas pipelines and, of course, fishing ports 
and processing facilities. One funny story, at least in hindsight, was the hysterics and 
extreme absurdity as a Canadian Coastguard contingent and a Russian navy strike 
force led by a weapnized icebreaker, squeezed past each other while navigating the 
narrow and still treacherous Northwest Passage. During this time, the cooperation 
achieved by the Arctic Council had already started to erode.  
 
Parts of Siberia, and indeed many historically remote areas inhabited by indigenous 
people all over the Arctic, saw businesses rush in. Older generations of fisherpeople 
in Yakutia were weary, but, similar to many Inuit and Yupik people in the American, 
Canadian and Greenlandic Arctic, we had been grappling with the loss of traditional 
livelihoods and high rates of unemployment for decades. Community elders 
witnessed more and more young Yakut people being drawn in by the economic 
boom. Young Yakuts hoped it could provide some stability in an environment where 
the weather became less predictable, where sea ice was unstable and traditional 
fishing and hunting much harder to maintain. They were promised a ‘New Era of 
Prosperity´ by the government. It drove them to leave behind family businesses and 
start working for large fishing companies, in new fish processing facilities, or other 
maritime industries; back then none of them led by indigenous people. I became one 
of those young Yakuts searching for an opportunity. 
 
To my community and I, it seemed great for a few years, mainly because we were not 
aware of the ongoing political tensions or environmental destruction. We know now 
that any journalist or whistleblower coming out against the government was quickly 
silenced. Yet all industries were grappling with the consequences of tensions in the 
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changing Arctic soon enough. The oil and gas industries were first. As the retreating 
sea ice revealed more and more untapped fossil-fuel resources all over the Arctic, 
political and eventually military tensions between Russia and Norway over competing 
interests in the Barents Sea soon made the sector unstable. Russia had made clear, 
by running aggressive military exercises that it would not share the oil resources 
found in the north Barents Sea, though Norway initially claimed part of it. Under 
pressure from its domestic politics that were distinctly anti-fossil fuel, Norway 
eventually backed down, and Russia thought itself unchallenged to claim these 
resources…  
 
Also within the fishing industry, this is when I first started in the sector, executives 
seemed initially excited about changes to the Arctic ecosystem: the continuous 
increase of boreal fish predators such as cod was welcomed as a gift. But after the 
regulations on Arctic fishing were officially abandoned in 2034 and the fiction of 
exploratory fishing was exposed for what it was, everyone suddenly had fishing 
vessels in the Arctic, and illegal fishing was rampant. The influx of new species 
continued, but so did the influx of commercial fishing vessels, from all Arctic states. 
Without any legal framework, there was not much any country could do. An 
exponential increase in competition for Arctic fish created tensions in the area 
between fishing fleets. This is when I first became aware of just how politicized and 
dangerous the business I was in was becoming without a rulebook to guide us. . The 
danger became particularly tangible when Russia assigned next generation naval 
vessels to accompany our boats to scare off competitors, occasionally ramming 
boats. Sometimes Chinese vessels were employed to accompany our fishing boats, 
keen to protect the investments Beijing had made in the Russian fisheries business as 
part of their Polar Silk Road plan. It all culminated in a near month-long stand-off just 
outside the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone, where Norway had detained four 
vessels that, allegedly, had made incursions into the Norwegian zone. Three of the 
vessels were Russian-flagged, one Chinese. Russia and Norway came close to military 




‘POP’! Then the carbon bubble burst. Oil and gas prices collapsed to precipitous lows 
almost overnight. This happened much, much faster than economists were 
projecting. The European central bank, followed by a large number of pension funds 
and other institutional investors, rapidly divested from all fossil fuel assets in an 
unstoppable cascade. Insurance companies stopped offering coverage for oil and gas 
exploration, and simultaneously two international oil companies announced plans to 
completely transition to renewables. The era of fossil fuels was over… Again, 
apologies to my Russian colleagues, but we all knew that the Russian economy was 
vulnerable, that it was a petro-state which had been a haven for crony capitalism… 
Russia had not invested in developing new industries or new institutions, but had 
focused solely on military expenditure. I have to say, the fact that I can stand here 
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and speak these words without fear of being poisoned (glances nervously at the 
Russian diplomats in the room) is a testament to the fundamental changes that have 
been going on ever since in Russian society. In any case, investment in Russian 
companies by the Arctic states was completely brought to a halt. And so, Russia, 
unlike ever before, started struggling with skyrocketing national debt. Due to Russia’s 
extreme increase in military spending, in anticipation of securing revenues from 
unexploited Arctic resources, it had quickly ran through its accumulated reserves, and 
then steadily racked up national debt which got close to 80% of its GDP.  
 
My sector, the fishing sector, was also hit hard by these developments. The Russian 
government could no longer afford to subsidise the large and overextended Russian 
fishing fleet and without state support it fragmented and splintered. To make things 
worse, China came in to repossess the assets it had invested in. Unemployment, 
soaring inflation and loss of confidence in the banking system put huge pressure on 
the government, which struggled to manage the situation. As we know, the Russian 
Federation was finally backed into a corner and sought rescue from the newly green-
tinged International Monetary Fund, granted of course only under stringent 
conditions. Russia was not only forced into beginning a process of fundamental 
economic transformation, but also to stop and even reverse its military build-up in 
the Arctic. Now, that weaponized icebreaker which I spoke about is part of the same 
outdoor museum in Murmansk as the Lenin, the soviet nuclear powered icebreaker, 
that was launched during another period of extreme hubris, in 1957.  
 
At just about this time, I had worked my way up to become CEO of Sakha Fishing, and 
struggled to steer my company through the mounting financial pressure and 
increasing illegal fishing as still more vessels moved into the Arctic. In all this turmoil, 
the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat had remained united, hosting annual meetings to 
voice indigenous peoples’ rights in the Arctic. I attended because I had hoped that 
with the Russian economic meltdown, the chaos in the fishing industry and the new 
reality of climate change, new Yakut business opportunities would be part of those 
discussions. Amazingly, already in that first, long meeting, we discussed a pan-Arctic 
indigenous-business alliance ‘Polar Renaissance’, which would be supported by the 
Secretariat as part of a larger reconciliation process. With Polar Renaissance and the 
Secretariat, we negotiated for Norway, Canada and Sweden to create a joint Arctic 
trust fund supporting indigenous-led transformation initiatives in the entire Arctic, 
including business, as part of a climate reparations agreement. This transformed the 
living conditions and future prospects not only for many Russian indigenous people, 
but indigenous communities all over the Arctic. It ultimately set off the ongoing 
institutional transformation we see today. 
 
Now we are celebrating the fifth anniversary of our first Arctic Reconciliation 
meeting. At that meeting, we recognized our common history, highlighted current 
achievements and created a vision for the next 50 years based on our shared 
humanity and our desire to secure and nourish our collective wellbeing. We are 
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working towards the ratification of the Arctic Treaty that Russia is now also part of. 
As part of the Arctic treaty negotiations, we hope to not only set up a body to 
manage our fisheries, overseeing all the high seas of the Arctic Ocean, but make 
sustainability performance and corporate social performance with respect to 
indigenous communities an obligation for ALL enterprises operating in the Arctic. 
Collectivily, we are building towards a better future together, but in recognition of 
our 150 year vision, we also need to recognize the new challenges that continue to 
emerge. For my own industry, mercury, trapped for thousands of years in permafrost, 
is a serious threat, slowly seeping into our Arctic foodwebs. The Arctic has changed 
and will continue to change. But, with a united Arctic, we stand a chance. Thank you 
all for listening.  
 
SI: Alternative pathways 
 
1. Scramble for the Atlantic - North-East Atlantic 
- Great Britain’s economy crashes following Brexit, prompting its citizens to 
overwhelmingly vote to rejoin the EU. After several years, the EU allows them to 
rejoin as a member state and the UK then collaborates with the other EU states as 
well as Iceland and Norway to modernize the management of the stocks in the North-
East Atlantic, making their strategies resilient to climatic changes.  
- Brexit proves to be a success for Great Britain, and it manages to negotiate with 
other Coastal States for extra stock quotas based on the principle of zonal 
attachment. Strict controls on fishing by foreign vessels are implemented in its EEZ, 
best practices in fisheries management are adopted and considerable investments 
made in technological advancements (e.g. sophisticated ecosystem models that 
optimize harvest strategies). These measures result in a more sustainable fishery, 
without conflict with neighboring states.  
- Great Britain fails to negotiate extra stock quotas after Brexit, and due to the loss of 
the EU as its main export market, the profitability of its fisheries greatly declines. As a 
result, Great Britain turns to various warm water species that have become more 
abundant due to climate change. These stocks become part of lucrative catch-and-
release recreational fisheries. Inshore fishing grounds are largely protected as nursery 
grounds for those species, to increase biodiversity, to act as natural carbon stores 
and to protect coasts. Only a few large commercial offshore fishing vessels remain, 
mainly targeting pelagic species. Other Coastal States start to look at this new 
approach with increasing interest 
 
2. Remodeled Empire - East China Sea  
China takes renewed control over its fisheries sector, reducing the amount of 
overfishing and fishing vessel incursions from Chinese actors. China’s marine sector 
would shrink due to reduced landings, effectively following in the footsteps of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. This paradigm shift in the country’s food security strategy 
(this is: letting go of the idea of self-sufficiency in fish supplies) would occur through 
several policy changes. China effectively executes on its plans to cull down its fishing 
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fleet and total catches over the next years, partially through setting and enacting 
tougher penalties on illegal fishing, the poaching of endangered species and marine 
pollution. The labor force within wild-capture fisheries would continue to shrink, and 
China would heavily invest money in tackling issues associated with aquaculture, 
boosting the sector.  
 
3. Oceanic Decolonization - West Africa  
- West African governments try to squeeze as much revenue out of already 
overexploited fisheries as possible. Rural fishery communities feel the pressure and 
continue to struggle. Urbanization pulls young people from the communities to 
cities, where more profits can be made. Fishing activity slowly declines and the 
system grinds on at a bio equilibrium. Fisheries dwindle, becoming less attractive 
even to foreign fleets as they are no longer profitable. 
- China shifts its food security strategy and offers West African governments to stop 
harvesting fish in the area with their own vessels in exchange for exclusive sourcing 
agreements to feed their growing population. China would focus on processing and 
exporting fish harvested from West Africa and pull out its trawlers from the region. 
This, however, negatively influences local food security as it drives up fish prices in 
West African markets. 
 
4. Polar Renaissance – Arctic 
- Tensions between the States become even more strained due to two issues. First, 
growing ship traffic along the Northern Sea Route causes force-on-force situations 
along the straits. Russia and Canada are on one side of the issue, and the USA and 
the EU on the other side. The latter group views the straits as “common heritage of 
mankind”, while the former group wants to maintain their exclusive national 
jurisdiction over these sea lanes. The straits issue becomes another source of 
interstate conflict in the region. Second, the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard 
(where a large part of the population is Russian), its surrounding continental shelf 
and Fisheries Protection Zone becomes a source for Norway-Russia conflict. 
- A major oil spill north of Siberia occurs either due to a tanker collision, a blowout on 
an offshore installation or a rupture in a pipeline. Given the vulnerability of the 
Arctic marine environment, this effectively puts an end to commercial fishing in 
large parts of the region. 
 
SI Methods: Workshop 
 
The expert workshop (titled Governing Resource Conflict in the Anthropocene) took 
place in Santa Barbara, California at the NCEAS facilities from the 22nd to 25th of 
November, 2018. The workshop consisted of 11 research scientists with expertise in 
environmental politics and governance, climate-conflict studies, ecology, human 
geography, fisheries and international law (Table 1). The organizers and facilitators 
(Jessica Spijkers and Tiffany Morrison) oversaw the selection of participants to ensure 
disciplinary breadth and gender balance (6 females, 4 males).  
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The topic of study was initially outlined to the experts in background material sent to 
them before the workshop. The material included specific questions to prime the 
experts such as: 
• What are the anticipated drivers (e.g. scarcity, climate change, population 
pressures) of future resource conflicts? 
• In which socioeconomic and environmental contexts can we expect anticipated 
conflict to spark wider social and political disruption? 
• Can we reasonably expect more conflict over natural resources in the future (taking 
into account multiple temporal and spatial scales), or could current conflicts be 
catalysts for peacebuilding? 
• Are there governance interventions or mechanisms to anticipate, prevent, or 
indeed harness conflict and its impacts? 
 
The exercises described below were interspersed with four presentations by different 
participants to stimulate thoughts, creativity and communication. Topics include: 
policy conflict and natural resources and conflict; climate change and conflict; 
conflict, food, fisheries and climate; and conflict and development. 
 
 
Table 1: Fields of expertise of workshop participants 
Expertise (Background as well as current role) relevant to the topic Number of 
participants 
Climate-security/conflict  4 
Development studies 5  
Environmental governance 6  
Fisheries science 4  
International law 2  
Climate-ocean interactions 2  
Human geography 1  
Sustainability science 4  
 
The workshop comprised 4 exercises designed to extract the data used in this paper, 
all of which was stored immediately on a shared drive: 
1. Exercise 1: defining conflict (1hr) 
Output data: A shared understanding of the types of fisheries conflicts that 
exist. 
Exercise: Participants worked in groups (3 groups of 3-4 people, selected at 
random) to address the following questions, by writing responses on cards and 
then discussing the answers in small groups (30min): What type of conflict has 
been part of/the main focus of your research? What other types of conflict 
related to natural resources do you think exist or could commence in the 
 21 
future or have you come across in other works? Each group then explained 
their data, the wider group discussed and we put answers on a poster. We 
filled in the type of resource, scale of conflict, and potential geographical 
location. The poster was discussed in the wider group in order to come to a 
shared definition of conflict. 
 
2. Exercise 2: Identification of the current drivers of fisheries conflict (1hr) 
Output data: A list of the drivers (social, economic, political and 
environmental) of fisheries conflict as defined in exercise 1. 
Exercise: Participants formed 3 groups and wrote 2-3 key driving forces (this 
amount was chosen to avoid cognitive overload (Miller 1994, Gross 2012)) for 
conflict (the specific kinds of conflict resultant from exercise 1) on cards. 
Historical and current trends for each driver were also discussed in the groups 
(e.g. has the driver been slowing down or speeding up, with participants 
choosing their own time perspectives). 
Each group did 3 rounds (all three were the same format), and together 
clustered the drivers in themes as they saw fit (social, economic, political, 
environmental). Afterwards, in a plenary session, we combined the driving 
forces on a whiteboard. One group at a time, all drivers that came out of the 
previous exercise was shared with the group and added to the wall (by 
participant). They gave a brief explanation of why they think this driver is 
relevant. The facilitator asked what overarching category (social, political, 
environmental or economic) this driver belonged to, what effect the driver has 
on the type of conflict and if the driver has historically been slowing down or 
speeding up. At the end, we discussed in group whether any drivers needed to 
be added. 
 
3. Exercise 3: Identification of how drivers of conflict are expected to change 
into the future (1hr) 
Output data: Explorative combinations of conflict drivers and their possible 
outcomes. 
Exercise: To explore the space of future uncertainty, participants were asked 
to think of new combinations of drivers that possibly lead to potentially new 
sources of conflict. The participants worked in random groups of 2 where 
every pair picked at random two (or three, to make sure we used all cards) 
driver cards from the previous exercise. The couples then had a free-form 12-
minute brainstorm session on how that combination of drivers could lead to 
already identified as well as new types of conflict in the future. They then 
share all their identified combinations in plenary to discuss how they would 
function. We performed three rounds of this. Then divided in three new 
groups, participants discussed each set of driver combinations we identified 
earlier to identify where (geographically) they would foresee these changes 
happening, and at what scale. This was then discussed in plenary group by 
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group. All discussed combinations of drivers were recorded and later used to 
explore possible future interactions amongst drivers within the four narratives. 
 
4. Exercise 4: Identification of governance options appropriate and effective for 
managing the identified current and future types of conflicts and/or their 
drivers (2hrs).  
Output data: List of governance structures, practices and interventions that 
could either help prevent or de-escalate fisheries conflict. 
Exercise: Participants, individually, took 10 minutes to think about questions 
below: 
• What kind of governance structures are these (ones that already exist, but 
otherwise not defined)?  
• On what scale do they exist and are they place/resource specific?  
• How do they address/cope with the current and future conflict types and 
their changing drivers? Are they successful? 
They reported back in plenary where it was discussed in free-form. Later two 
smaller groups of participants discussed currently non-existing governance 
structures that could be developed in the future for conflict mitigation. The 
groups reported back in plenary where it was discussed in free-form. 
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